POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AS MORAL VIGILANCE

by

SEAN T. STEVENS

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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By SEAN T. STEVENS

Dissertation Director:

Lee Jussim

Social Psychological research generally concludes that political ideology is an outcome variable, dependent on our underlying psychological motivations. In the following paper, I propose a model of political ideology as moral vigilance – a general preparedness to detect moral transgressions of the values one highly emphasizes. This perspective integrates Moral Foundations Theory with Error Management Theory and is developed and tested in two studies. Study 1 replicates and extends research indicating that the Moral Foundations predict a wide variety of social and political attitudes, over and above demographic and cognitive flexibility variables. In particular, the Moral Foundations of Sanctity, Fairness, and Liberty appear to underlie many social and political attitudes within the United States. In Study 2 two statements, one ambiguously prejudiced statement and one ambiguously unpatriotic statement, made by an unknown individual in a television interview were presented. Two patterns of results emerged. First, those who placed a high emphasis on Loyalty found both statements offensive and desired greater social distance from the speaker. Second, those who placed a high emphasis on Fairness (Liberty) appeared to infer similarity with the person who made the ambiguously unpatriotic (prejudiced) comment and reported the speaker was educated, in effect granting the speaker psychological standing for their position.

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Political Ideology as Moral Vigilance

Historically, social psychologists have demonstrated considerable interest in how people construe events in their social environment, with the bulk of this scholarship concluding social perception is riddled with error and bias (see, e.g., Jussim, 2012; Jussim, Stevens, & Salib, 2011). Ideology[1] is often considered a source of this error and bias because it can distort the perception of social reality. This contention can be traced to Marx and Engels (1848/1998), who defined ideology as a propagandistic belief system employed by the dominant class in a society to quell political dissent and prevent revolution. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) integrated Freudian approaches to the impact of unconscious drives and motivations on human behavior with Marxist theory on ideology, a fusion that has influenced much of the subsequent social psychological literature (e.g., Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996; Duckitt, 2001; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Research on the psychological underpinnings of ideology tends to emphasize the potential psychological mechanisms underlying defense of the societal status quo (e.g., current socioeconomic relations; Adorno, et al., 1950; see also, Jost, 2006; Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008)[2] and considers conservatism a psychological mechanism that distorts social perception and quells the desire for egalitarian social change (e.g., Jost, et al., 2003; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Yet, understanding much about the psychology of conservatism does not provide a complete picture of the psychological factors that potentially underlie ideology, it simply provides us with insight into the psychological factors

underlying conservatism. I do not dispute the link between conservatism and resistance to egalitarian social change, yet in contrast to much of the prior social psychological literature on the topic, I propose conservatism is not the only ideology which distorts social perception. All ideologies tell a story about the society one lives in and help an individual make sense of the current sociopolitical environment. They usually define a problem or obstacle to overcome, heroes who pursue this goal, villains who stand in the way, a conflict, and a desired resolution (e.g., Graham & Haidt, 2012; Westen, 2007; see also, Lakoff, 1996; Martin, Scully, & Levitt, 1990). Different ideologies produce different interpretations of past and current sociopolitical realities, and often offer different solutions to mass-scale social organization dilemmas and thus, contrasting, moral visions of what the proper goals of society are and how these goals should achieved.

I further suggest that, across many social contexts people are motivated by a desire to protect and/or establish this preferred moral order (e.g., Bell, 1976; Haidt, 2012; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). Morality fosters the development of groups and communities by creating a moral matrix, "an interlocking set of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible" (Haidt, 2008, p. 70). A philosophy (e.g., utilitarianism), an ideology (e.g., conservatism, liberalism), and/or a religious belief system (e.g., Buddhism, Christianity, Judaism, Islam) all constitute examples of this interlocking set. Different moral matrices can shape our attitudes and beliefs about the world in different ways.

For instance, what constitutes a fair allocation of resources? Should this allocation be based on equity (i.e., those who put in more effort get more), equality (i.e., all people get the same amount), or need (i.e., those who need the most get the most)? Liberalism[3] and conservatism do not generally answer this question in the same way.

Since morality is central to our self-concept (e.g., Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007; Wojciszke, 2005) we possess a strong desire to protect our identity, in the public and private realms, from moral transgression and contamination (Belk, Wallendorf, & Sherry, 1989; Tetlock, et al., 2000). This is similar to the view of Edelman (1964) who suggested all people find something threatening in the sociopolitical domain and that this threat is always present:

> "That one man's reassurance is another's threat guarantees that threat will always be present for all men. It may be imminent or it may be a potentiality to brood about, but the threatening trends naturally loom larger than the reassuring ones" (Edelman, 1964, p. 13).

Thus, most social perceivers, regardless of ideology, are vigilant for threatening sociopolitical stimuli that "naturally loom larger" than non-threatening stimuli. This suggests people may exaggerate the presence of threat in the sociopolitical domain. Edelman did not make explicit reference to ideology nor did he describe how the psychological foundations of this perceiver readiness (e.g., Bruner, 1957; Bruner & Goodman, 1947; Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994) develop.

The proposed model builds on Edelman's (1964) foundation. It is grounded in Moral Foundations Theory (e.g., Graham, et al., 2009; Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2009), research on moral conviction (e.g., Goodwin & Darley, 2008, 2012; Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Snell, 2010) and moral attribution (e.g., Morgan, Mullen & Skitka, 2010; Jones & Fitness, 2008; Reeder & Coovert, 1986; Reeder & Spores, 1983; Trafimow, 2001; Wojciszke & Szymkow, 2003), and Error Management Theory (Haselton & Buss, 2000; Haselton & Nettle, 2006). Error management is based on the logic of signal detection (e.g., MacMillan & Creelman, 1990; Swets, Tanner, & Birdsall, 1961) and contends that when decisions are made under uncertainty and the cost of an error is asymmetrical, we are biased towards committing the error that is perceived as less costly. To be clear, error management biases refer to detection thresholds, and not errors in judgment. They are analogous to a smoke detector (see, Nesse, 2005), in the case of detecting a potential fire it is better to commit a false alarm (i.e., alarm sounds when there is no fire) than a miss (i.e., alarm does not sound when there is a fire).

What is perceived as moral, just, and good for one person may be perceived as immoral, unjust, and evil for another. Thus, most ideologies are concerned with some type of threat and are employed to manage occurrence of and/or exposure to this threat. Most ideologies are therefore a form of moral vigilance – a psychological state of perceiver readiness that consists of a collection of attitudes, behaviors, and cognitive biases that reduce the risk of personal exposure to moral transgression and moral contamination (see, Jones & Fitness, 2008)[4] – that monitors the sociopolitical domain for moral transgression.

This type of perceiver readiness can be considered a form of error management (e.g., Haselton & Buss, 2000; Haselton & Nettle, 2006) in the social domain.

Overview

This introduction proceeds in four parts. The first part provides a brief historical overview of the term ideology and explores how it became synonymous with distortion of social perception. The second reviews social psychological approaches to ideology, all of which consider ideology an outcome variable, dependent on psychological intuitions, motivations, and/or needs (Adorno, et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996; Duckitt, 2001; Haidt & Graham, 2009; Jost, et al., 2003; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The third part reviews Moral Foundations Theory (e.g., Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2009) and its application to ideology and political attitudes, and integrates this literature with research on moral attributions and judgments (e.g., Goodwin & Darley, 2008, 2012; Jones & Fitness, 2008; Reeder & Coovert, 1986; Reeder & Spores, 1983; Trafimow, 2001; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998; Wojciszke & Szymkow, 2003; see also, Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). The fourth part briefly reviews Error Management Theory (e.g., Haselton & Buss, 2000; Haselton & Nettle, 2006), integrates it with the research on Moral Foundations Theory and moral attributions and judgments, and proposes a theoretical perspective of ideology as moral vigilance.

<u>The Marriage of Ideology and Distortion: A Brief History</u>

The term ideology first appeared in the writings of French Philosopher Antoine Destutt de Tracy near the end of the 18th century and was defined as a science of ideas. However, upon Napoleon's rise to power the term quickly took on a pejorative connotation, as he characterized political rivals as "ideologues" and labeled their ideas false and subversive. Marx and Engels (1848/1998) subsequently offered two different definitions of the term. The first, fairly benign definition, referred to any abstract, internally coherent belief system used to make sense of one's social environment. The second, more critical and pejorative form, cast ideology as a propagandistic belief system that systematically distorts social perception.

Although Marx and Engels (1848/1998) offered two definitions of ideology, they ultimately emphasized the more critical and pejorative form. They suggested all features of a society – its social classes, political and religious structures, and ideologies – were an outgrowth of its economic activity (e.g., Marx, 1859/1992). The dominant ideas of a society (in their case a blend of classical liberalism with laissez faire capitalism) achieve their status through developments in the economic realm. These ideas are supported and perpetuated by the ruling class in order to rationalize and maintain the current socioeconomic structure. Ideology is therefore false and subversive because it narrowly reflects the interests of the ruling class, rather than the interests of society as whole, and blinds people to their own exploitation. In order to overcome ideology, class interests within a society must be eliminated.

The viewpoint advanced by Marx and Engels (1848/1998) can be characterized as a critical approach to ideology. Critical approaches generally consider ideology as motivated to either defend the societal status quo (e.g., current socioeconomic relations) or oppose it (see, e.g., Jost, 2006; Jost, et al., 2008). The term "right-wing" or conservative is generally employed to describe the former ideological stance while "left-wing" or liberal is reserved for the latter. The terms right-wing and left-wing have their origins in the French Revolution when, at the time, supporters of the regime happened to sit on the right side of the legislative assembly while the opponents of the regime sat on the left.

Subsequent theorists (e.g., Althusser, 1969; Lenin, 1902/1969) expanded the scope of ideology beyond the socioeconomic realm and considered it the basis for all social and political action. The notion that ideology was false and only representative of the socioeconomic interests of the ruling class was downplayed. Althusser (1969) suggested that ideology helped an individual make sense of the world and considered it indispensable because it helped people band together and provided a mechanism for socialization into a community. Because ideology possesses beneficial social functions it would not disappear with the elimination of class interests. Although this represents somewhat of a departure from Marx and Engels (1848), Althusser does contend that people are generally unaware when their actions, beliefs, and behaviors are ideological and thus retains the idea that ideology distorts social perception.

The psychological model of ideology proposed in this dissertation adopts a similar view. It considers all ideologies, regardless of whether they resist or

endorse social change, a collection of interrelated attitudes, beliefs, and values that provide an account of current sociopolitical reality offering explanations for how it came to be, and proposing how this reality can be bettered. Importantly, the proposed approach is descriptive, in that it attempts to describe how different ideologies come to perceive and describe sociopolitical reality in a particular way and why they may proscribe, at times, vastly different solutions to perceived social problems. The solutions each ideology proscribes are constrained by how the sociopolitical environment is interpreted and explained. The proposed approach is not normative, in that it does not seek to promote or condemn the moral concerns and judgments associated with any ideology.

<u>Social Psychological Approaches to Ideology</u>

The pioneering work of Adorno, et al. (1950) offered an integration of critical approaches to ideology with Freudian approaches to the impact of unconscious drives and motivations on human behavior. Their work on the authoritarian personality constitutes one of first psychological investigations of ideology (see also, Fromm, 1941; Reich, 1933/1980) and their conclusions have influenced much of the subsequent social psychological research on the topic. Briefly, Adorno, et al., consider ideology a unidimensional construct, organized along a single left-right dimension or continuum. The left pole of this continuum is anchored by progressive, egalitarian, and democratic attitudes while the right pole is anchored by a resistance to progressive social change and pro-fascistic attitudes.

Many subsequent theoretical approaches retain the undimensional conceptualization of Adorno, et al. and broadly conceptualize individual differences in ideology to be the result of variance in preferences for change versus stability, a tension that is often related to preference for hierarchy versus equality. In other words, although social psychological perspectives on ideology may diverge on what psychological factors underlie ideology, they tend to converge on the idea that ideology reflects an individual's preference for or resistance to social change (e.g., Adorno, et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996; Jost, et al., 2003; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; see also, Wilson, 1973). The following section briefly reviews the authoritarian personality (Adorno, et al., 1950); Right-Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996), Social

Dominance Theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), System Justification Theory and the view of conservatism as motivated social cognition (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, et al., 2003). Additionally, Duckitt's (2001) multidimensional dual-process model of ideology and prejudice and Tetlock's (1986; Tetlock, et al., 2000) value pluralism model are also reviewed.

The Authoritarian Personality

Adorno, et al. (1950) hypothesized that a generalized prejudice towards outgroups was a manifestation of an underlying personality dimension. To measure this dimension, Adorno, et al. developed a scale, subsequently labeled the Fascism Scale (or F-Scale), that did not mention any group by name and thus, did not appear to measure prejudice. It was quickly realized that the F-Scale scale measured antidemocratic tendencies. Adorno, et al. hypothesized that this generalized prejudice was caused by an underlying personality syndrome, which they referred to as the authoritarian personality. The concept of the authoritarian personality is generally referred to as authoritarianism. One of Adorno, et al.'s (1950) major findings was that authoritariansim, ingroup glorification, political and economic conservatism, and support for profascist attitudes often covary. They concluded that this covariation was a manifestation of the authoritarian personality and proposed that authoritarianism was motivated by fear and aggressiveness to seek order, stability, and control over their environment. Psychological needs for order, stability, and control purportedly motivated an individual to adopt right-wing ideologies in the face of threat and anxiety.

Theoretical and methodological critiques of the authoritarian personality quickly emerged (see, Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996; Christie, 1954; Rokeach, 1960; Shils, 1954). Christie (1954), Shils (1954), and Rokeach (1960) objected to the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis. Rokeach (1960) proposed a concept of general authoritarianism focused on the cognitive rigidity of people's belief systems and developed an alternative measure of authoritarianism, the Dogmatism Scale (D-Scale). The D-Scale however suffered from many of the same methodological flaws as the F-Scale (reviewed in more detail below). Additionally, and in contrast to Rokeach's (1960) hypotheses, higher dogmatism scores were frequently found among right-wing political groups (Barker, 1963; Direnzo, 1968; Rokeach, 1960) *and* often positively correlated with authoritarianism (Barker, 1963; Granberg & Corrigan, 1972).

Because all the items of the F-Scale were written in the pro-trait direction (i.e., agreement indicated higher authoritarianism) Altemeyer (1981) hypothesized the items were subject to acquiescence bias (see, e.g., Krosnick, 1999). He demonstrated that the F-Scale's format increased its internal consistency and reliability, that unidirectional measures of prejudice obtained much stronger correlations with the F-Scale than bidirectional measures, and that the F-Scale did not demonstrate unidimensionality when acquiescence was controlled for. As a result, Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996) has called into question conclusions from research that employed the F-Scale as a measure of authoritarianism. This critique was also leveled against Rokeach's (1960) D-Scale because the

phenomenon of acquiescence bias can explain its surprising positive correlation with the F-Scale.

Despite the theoretical and methodological flaws of the authoritarian personality approach, many later approaches (e.g., Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996; Jost, et al. 2003; Rokeach, 1960; Wilson, 1973) have accepted the basic assumption of unidimensionality. More importantly, the fusion of Marxist and Freudian theories influenced much of the subsequent social psychological research on ideology. The idea that ideology attracts people on the basis of their underlying psychological intuitions, motivations and needs provides a mechanism for the dominant class to employ ideology as a tool to distort social perception and thus quell the desire for egalitarian social change. As social psychology in general became increasingly interested in errors and bias in social perception (see, e.g., Jussim, 2012; Jussim, et al., 2011) a practice of "singling out political conservatives for specific study" (Jost, et al., 2003, p. 339) also emerged.

Right-Wing Authoritarianism

Altemeyer (1981) rejects the Freudian foundation of Adorno, et al. (1950) and proposes a social-learning approach to authoritarianism. The authoritarian personality was reformulated as right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), a manifestation of three co-varying attitudinal clusters. 1) Authoritarian submission: submission to authorities perceived as established and legitimate; 2) Authoritarian aggression: general aggressiveness, directed towards various outgroups, that is believed to be sanctioned by established authorities; and, 3) Conventionalism: a

high degree of adherence to the social conventions perceived to be endorsed by society (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996). Attitudinal clusters are defined as "orientations to respond in the same way toward certain classes of stimuli (namely established authorities, targets for sanctioned aggression, and social conventions)" (Altemeyer, 1988, p. 3), and an orientation to respond is distinguished from an actual behavioral response, which requires the presence of certain situational factors (e.g., perceived social deviance, perceived threats to social order and/or stability). Importantly, Altemeyer's (1981, 1988, 1996) RWA scale is not subject to acquiescence bias and provides a more methodologically sophisticated and statistically robust measure of authoritarianism than the F-Scale.

High scorers on the RWA scale tend to hold self-contradictory beliefs and display double standards in their judgments. They are especially likely to submit to the will of established authorities, act aggressively towards those who constitute threats to established authorities, hand out harsher sentencing decisions to social deviants (e.g., hippies, prisoners) than to established authorities (e.g., businessman, prison guard) when the same crime is committed, and strongly adhere to a culture's traditional norms and values (see, Altemeyer 1981, 1988, 1996). High RWA's are also more likely to consider the social environment as dangerous, unpredictable and threatening (Altemeyer, 1988, 1996; Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt, Wagner, Du Plessis, & Birum, 2002; Sibley & Duckitt, 2010). They report higher levels of ethnocentrism, nationalism, and prejudice, particularly towards homosexuals (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996), and endorse violence towards perceived social deviants (e.g., homosexuals, abortionists, religious cults)

particularly if such violence is sanctioned by recognized authorities (Altemeyer, 1996). This suggests that, for individuals high in RWA, diversity may be an indicator that traditional norms and values are being undermined and require defense (Feldman, 2003).

Additionally, high scores on the RWA scale are associated with opposition to environmentalism, abortion rights, services for AIDS patients and homeless people, and diversity programs on college campuses. They also tend to report greater pro-capitalist attitudes (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996; Doty, Peterson, & Winter, 1991; Peterson, Doty, & Winter, 1993). Religious indoctrination policies are endorsed if the teaching promotes their religion but vociferously opposed if another religion is promoted (Altemeyer, 1996). Covert government activities (e.g., illegal wiretapping, illegal drug raids, denial of right to assemble; Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996; Doty, et al., 1991; Peterson, et al., 1993) and the use of preemptive warfare (Crowson, Debacker, & Thoma, 2006; McFarland, 2005) are endorsed if they are proposed by established, recognized authorities.

Duckitt (2001) and Feldman (2003) note that research on authoritarianism often begins with the assumption that the observed consistencies between ingroup favoritism (e.g., nationalism), intolerance, and conservatism is a function of an underlying personality dimension. Yet, the items of the F-Scale and the RWA scale do not assess behavioral tendencies or reactions as most personality assessments do (see, e.g., Duckitt, 2001; Feldman, 2003; Feldman & Stenner, 1997) and, instead, assess generalized social attitudes and beliefs. Alternatively therefore, the observed consistencies may reflect current sociopolitical conflicts

(Feldman, 2003) and/or be driven by a person's underlying values and worldview (Duckitt, 2001). Altemeyer (1998) acknowledges the attitudinal content of the RWA scale but maintains that the responses represent direct expressions of personality.

Duckitt (2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008) further challenges Altemeyer's (1998) contention that RWA represents an underlying personality dimension on empirical grounds. Societal instability, economic uncertainty, and sociopolitical changes all increase RWA (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov, & Duarte, 2003; Liu, Huang, McFriedes, 2008). This is consistent with archival and naturalistic data that suggest societal expressions of authoritarianism (e.g., conversion to more orthodox churches, support for increased police funding) increase under conditions of societal and/or economic threat (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Rickert, 1998; Sales, 1972, 1973). Additionally, people's experience over time (e.g., higher education, becoming a parent) impacts RWA levels (Altemeyer, 1996). Lastly and perhaps most importantly, RWA scores correlate weakly with the, well-established, "Big Five" of personality (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). RWA may therefore, be better conceptualized as an interrelated set of ideological attitudes and beliefs (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010).

Social Dominance Theory

Social Dominance Theory (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) proposes all human societies that can produce an

economic surplus develop group-based social hierarchies. These group-based

hierarchies are characterized by one or a small number of dominant, high status

groups at the top. High status groups possess a disproportionate share of positive

social value (e.g., economic and political power, social status) compared to

subordinate, low status groups. This hegemonic relationship can be maintained

through two primary methods, the threat or actual use of force, or the control of

societal discourse. The latter method is generally preferred because it minimizes

conflict and violence. To control societal discourse the dominant group or groups

often employ hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths, which provide justification

for the current structure of a group-based social hierarchy. The term myth is not

meant to imply falsity. Rather the term myth refers to the appearance of truth

because enough people in society share the belief that the myth is true (see,

Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Social Dominance Theory also proposes the existence

of hierarchy-attenuating myths, which delegitimize the current group-based social

hierarchy.

Broadly, legitimizing myths are defined as "values, attitudes, beliefs,

causal attributions, and ideologies that provide moral and intellectual justification

for social practices that either increase, maintain, or decrease levels of social

inequality among social groups" (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p. 104). Examples of

hierarchy-enhancing myths include the Protestant Work Ethic, nationalism,

negative stereotypes, and conservatism. Examples of hierarchy-attenuating myths

include the U.S. Declaration of Independence, socialism, communism, feminism,

and the universal rights of man (see, Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The acceptance or

rejection of specific legitimizing myths is primarily determined by an individual's

social dominance orientation (SDO), defined as one desire's for group-based

social hierarchy (Pratto, et al., 1994) and is measured by the SDO scale (e.g.,

Pratto, et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

One's level of SDO is thought to be influenced by at least three major

factors. Initially, people are born with temperamental predispositions and

personalities that partially shape sociopolitical attitudes (see, e.g., Alford, Funk, &

Hibbing, 2005; Bouchard Jr., 1994; Kandler, Bleidorn, & Reimann, 2012; Oxley,

et al., 2008; Smith, Oxley, Hibbing, Alford, & Hibbing, 2011). Socialization

(e.g., background, education, religious beliefs, group membership) can then

accentuate or attenuate these predispositions, although males in general are

expected to have significantly higher levels of SDO. High SDO is associated with

ethnocentrism, nationalism, prejudice, and conservatism (e.g., Altemeyer, 1996;

1998; Pratto, et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In general, high SDO's

endorse group-based hierarchy and the right of powerful groups to impose their

will on weaker groups.

Although SDO and RWA appear conceptually similar and are often

positively correlated, research indicates that they represent distinct constructs

(Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The most

notable contrast is that high SDO's are not, in general, particularly religious

(Altemeyer, 1998). High RWA's endorse coercive social control, strongly obey

recognized authorities, and conform to moral and religious norms and values.

High SDO's in contrast, strongly desire to exert control over others across a

variety of domains. In other words, high RWA's are looking for an authority to provide guidance while high SDO's desire to be that very authority. Conservatism often advances policies consistent with the motivations of high RWA's and high SDO's and is therefore usually positively correlated with both constructs (Jost, et al., 2003).

Similar to his criticisms of RWA, Duckitt (2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010) contends SDO does not represent an underlying personality dimension. Like the RWA scale, the items of the SDO scale assess generalized social attitudes and beliefs and not behavioral tendencies or reactions (Duckitt, 2001). Perceived threat – particularly threats to status or resources – increase an individual's SDO both temporarily (Guimond, et al., 2003) and over time (Matthews, Levin, & Sidanius, 2009). Lastly, like RWA, SDO correlates weakly with the, well-established, "Big Five" of personality (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). Thus, Duckitt (2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010) contends SDO may be better conceptualized as an interrelated set of ideological attitudes and beliefs.

System Justification Theory and Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition

System justification theory (Jost, 1995; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004) offers a psychological explanation for why low status individuals and groups endorse ideological positions which are counter to their social and economic interests (see, e.g., Frank, 2004; Fong, 2001; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; for a rebuttal, see, Gelman, 2006). System Justification Theory proposes a general psychological motivation to justify and rationalize existing social,

economic, and political arrangements. As a result, ideologies that justify existing status hierarchies are adopted and the status quo is perceived as fair and legitimate. The expression of the system justification motive depends on the degree to which the status quo is perceived as legitimate (Jost, et al., 2004), although it can be triggered automatically by stimuli relevant to social status (Jost & Huntady, 2002), and is considered a nearly universal social psychological need possessed by most members of a society (Jost & Andrews, 2011; Jost, et al., 2004). Since it is assumed that most people experience some degree of threat and anxiety in response to inequality (Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, & Chen, 2007) the system justification motive is often considered an adaptive psychological response.

A number of ideologies, such as the Protestant Work Ethic, meritocracy, belief in a just world, fair market ideology, right-wing authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation, have been proposed to satiate the system justification motive (Jost & Hunyady, 2005, see Table 1 for definitions). Specifically, the adoption of these ideologies allows people to deny injustice and disadvantage, to justify existing social roles, to "blame the victim," to identify with their oppressor, to accept their fate, and ultimately resist egalitarian changes to the current social, economic, and political system. Thus, these ideologies, to a degree, distort social perception because they allow people participate in their own exploitation by allowing them to legitimize and justify inequality (see, Jost, 1995, for the taxonomy of social psychological evidence for false consciousness).

System justifying ideologies are considered manifestations of conservatism, itself a form of motivated social cognition which possesses two

core aspects, resistance to change and tolerance of inequality (Jost, et al., 2003). Core aspects of an ideology are stable, unchanging properties. In contrast peripheral aspects are malleable and subject to change depending on circumstances (Abric, 2001; Huntington, 1957). Historically traditional social arrangements have been more hierarchical than egalitarian (see, e.g., Jost, et al., 2003) and because change, particularly egalitarian social change (e.g., upheaval of social hierarchy and/or tradition), is often uncertain and threatening. Thus, the core aspects of conservatism, resistance to change and tolerance of inequality, often occur in tandem throughout human history.

Jost, et al. (2003) tested the conservatism as motivated social cognition hypothesis in a meta-analysis. This meta-analysis was performed on 88 different psychological investigations of ideology from 12 different countries. Conservatism was associated with close-mindedness (e.g., dogmatism-intolerance of ambiguity, cognitive rigidity); lowered self-esteem; negative emotions (e.g., fear, anger, disgust); loss prevention; fear of death; and perceived threat to the social or economic system. Additionally, system instability, terror management (i.e., managing death anxiety), fear of threat and loss, fear of uncertainty, needs for order, structure, and closure, dogmatism-intolerance of ambiguity, lower openness to experience, and lower integrative complexity, were all predictive of conservatism (see Table 2 for conceptual/operational definitions), with death anxiety emerging as the strongest predictor overall. Jost, et al., conclude that a set of interrelated epistemic (dogmatism-intolerance of ambiguity; uncertainty avoidance; need for order structure, and closure), existential (self-esteem; loss

prevention; terror management) and ideological (system justification; social dominance) needs motivate the acceptance of conservative ideologies (Jost, et al., 2003; see also, Wilson, 1973). This reduces threat and uncertainty and, satiates the system justification motive.

Subsequent meta-analyses have reported relationships between right-wing attitudes and intolerance of ambiguity, cognitive ability, rigidity, integrative complexity, and field dependence (Van Hiel, Onraet, & De Pauw, 2010), and perceptions of internal (e.g., neuroticism, death anxiety) and external (e.g., outgroup threat, threat to social cohesion) threat (Onraet, Van Hiel, Dhont, & Pattyn, 2013). However, Van Hiel, et al. (2010) reported weak (rigidity, integrative complexity, and field dependence) to moderate (intolerance of ambiguity and cognitive ability) relationships with right-wing attitudes. Onraet, et al. (2013) reported a significantly stronger relationship between right-wing attitudes and external threats (e.g., belief in a dangerous world, societal threat), compared to internal threats (e.g., neurotic anxiety; death anxiety; test anxiety). Additionally, in a meta-analysis of mortality salience effects on political attitudes, Burke, Kosloff, and Landau (2013) report a moderate effect of mortality salience on worldview defense (i.e., defend one's ideology when threatened) and a weak effect of mortality salience on conservative shifting. In other words, conservatism is not the inevitable result of death anxiety, and depending on situational circumstances liberalism, or another ideology, may emerge.

In sum, unidimensional psychological approaches to ideology have progressed from an almost exclusive focus on personality (Adorno, et al., 1950)

considering ideology the result of an interaction between dispositional and situational factors (Jost, et al., 2003) that creates shared realities (Jost, et al., 2008; Haidt & Graham, 2010; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) but also distorts social perception in system justifying ways (Jost, et al., 2003; Jost, et al., 2009). Regardless of whether ideology is conceptualized along a continuum anchored by authoritarianism-egalitarianism, traditionalist-progressive, high versus low system justification, or simply conservatism-liberalism, this dimension appears to most clearly capture attitudes and beliefs about social, economic, and political inequality (e.g., Jost, 1995; Jost, et al., 2003; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). This dichotomous relationship between liberalism and conservatism is likely driven by conceptualizing ideology as unidimensional. Such a conceptualization also has difficulty explaining the existence of ideologies such as libertarianism or ecologism, because they are not well represented by the traditional liberal-conservative spectrum (Freeden, 1996; Kenny, 2003). Indeed, the idea that ideology is represented along more than one dimension stubbornly persists in the social psychological literature (e.g., Conover & Feldman, 1981; Duckitt, 2001;Haidt, 2012; Goren, 2013; Rokeach, 1973; Saucier, 2000; Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Stenner, 2005, 2009; Weber & Federico, 2013).

Dual-Process Motivational Model of Ideology

Duckitt (2001) adopts a mulitidimensional perspective and proposes a dual-process motivational model of ideology, in which RWA and SDO express distinct motivational goals. RWA reflects a desire to establish collective security and order (e.g., maintaining societal cohesion and stability). Threats to collective

security and order are expected to increase RWA and high RWA's are expected to support policies and political parties that purport to reduce threats to collective security and defend traditional values. SDO, in contrast, expresses the motivational goal of attaining personal and/or group power (e.g., dominance and superiority over others). Threats to status and resources, therefore, are expected to increase SDO and high SDO's are expected to support political policies and parties that purport to increase group dominance, superiority, and inequality. Duckitt's dual-process model differs from the motivated social cognition perspective reviewed above in that attitudes and behaviors associated with RWA and SDO are considered examples of social conservatism and economic conservatism respectively.

Research (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt, et al., 2002) indicates social conformity (i.e., low openness and high conscientiousness) and belief in a dangerous world predict RWA, but not SDO. Additionally, societal threat heightens a belief in a dangerous world which in turn increases RWA, but not SDO (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003). In contrast toughmindedness (i.e., low agreeableness) and perceptions of the world as a competitive jungle predicted SDO, but not RWA. The impact of toughmindedness on SDO was completely mediated by perceptions of the world as a competitive jungle. RWA is predicted by low openness and weakly by high conscientiousness. SDO, in contrast is predicted by low agreeableness and by low openness although this relationship is largely eliminated when RWA is controlled for (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008, 2009; Van Hiel, Cornelis, & Roets, 2007).

Consistent with the dual process model of ideology, RWA predicts negative attitudes towards threatening outgroups (e.g., criminals, terrorists) and social deviants (e.g., drug dealers, protesters). SDO predicts attitudes towards disadvantaged groups (e.g., physically handicapped, unemployment beneficiaries), and social deviants. Dru (2007) measured RWA and SDO, and then used vignettes and survey items to prime either collective security (i.e., vignette on need for ingroup norm preservation, survey items focused on collective behaviors) or competitiveness (e.g., vignette on various forms of competition, survey items focuses on group competition). When collective security was salient, RWA significantly predicted anti-immigrant attitudes while SDO did not. In contrast, when competitiveness was salient, SDO significantly predicted anti-immigrant attitudes while RWA did not.

Additionally, McFarland (2005) assessed RWA and SDO in the week prior to the start of the Second Gulf War in 2003. Both RWA and SDO significantly predicted support for the attack. However, the effects of RWA were fully mediated by perceived threat from Iraq (e.g., weapons of mass destruction, aid to terrorists) while the effect of SDO was fully mediated by a reduced concern for the human costs of the conflict (e.g., loss of innocent lives is necessary to remove Saddam Hussein). Crowson, et al. (2006) reported similar findings. Specifically, both RWA and SDO predicted support for war with Iraq, but only RWA predicted the belief that Saddam Hussein supported terrorism. Attitudes towards the human costs of conflict were not assessed. Collectively, these

findings support the notion that RWA and SDO possess different underlying psychological motivations.

Thus, while RWA and SDO may often lead to the same policy preferences, they do so for different reasons. Ideological attitudes associated with RWA are linked to a heightened perception that the sociopolitical environment is inherently dangerous, threatening, and unpredictable and motivated by a desire to maintain societal cohesion and stability. Ideological attitudes associated with SDO, in contrast, are linked to a heightened perception that the world is highly competitive and requires a dog-eat-dog mentality and are motivated by a desire to attain power and superiority. However, although the dual-process motivational model of ideology adopts a multidimensional perspective, it remains largely focused on preferences for stability and order over social change (RWA) and group-based status hierarchy over egalitarianism (SDO) while, in parallel, recent research suggests ideology may be even more multidimensional (e.g., Graham, et al., 2009; Goren, 2013; Haidt, 2012; Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009; Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012; Weber & Federico, 2013).

Value-Pluralism Model

Values can define what is right and wrong, what is permitted and what is prohibited. Different societies and subcultures emphasize values differently, or instill different values altogether. Thus, individuals within a society may hold drastically different ideas, based on different value priorities, about what the proper goals of a society are and how those goals should be achieved.

Importantly, value differences appear to, in part, underlie ideological divisions, at least within the United States (e.g., Graham, et al., 2009; Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, and Haidt, 2012; Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Weber & Federico, 2013), suggesting ideological conflict may be rooted in different worldviews, motives, and ultimate goals. Furthermore, societal level policy decisions and attempts to solve mass scale social organization dilemmas often involve value trade-offs, where satisfying one important value may entail violating another important value. For instance, in the attempt to prevent future terrorist attacks how much surveillance of private citizens and their personal activities (e.g., phone calls; email; social networking; GPS monitoring) is acceptable? This scenario presents a trade-off between our desire to prevent harm and our desire to maintain a degree of privacy and personal liberty in our own affairs.

Psychologically, value trade-offs are difficult because they can be cognitively complex, emotionally stressful, and/or socially awkward (e.g., Festinger, 1957; for a review of the difficulty of trade-off reasoning, see, Tetlock, 1999). As a result, when faced with a value trade-off people tend to rely on heuristic based processing (e.g., Abelson, 1959), precluding a direct comparison of the values in conflict. This state of affairs can easily produce instances of ideological inconsistency where an individual states support for choice A over choice B, choice B over choice C, and choice C over choice A. Tetlock (1986; Tetlock, Peterson, & Lerner, 1996) however, contends people are effective cognitive managers who strategically employ their mental resources and has

proposed a value pluralism model that attempts to delineate the conditions under which people elect to engage in more cognitively complex trade-off reasoning.

The value pluralism model (Tetlock, 1986, 1999; Tetlock, et al., 1996) suggests virtually anyone can be motivated to engage in trade-off reasoning when the following, optimal, conditions are met: a) scarcity compels the acknowledgment of a value conflict; b) the values in conflict are both important and approximately equal in their importance; c) people believe it is culturally acceptable to consider the trade-offs in question; d) people see no socially acceptable way to avoid taking a stand through decision-evasion tactics such as buck-passing, procrastination, and obfuscation; and, e) people believe they are accountable to an audience, magnifying the need for self-critical policy analysis. Furthermore, it is assumed that ultimate or terminal values (see, Rokeach, 1973) underlie all ideologies and specify a desired solution to mass scale social organization dilemmas. These goals or desired solutions can run the gamut from the achievement of social equality and a fully egalitarian society to maintaining racial purity and a strict social hierarchy. Importantly, although ideologies may vary widely in the extent to which they acknowledge value conflicts and trade-offs the general prediction is that ideology by issue interactions will determine if complex trade-off reasoning occurs or is avoided (see, Tetlock, 1999).

Because some values are so highly prioritized and can become imbued with sacredness, Tetlock, et al. (2000) reformulated the value pluralism model as the sacred value protection model. Sacredness is defined as "the human tendency to invest people, places, times, and ideas, with importance far beyond the utility

they possess" (Graham & Haidt, 2011, p. 4). Once a value is imbued with sacredness it establishes proscriptive guidelines of what attitudes, behaviors, and judgments are socially acceptable (Tetlock, 1986; Tetlock, et al., 2000). In other words, a sacred value can be defined as any value that possesses a level of priority that precludes any consideration of trade-offs with other values (Tetlock, et al., 2000; see also, Graham & Haidt, 2011). The transgression of a sacred value triggers, at least, two psychological reactions. Moral outrage, defined as a combination of affective (e.g., anger, disgust, shame), cognitive (e.g., negative, dispositional attributions of individuals and groups that commit, support, or tolerate the transgression), and behavioral (e.g., support for ostracizing transgressors) reactions to a moral transgression. A reaction of moral outrage is followed by moral cleansing, a reaffirmation of core values and loyalties through attitudes and behaviors that shore up those aspects of the moral order that have been undercut by the transgression (see, Tetlock, 2003; Tetlock, et al., 2000).

The contemplation of a trade-off involving a sacred value is considered taboo, thus it may negatively impact one's moral identity, with greater contemplation producing more damage (Tetlock, et al., 1996). Consistent with this, Tetlock, et al. (2000) reported that racial egalitarians largely refused to employ racially-tainted base-rates concerned with crime when making insurance pricing decisions for different neighborhoods and were likely to express that regardless of whether crime statistics for a neighborhood were accurate they simply should not be used because it is immoral to do so. Furthermore, racial egalitarians harshly condemned a fictional insurance executive who elected to

employ racially-tainted base rates concerned with crime in insurance pricing decisions. Likewise, Tetlock, et al. also reported that religious fundamentalists were likely to outright reject heretical counterfactuals concerning the life of Christ (e.g., Joseph left Mary and Jesus grew up the child of a single-mother in a one-parent household) and condemn the source. When such ideas were considered, they were followed by strong endorsement of moral cleansing behaviors, regardless of whether people had the opportunity to condemn the source of the heretical counterfactual.

A Torrid Affair – Morality and Politics:

In general, morality embodies a code of conduct that makes group-living and social life possible by providing a guideline for people's social attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Haidt, 2012). Moral behavior provides a way to judge whether interaction with a target, or group of targets, is likely to be beneficial or dangerous (Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998). Broadly, we appear to possess a heightened state of vigilance for the detection of immoral behavior, compared to moral behavior (e.g., Goodwin & Darley, 2008, 2012; Jones & Fitness, 2008; Reeder & Coovert, 1986; Reeder & Spores, 1983; Trafimow, 2001; Wojciszke, et al., 1998; Wojciszke & Szymkow, 2003; see also, Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). Attributions of immorality are made with more frequency, generalize more easily across situations, and are more resistant to change (Reeder & Coovert, 1986; Reeder & Spores, 1983; Trafimow, 2001) than attributions of morality, which are often explained with reference to situational factors (e.g., Morgan, et al., 2010; Reeder & Spores, 1983) or met with suspicion (e.g., Wojciszke & Szymkow, 2003).

I accept Haidt's (2001; see also, Haidt, Koller, & Das, 1993) social intuitionist model of moral reasoning and judgment. Moral judgments are considered automatic and intuitive affective evaluations (e.g., right vs. wrong, good vs. bad) about the actions or character of a person. They are made with respect to a set of values held as obligatory by a culture or society. Moral reasoning occurs after this judgment in a post-hoc fashion and often reaches conclusions consistent with the initial reaction. Theoretically social intuitionism

is based on the affective primacy principle (Zajonc, 1980) and evidence that people search for arguments that support initial judgments (e.g., Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). An application of the Social Intuitionist Model to politics suggests ideology is a form of motivated social cognition (e.g., Jost, et al., 2003) employed after an initial intuitive judgment. Many of our sociopolitical attitudes and beliefs are thus post-hoc rationalizations of our intuitive reactions (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Zajonc, 1980) to sociopolitical stimuli. In other words, political preferences need no inferences and people may be unaware when their actions, beliefs, and behaviors are ideological.

Moral Foundations Theory (Graham, Haidt, Koleva, Motyl, Iyer, Wojcik, & Ditto, 2013; Graham, et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2009; Haidt, et al., 2009) builds on the Social Intuitionist Model proposing a specific set of intuitions, or foundations, that shape our moral judgments. It rests on four main claims: 1) Nativism – the human mind is prepared, via natural selection, to respond to certain sets of patterns (the moral foundations) in the social environment; 2) Cultural learning/socialization – revises the moral foundations through development and experience within a culture and society; 3) Intuitionism – intuitive moral judgments precede moral reasoning, which is often employed for socially strategic purposes (e.g., Haidt, 2001); and, 4) Pluralism – in the environment of evolutionary adaptation humans faced many recurrent social problems and mass scale social organization dilemmas and there are thus many foundations of morality (see, Graham, et al., 2013).

The foundations proposed (see, e.g., Graham, et al., 2009; Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2009) are Care/Harm, Fairness/Cheating, Loyalty/Betrayal, Authority/Subversion, and Sanctity/Degradation. Each foundation is considered a response to an adaptive challenge. The Care foundation emerged as a response to the adaptive challenge of caring for vulnerable offspring and often produces compassion. Although the original triggers may have been limited to the need, distress, or suffering of one's own infant or child a wide variety of social stimuli now trigger the compassion associated with the Care foundation, such as suffering children and adults from the other side of the world. These feelings of compassion often go hand-in-hand with kind feelings towards those who defend or help the victims and anger at the source of the harm.

The Fairness foundation emerged in response to reciprocal social exchange relationships with non-kin. We appear particularly sensitive to signals of cooperation, cheating, and deception (e.g., Trivers, 1971) and tend to respond to the cooperation with gratitude and cheating or deception with either anger at the cheater or deceiver or guilt over being the cheater or deceiver ourselves. Current triggers of the Fairness foundation include interactions with others, interactions with inanimate objects (e.g., vending machine that takes one's money without producing a product), and interactions among other parties that one learns about through conversation or gossip. The Loyalty foundation emerged in response to the challenge of forming cohesive coalitions to compete with other groups over resources, such as food or territory, and to navigate rank and power within a group. It tends to produce feelings of group pride and anger or rage at

traitors or external threats to the group. Sports fandom, nationalism, and brand loyalty all constitute current examples of the Loyalty foundation.

The Authority foundation emerged in response to the challenge of living within a hierarchical society where there is a need to foster beneficial relationships with other individuals who occupy various positions with this hierarchy. Indications of rank constituted the original triggers. Importantly, while an individual of subordinate rank is expected to show deference, obedience, and respect towards those of higher rank, those same authority figures are expected to provide protection for and show restraint towards their subordinates. In other words, the Authority foundation is not simply concerned with following the law, but rather with how people interact with respected professionals, bosses, and leaders of any kind, as well as lager modern institutions such as the legal system or the government. The Sanctity foundation emerged in response to the problem of avoiding disease and contagion. Original triggers may have included diseased people, waste products, or rotten food and are thought to have become linked to disgust (e.g., Haidt, 2012; Rozin, Haidt, McCauley, 2008) and the behavioral immune system (e.g., Schaller & Park, 2011). Current triggers include disease, deformity, and sexual deviancy. A reverence for cleanliness, piety, and temperance may also develop.

Care and Fairness have been classified as the individualizing foundations because they emphasize protecting and expanding the rights of the individual. Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity are classified binding foundations because they emphasize the protection and stability of the community/group (Haidt & Graham,

2009). In response to concerns the Fairness foundation was focused primarily on equality as egalitarianism, particularly in the lifestyle realm, and not nearly enough on notions of fairness as proportionality or equity, a sixth foundation, Liberty/Oppression, has been proposed (see, Haidt, 2012; Iyer, et al., 2012). The Liberty foundation emphasizes the promotion of positive liberty (e.g., equal opportunity) and negative liberty (e.g., lack of obstruction). It is concerned with the promotion of individual freedom and challenging abuses of power by authority figures, such as bullying and/or domination (see, Haidt, 2012; Iyer, et al., 2012). Liberty, like Care and Fairness, is considered an individualizing foundation (Haidt, 2012).

A moral matrix primarily based on the individualizing foundations is likely to promote a society where people pursue their own goals as they see fit. The emphasis on individual rights and liberties is likely to decrease social integration (e.g., Haidt & Graham, 2009) by reducing (or even eliminating) established institutions. In contrast, a moral matrix which also emphasizes the binding foundations may promote the belief that strong social institutions and social constraints are valuable for human welfare, necessary for socialization, and difficult to replace if weakened (e.g., Muller, 1997). Changes to established institutions are considered with caution and only endorsed if they do not weaken necessary constraints on human impulse. In other words, proponents of a moral matrix based primarily on the individualizing foundations are often at odds with proponents of moral matrices that place a greater emphasis on the binding foundations.

Moral Foundations and Political Attitudes

Moral Foundations Theory suggests our moral intuitions motivate many of our political attitudes. It is broadly consistent with other psychological approaches to ideology in that it contends people may be psychologically predisposed to adopt particular political attitudes (e.g., Altemeyer, 1996; Duckitt, 2001; Haidt, 2012; Jost, et al., 2003; Lakoff, 1996; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Wilson, 1973). In other words, political disagreement may, in part, reflect moral disagreement. Liberals tend to prioritize the individualizing foundations while conservatives place a more equal emphasis on all six foundations (e.g., Graham, et al., 2009; Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2007, 2009). Thus, although liberals and conservatives often disagree over what is harmful, unfair, and oppressive (Haidt & Graham, 2011; Schlenker, Chambers, & Le, 2012) the starkest disagreements are expected to occur over issues associated with the binding foundations of Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity.

Koleva, et al. (2012) measured how individuals emphasized the moral foundations and their level of moral disapproval towards a variety of political issues. In general, disapproval towards each issue was predicted by one or more of the moral foundations, over and above demographic factors such as age, gender, religious attendance, and, most importantly, political orientation and interest in politics. More specifically, Sanctity emerged as the single strongest predictor of moral disapproval for abortion, same-sex marriage, the use of pornography, having a baby outside of marriage, casual sex, and gambling; while Care emerged as the strongest predictor of moral disapproval for animal testing.

Care also predicted moral disapproval of the death penalty. Additionally, Fairness weakly predicted moral disapproval of animal testing; Authority weakly predicted moral disapproval of abortion, the use of pornography, and casual sex; and Loyalty predicted moral disapproval of flag burning. In a follow-up study Koleva, et al. found that Sanctity predicted support for stricter abortion laws, a ban on same-sex marriage, and the teaching of intelligent design, opposition to stem-cell research, and negative attitudes towards illegal immigrants. Loyalty predicted support for a flag burning amendment, increased defense spending, and aggressive anti-terrorism policies. Care predicted support for gun control and opposition to torture. Lastly, Care and Sanctity predicted support for taking tougher measures against global warming.

Stevens and colleagues (Stevens, Jankauskaite, Wilder, & Jussim, 2013a; Stevens, Salib, Baron, & Wilder, 2013b) measured the emphasis placed on the moral foundations, Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; e.g., Altemeyer, 1996), and a variety of additional social and political attitudes. In general, one of the moral foundations emerged as the strongest predictor for nearly all of the variables assessed, over and above political ideology. Sanctity emerged as the strongest predictor of RWA, with greater emphasis on Sanctity associated with greater levels of RWA; opposition to abortion, stem-cell research, gay rights, marijuana legalization, and physician-assisted suicide; a belief that human life begins at conception; and objection to the belief that free speech is the most important democratic right. Care emerged as the strongest predictor of opposition to the death penalty and the use of torture, and support for increased gun

restrictions. It also predicted RWA, with greater emphasis on Care associated with lower levels of RWA; and support for affirmative action and gay rights. Fairness emerged as the strongest predictor of support for affirmative action, and also predicted support for increased gun restrictions, marijuana legalization, abortion, and stem-cell research; opposition to torture; a belief that freedom of speech is the most important democratic right; and an objection to the belief that human life begins at conception. Authority emerged as the strongest predictor of concern about illegal immigration, and also predicted support for warrantless wiretapping, the use of torture, and the death penalty; and a belief that human life begins conception. While Loyalty did not emerge as the strongest predictor for any variable, it did predict opposition to increased gun restrictions and affirmative action; support for warrantless wiretapping and the use of torture; and a belief that freedom of speech is the most important democratic right.

The results of Koleva, et al. (2012) and Stevens, et al. (2013a) are fairly consistent. In general the moral foundations predicted a wide variety of political attitudes. In both studies, Sanctity emerged as the most prominent predictor of attitudes towards sexuality and Sanctity of life issues such as, abortion, stem-cell research, and gay rights; while Care emerged as the most prominent predictor of attitudes towards the death penalty, torture, and gun control. Additionally, Loyalty consistently predicted attitudes towards national security issues, such as defense spending and anti-terrorism policies (e.g., warrantless wiretapping). Consistent with these findings, moral convictions predicted strength of candidate preference, voting intentions and voting behavior in the 2000 and 2004 U.S.

presidential elections, even when controlling for factors such as party affiliation and attitude strength (Skitka & Bauman, 2008). Lastly, a longitudinal investigation into the development of sociopolitical attitudes over a 7 year period in a nationally representative sample of adolescents, revealed that political disengagement (i.e., apathy and lack of knowledge) was highest among males who did not possess moral convictions about sociopolitical issues (Snell, 2010).

Moralization, Moral Outrage, and Ideology

It appears our moral attitudes and beliefs, in part, underlie a wide variety of our social and political attitudes, a conclusion consistent with political science research indicating core values and predispositions consistently predict sociopolitical attitudes, as well as, if not better than, variables such as party affiliation and socioeconomic status (e.g., Carmines & Stimson, 1980; Erikson & Tedin, 2007; Feldman, 1988; Goren, 2013; Fong, 2001; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993). The treatment of political attitudes and behaviors as manifestations of our moral attitudes and beliefs has some intriguing implications. Importantly, moral attitudes, beliefs, and judgments are distinct from other strongly held attitudes, beliefs, and judgments (e.g., preferences, social conventions). They are often held with a conviction reserved for everyday (e.g., Brooklyn is one of New York City's five boroughs) or scientific (e.g., the boiling point of water is 212 degrees Fahrenheit) facts (Goodwin & Darley, 2012). This type of attitude can be referred to as a moral conviction, the strong and absolute belief that something is right or

wrong without the need for proof or evidence (e.g., Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Skitka & Mullen, 2002).

A moral conviction ultimately produces moral judgments, which are concerned with what individuals and/or groups *should* do. An act is moral or immoral, and once an individual makes such a judgment there is little room for debate (e.g., Goodwin & Darley, 2008, 2012; Tetlock, et al., 2000; Trafimow, 2001). Thus, moral convictions can provide a strong justification for behavioral action (Effron & Miller, 2012; Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Skitka & Mullen, 2002; Skitka, 2010; see also, Goodwin & Darley, 2008, 2012; Peterson, 2009; Tetlock, et al., 2000) and helps to define what will trigger a response of moral outrage in a given individual. Because different ideologies possess distinct moral matrices, the very sociopolitical stimuli that some people find moral and reassuring may be seen as a moral transgression or moral failure by others (Peterson, 2009). As a result certain sociopolitical stimuli – certain people, events, objects, and policies, in the past and present – are identified as unquestionably good, heroic, and moral, and defended at all costs (Tetlock, et al., 2000). Likewise, other people, events, objects, and policies, in the past and present, which violate the moral foundations one has highly prioritized, are identified as unquestionably bad, evil, and immoral. These symbols are considered morally corrupting, contaminating, and degrading, and are vociferously opposed because they are considered threats to the preferred moral order (see, Graham & Haidt, 2011; Tetlock, et al., 1996; see also, Edelman, 1964).

The sociocultural process of moralization imbues previously morally neutral stimuli with moral qualities (e.g., Rozin, 1999; Rozin, Markwith, & Stoess, 1997). Consistent with the moral attribution literature (e.g., Goodwin & Darley, 2008, 2012; Jones & Fitness, 2008; Morgan, et al., 2010; Reeder & Coovert, 1986; Reeder & Spores, 1983; Trafimow, 2001; Wojciszke & Szymkow, 2003) these moral qualities are usually negative (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Rozin, 1999). The potential consequences of moralization include: government action (e.g., taxation; regulation; prohibition); increased institutional support (e.g., from schools or foundations) for reform; scientific investigation into processes and relationships that ultimately confirm the moral qualities of the issue; and a license to express strong public disapproval (e.g., irritation; outrage) of those who are perceived as transgressing the new moral value (see, Rozin, 1999). Effron and Miller (2012) suggest moralization provides people with the social legitimacy, also known as psychological standing (Miller & Effron, 2010; Miller, Effron, & Zak, 2009), to express their attitudes and beliefs about and advocate for an issue they do not have a strong material stake in. Examples of this phenomenon may include: males who support abortion, heterosexuals who support same-sex marriage, and members of a racial or ethnic group who advocate on behalf of members of another racial or ethnic group. Additionally, it may provide legitimacy for supporting policies that are against one's own material interests, such as people of lower socioeconomic status who support tax cuts for the wealthy and people of high socioeconomic status who support tax increases on the wealthy.

Abric (2001) suggests that complex social representations, such as ideologies, possess stable, core characteristics and more malleable, peripheral associations. The relevance of these peripheral associations fluctuate over time, may or may not be directly related to an ideology's core characteristics, and are dependent on the current social context (Jost, et al., 2003). Moralization may therefore constitute one of the psychological processes that increases the ideological relevance of an issue peripherally associated with a given ideology. Likewise, the corresponding process of amoralization, which converts values into preferences (Rozin, et al., 1997)[5], can decrease ideological relevance of the same issue. The moralization of sociopolitical issues therefore, is expected to provide people with the psychological standing (Miller & Effron, 2010; Miller, et al., 2009) to act on their sociopolitical attitudes and beliefs.

Ideology as Moral Vigilance:

As reviewed above, ideologies are based on and organized around sacred values (see, Edelman, 1964; Haidt, 2012; Tetlock, 1986; Tetlock, et al., 2000) which proponents consider objectively correct. Upon encountering a stimulus in the sociopolitical domain an initial, intuitive judgment about whether the stimulus is moral, immoral, or irrelevant is made. Ideology subsequently helps one interpret this judgment. Often, this interpretation supports, and thus rationalizes, the initial judgment. An individual may seek further confirmation for their conclusions through interpersonal interaction. These other individuals often possess a similar moral matrix as the social perceiver (e.g., Byrne, 1971; Chambers, Schlenker, & Collisson, 2013; Haidt, Rosenberg, & Hom, 2003) and can reinforce one's initial judgments. Importantly, the agreement between individuals that a sociopolitical stimulus constitutes a transgression of a sacred value can motivate collective action in the sociopolitical domain (e.g., Jost, et al., 2012; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears, & Bettache, 2012) by capitalizing on shared moral outrage and blame-validation processes (Alicke, 2000).

Yet, a considerable portion of perception in the sociopolitical domain is concerned with the motivations of people (e.g., politicians, activists, pundits) and, because it is concerned with unobservable and ambiguous phenomena, often occurs under varying degrees of uncertainty. Decisions made under uncertainty can result in two types of errors: false positives, also known as false alarms, and false negatives, also known as misses. Signal Detection Theory (e.g., Macmillan

& Creelman, 1990; Swets, et al., 1961) proposes that an individual perceiver employs a subjective criterion to reduce uncertainty and render judgment. This decision criterion is independent from sensitivity, or accuracy, and represents a threshold of evidence, the minimum amount required for the perceiver to report the presence of something. Setting the decision criterion too low (e.g., requiring a weaker signal to report the presence of threat) leads to a greater number of false alarms, but setting it too high (e.g., requiring a stronger signal to report the presence of threat) increases the number of misses.

Because the costs associated with making a false alarm or miss are rarely symmetrical (Haselton & Buss, 2000; Haselton & Nettle, 2006; Nesse, 2005) Haselton and collegues (e.g., Haselton & Buss, 2000; Haselton & Nettle, 2006) proposed Error Management Theory. A false alarm (i.e.: incorrect classification of a stimulus as a threat) triggers the expression of a defensive response, this constitutes a misuse of resources. A miss however results in exposure to the harm itself. Depending on what the threat is, the cost of harm could be immense (e.g., policies that produce institutional discrimination; terrorist attack that results in massive casualties). Error Management Theory contends that when the cost of an error is asymmetrical our decision making processes are biased towards committing errors that are less costly. Likewise, if the cost of an error is the same but the benefits are asymmetrical, decision processes are biased towards the more beneficial decision (Haselton & Buss, 2000; Haselton & Nettle, 2006).

The negativity bias in moral attributions reviewed above is consistent with an error management perspective. An error management bias can be defined as a

"better safe than sorry" strategy that drives decision making under uncertainty towards making the less costly error. Recall, the decision that someone or something is immoral is made with greater ease and frequency than a decision that someone or something is moral (e.g., Reeder & Coovert, 1986; Reeder & Spores, 1983; Trafimow, 2001). This decision is stubbornly resistant to change (e.g., Reeder & Coovert, 1986) because once a target is "marked" as morally contaminating (e.g., Hutcherson & Gross, 2011) and elicits strong negative affect, moral behavior is often met with suspicion (Wojciszke & Szymkow, 2003).

Consistent with this line of reasoning, Jones and Fitness (2008) report that criminal behavior (e.g., drug trafficking; fraud) elicits disgust and a preference for cleansing materials (see also, Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). In a mock juror setting, high disgust sensitivity was associated with dispositional attributions of blame, a bias towards conviction, longer sentence recommendations, and exaggerated perceptions of crime in the community. This indicates that immoral behavior by others triggers the affective (e.g., disgust), cognitive (increased dispositional attributions), and behavioral (e.g., harsher sentencing recommendations) components of moral outrage and produces behaviors consistent with moral cleansing (e.g., Tetlock, 2003; Tetlock, et al., 2000). More importantly, the exaggerated perceptions of crime in the community indicate that the experience of moral outrage can exaggerate the amount of immoral behavior one perceives in the sociopolitical environment and thus distort social perception.

According to Error Management Theory (e.g., Haselton & Buss, 2000; Haselton & Nettle, 2006), decision making processes should be biased towards

avoiding exposure to morally contaminating stimuli. Consistent with this, the decision that someone is immoral leads to derogation and produces a desire for long-term avoidance (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). Indeed, people are less tolerant of moral differences (Haidt, et al., 2003; Wainryb, Shaw, Langley, Cottam, & Lewis, 2004) than differences based on race, gender, or class. In general, we like people who share our attitudes, beliefs, opinions, and values more than those who disagree with us (e.g., Byrne, 1971). This similarity-liking principle can override the impact of other important factors in social perception, such as gender, race/ethnicity, and social status (Chambers & Melnyk, 2006; Chambers, et al., 2013; Rokeach, 1960; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993).

An integration of Error Management Theory with Moral Foundations Theory (Graham, et al., 2009; Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2009) provides an interpretive framework for how people come to find certain stimuli in the sociopolitical domain morally contaminating and thus develop error management biases. All ideologies are based on sacred values (Edelman, 1964; Haidt, 2012; Tetlock, et al., 2000) that are considered as objectively correct as scientific and everyday facts (e.g., Goodwin & Darley, 2008, 2012). These values are often promoted and defended at all costs with compromises and trade-offs considered non-negotiable (e.g., Tetlock, 2003; Tetlock, et al., 2000). People or groups perceived as transgressing one's sacred values are characterized as villains, and met with moral outrage and intolerance (e.g., Haidt, et al., 2003; Tetlock, et al., 2000; Tetlock, et al., 2007; Wainryb, et al., 2004). Since the sociopolitical

domain is dynamic and often ambiguous, the social perception of moral transgressions is expected to be biased towards making false alarms.

This view constitutes the proposed perspective of ideology as moral vigilance and, initially, the main prediction is that the social perceiver sets a lower evidentiary threshold for identifying ambiguous sociopolitical stimuli as transgressions of the moral foundations they highly emphasize. At least initially, I am primarily focused on how understanding how an event in the sociopolitical domain triggers an intuitive reaction which is then followed by a constrained interpretation and a post-hoc causal explanation (see, e.g., Haidt, 2001). The interpretation of the event is considered constrained because it is expected to be influenced by how an individual emphasizes the moral foundations. This emphasis is also expected to influence the post-hoc explanation produced. The remainder of this section presents two examples of ideology as moral vigilance, liberalism and conservatism. This is not meant to imply that the proposed perspective only considers the ideologies of liberalism and conservatism. Rather, it is done because the majority of the social psychological literature on ideology focuses on disparate affinities for liberalism and conservatism, in various forms. Because the model is grounded in Moral Foundations Theory, the potential exists for expansion to include ideologies such as libertarianism (e.g., Iyer, et al., 2012) and thus should not be interpreted as a unidimensional approach to ideology.

Liberalism as Moral Vigilance

As reviewed above, liberal ideologies tend to emphasize the individualizing foundations of Care, Fairness, and Liberty, while remaining, at best, ambivalent about the binding foundations. Haidt (2012) suggests the Care and Liberty foundations support many of the ideals of social justice movements which emphasize compassion and empathy for the poor and the need for collective action to challenge the oppression of bullying, domineering elites. Indeed, given that human social arrangements historically have been more hierarchical than egalitarian, liberalism tends to challenge existing social and economic hierarchies. In other words, liberal ideologies generally consider inequality (social-relational and/or economic) one of the major societal problems or obstacles to overcome. The economic elite tend to be perceived as the villain because they purportedly use their power to determine the dominant cultural ideas (or the ideological superstructure) within a society and support and/or reinforce the current hierarchical structure. The desired resolution, or solution to this obstacle, is a reduction, or elimination, of inequality by the defeat of the "false ideas" and outdated traditions that are dominant within a society and generally considered the primary source of inequality, prejudice, discrimination, and oppression (e.g., Jost, et al., 2003; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

An integration of Moral Foundations Theory with Error Management Theory suggests the individualizing foundations of Care, Fairness, and Liberty, may constitute the best predictors of liberal error management biases. In other words, liberals possess error management biases for the detection of harm, inequality, and oppression. More specifically, because of the common narrative

of liberal ideologies, that a socially and economically powerful elite exploits and oppresses the remainder of society through control of the ideological superstructure, liberals are expected to possess error management biases for prejudice, discrimination, and oppression of historically disadvantaged groups, and the harm caused by such attitudes and behaviors (see, e.g., Haidt, 2012). They are also expected to possess error management biases for the detection of unfair, or unjust, status inequalities.

Thus, when faced with uncertainty in the sociopolitical domain, these biases are expected to result in false alarms for cruelty, suffering, inequality, oppression of the and/or prejudice towards the poor and historically disadvantaged, greed (in seeking money and/or power), oppression by traditional authority figures, and the failure of authority figures to provide subordinates with care and/or prevent harm to them. It is important to note that although the ideology as moral vigilance perspective suggests liberals possess specific error management biases, and therefore expected to make certain types of false alarms, this does not mean liberals are incorrectly identifying these sociopolitical phenomena as harmful, unfair and unjust, and/or oppressive. The lower evidentiary criterion or threshold for perceiving these transgressions could also produce more hits or correct identifications. In other words, the ideology as moral vigilance perspective suggests liberals may overestimate (or exaggerate) the prevalence of these phenomena.

The associations between individual moral foundations and specific social and political attitudes reported above (e.g., Koleva, et al., 2012; Stevens, et al.,

2013) further suggest more specific hypotheses. As noted, Care prominently predicts attitudes towards gun control, the use of the death penalty, and the use of torture. It also predicts attitudes towards gay rights and animal testing (Koleva, et al., 2012; Stevens, et al., 2013). Thus, a high emphasis on the Care foundation is expected to produce error management biases for harm, whether it is a person inflicting this harm on another person or people (e.g., gun control; torture) or a government, state, or society directing this violence towards a specific target (e.g., death penalty). More specifically, liberals may possess error management biases for the harm done by guns, torture, and the death penalty which should be primarily predicted by the Care foundation.

Likewise, Fairness predicts support for affirmative action (Stevens, et al., 2013) and appears to best capture the ideological attitudes about social change and inequality associated with the widely used liberal-conservative dimension (Haidt, 2012; Koleva, et al., 2012). The moral vigilance perspective of liberalism therefore suggests an emphasis on Fairness produces error management biases for the perception of inequality, and unfair discrimination. An error management bias may also occur for cheating on behalf of the economic elite, particularly if the individual, in addition to Fairness, places high emphasis on Care and Liberty and a lower emphasis on the binding foundations of Loyalty, Authority, and respect. Lastly, Liberty is expected to produce error management biases for oppression on behalf of authority figures. This oppression can be intentionally carried out or be driven by more subtle, systemic societal factors (e.g., institutional racism). When coupled with an emphasis on Care and Fairness and comparatively less emphasis

on the binding foundations, this oppression is expected to be perceived as occurring to groups who have been historically disadvantaged and/or discriminated against (see, Haidt, 2012).

Conservatism as Moral Vigilance

Although conservative ideologies tend to place a fairly equal emphasis on the moral foundations, when compared to liberals they place more emphasis on the binding foundations and display greater concern for maintenance of social order and stability. This pattern often produces support for long-standing social traditions and institutions because they tend to promote social cohesion and unity (Graham & Haidt, 2010). The disintegration of social cohesion and social order, as reflected by an increase in, for instance the crime rate or the divorce rate is often attributed to value pluralism or multiculturalism. Additionally, conservative ideologies tend to demonstrate a heightened level of concern about the presence of free-riders within one's society (e.g., Christiansen & Levine, 1997; Jasper & Ansted, 2008; Skitka, 1999) and, in the United States, strongly endorse pro-capitalist policies. Redistributions of wealth are considered unfair and opposed because they can promote social loafing and free-riding, which weakens the social order. Thus, proponents or agents of social change are often perceived as a villain because they seek to weaken society's adherence to traditional social norms, values, and institutions which promote social cohesion and group unity (e.g., Graham & Haidt, 2010; Haidt & Graham, 2009). The weakening of traditional norms and institutions is considered one of the major social obstacles to combat because it may ultimately lead to the disintegration of social cohesion and social

order. The desired resolution, or solution, is a reestablishment of social cohesion through the defense and promotion of traditional norms and institutions.

An integration of Moral Foundations Theory with Error Management Theory suggests the binding foundations of Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity, may constitute the best predictors of conservative error management biases. In other words, the ideology as moral vigilance perspective suggests conservatives possess error management biases for the detection of betrayal, subversion, and degradation. More specifically, the common narrative of conservative ideologies suggests that traditional norms, values, and institutions possess a collective wisdom that may not be well understood but should be honored, and possibly revered. The longevity of these institutions is perceived as indicative of their usefulness, and weakening or eliminating them is thought to result in harmful, unintended (and possibly unconsidered) consequences for social cohesion and societal stability (see, e.g., Muller, 1997). Thus, conservatives are expected to possess error management biases for challenges to or deviance from traditional norms and values, insubordination of respected authorities, ingroup criticism, and threat from outsiders (particularly those with different values and social customs). Akin to the suggestion above in the liberalism as moral vigilance section, once any of these phenomena are perceived and regardless of whether the detection is a hit or a false alarm, conservatives may become morally outraged and thus be driven to engage in moral cleansing behaviors (e.g., Tetlock, et al., 2000).

As with the liberalism as moral vigilance proposal above, associations between the moral foundations and a variety of social and political attitudes and

beliefs (e.g., Koleva, et al., 2012; Stevens, et al., 2013) suggest more specific hypotheses. The emphasis placed on Sanctity predicts disapproval of abortion, homosexuality, the use of pornography, having a baby outside of marriage, physician-assisted suicide, casual sex, marijuana legalization, gambling, the teaching of evolution, and illegal immigrants (Koleva, et al., 2012; Stevens, et al., 2013). Koleva, et al. (2012) note most of these issues are concerned with sexuality and the Sanctity of life, and their association with Sanctity suggests engaging in such behaviors is considered degrading (e.g., abortion; homosexuality; marijuana usage) to one's self or soul and/or, by extension, a valued group's identity (e.g., illegal immigration; teaching of evolution). Thus, Sanctity is expected to predict conservative error management biases for phenomena related to sexuality and sanctity of life issues, such as the number of abortions, the amount of casual sex, or the extent of marijuana usage that occurs within a society.

Loyalty and Authority appear primarily linked to patriotism and national security issues. Loyalty predicts support for a flag burning amendment, increased defense spending, and aggressive anti-terrorism policies, while Authority predicts concern about illegal immigration, and support for warrantless wiretapping, the use of torture, and the death penalty (Koleva, et al., 2012; Stevens, et al., 2013). Increased defense spending, aggressive anti-terrorism policies (including warrantless wiretapping) and the use of torture in interrogations can all be considered ways to ward off future external threats to one's group. Thus, Loyalty and Authority are expected to predict conservative error management biases for

the detection of external threats, such as a terrorist attack, an invasion, or illegal immigration. Flag burning concerns the desecration of a sacred group symbol and Loyalty is therefore expected to also predict conservative error management biases for the detection of group criticism or a lack of patriotism.

Additionally, although conservative ideologies, in comparison to liberal ones, place greater emphasis on the binding foundations, they also emphasize the individualizing foundations. Therefore they may also develop error management biases for harm, cheating, and oppression. However, because of their greater emphasis on the binding foundations, conservative ideologies may develop different conceptualizations of what is harmful, unfair, and oppressive. Indeed, conservatives tend to base judgments of fairness on equity instead of egalitarianism (see, e.g., Haidt, 2012; Schlenker, et al., 2012) and appear to consider progressive taxation oppressive of economic liberty (Haidt, 2012; Iyer, et al., 2012). Thus, conservatives are also expected to develop error-management biases for free-riders within a society, biases that should be predicted by the Fairness and Liberty foundations. Furthermore among conservatives, the Liberty foundation is expected to predict suspicion of the federal government and the development of error management biases for government infringements on economic and religious liberty.

In terms of Care, although it appears liberals and conservatives may not always agree on what is harmful, there does appear to be a lot of common ground. For instance, certain liberal progressives and religious conservatives both concern themselves with helping the poor and disadvantaged within a society. Indeed

religion, in addition to liberal progressivism, contributed to the development of both the abolitionist-anti-slavery movement in the 1800's and the civil rights movement of the 1950's and 1960's. Recent events involving gun violence in the United States provide further examples of this overlap. First, in response to a 2011 shooting at a question-and-answer session held by U.S. congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords liberal and a number of conservative politicians (e.g., Peter King of New York) called for an examination and reformation of the nation's gun laws, advocating stricter gun regulations. Almost, two years later, in December 2012, a school-shooting occurred at an elementary school in Newtown, Connecticut. Again, liberals and a number of conservative politicians (e.g., Chris Christie of New Jersey; Pat Toomey of Pennsylvania) called for stricter gun regulations. Thus, depending on the circumstances, when issues or events relate to the Care domain conservatives may display error management biases that are similar to liberals.

Ideology and Intolerance

Although the ideologies of conservatism and liberalism have not been presented in a dichotomous, Manichean fashion, it should be readily apparent that within a society they are often in direct conflict with each other. The expansion of individual rights and liberties appears to ultimately destabilize the group or community (e.g., Haidt & Graham, 2009). Within a society therefore, liberals and liberalism may be more easily perceived as immoral by conservatives. Likewise, efforts by conservatives to maintain or strengthen social stability at the expense of individual rights and liberties may be more easily perceived as immoral by

liberals. The extremity of an ideological rival's position is often exaggerated (e.g., Chambers, Baron, & Inman, 2006; Haidt, 2012; Robinson & Friedman, 1995; Robinson, Keltner, Ward, & Ross, 1995) and the judgment that someone is immoral produces intolerance and derogation (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Haidt, et al., 2003; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Wainryb, et al., 2004). Presumably, this may also allow one to delegitimize the attitudes and beliefs of ideological, and rivals prevent one from granting psychological standing to them (e.g., Effron & Miller, 2012).

In other words, liberals are expected to display equivalent levels of intolerance and derogation towards conservatives, as conservatives display towards liberals. This intolerance is driven by moral outrage. This hypothesis is not meant to suggest that liberals and conservatives are equally prejudiced across the board. Indeed, there is ample evidence that levels of prejudice towards outgroups are higher among conservatives than liberals (e.g., Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996; Duckitt, 2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Rather, because conservatives are perceived as threats to the preferred moral order they can engender moral outrage in liberals, providing a foundation for derogation and intolerance. Thus, the ideology as moral vigilance perspective suggests that when liberals are intolerant it is generally directed towards conservatives. Likewise, the intolerance that conservatives display towards liberals is also driven by moral outrage.

This state of affairs is essentially the sociopolitical environment described by Edelman (1964). The person some perceive as in need is, to others, a free-

rider threatening the social fabric of the community. The wealthy philanthropist can be seen as a selfless hero or have his motives met with suspicion. In a democracy, the encouragement of opposing views almost ensures the potential for ideological disagreement when debating how to solve mass-scale social organization dilemmas. All ideologies perceive current sociopolitical realities as deviating from the preferred moral order (e.g., Martin, et al., 1990). This disequilibrium promotes political participation and activism (e.g., Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Snell, 2010) because there is always an issue to moralize and thus an enemy to defeat (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). The remainder of this dissertation presents the results of two studies which investigate the ideology as moral vigilance hypothesis.

Study 1

Study 1 attempted to replicate and expand on previous findings (Koleva, et al., 2012; Stevens, et al., 2013) which have demonstrated that the moral foundations predict a number of ideological attitudes and beliefs, even when controlling for factors such as self-reported political ideology, party affiliation, and other demographic factors such as education level and socioeconomic status. The hypotheses for Study 1 were based on Moral Foundations Theory, the results of Koleva, et al. (2012), and the results of Stevens, et al. (2013a). First, in general, the moral foundations were expected to explain a significant and unique portion of the variance in social and political attitudes. These associations were expected to occur even when controlling for demographic and cognitive flexibility variables (i.e., need for cognition and need for closure). Need for cognition and need for closure were included because of their often reported association with ideology and ideological attitudes; need for cognition was expected to be negatively associated with conservatism while need for closure was expected to be positively correlated with it (see, e.g., Jost, et al., 2003). No further predictions in regards to the cognitive flexibility variables were made.

More specifically and based on the results of Koleva, et al. (2012) and Stevens, et al. (2013a), Sanctity was expected to predict attitudes towards sexuality and sanctity of life issues (i.e., opposition to abortion rights, stem-cell research, gay rights, physician-assisted suicide, and marijuana legalization). Care was expected to predict support for increased gun control, concern about the environment, and opposition to the use of torture and the death penalty. Loyalty

was expected to predict disapproval of flag burning and support for stronger national security policies (defense spending and warrantless wiretapping). Authority was also expected to predict support for stronger national security policies, as well as concern about illegal immigration. Fairness was expected to predict attitudes towards economic inequality, such as support for affirmative action.

Additionally, I assessed attitudes towards fiscal conservatism, government healthcare, the Tea Party, and Occupy Wall Street, as well as concern over the economy, faith in the government, and trust in religion. Fairness was expected to predict support for government healthcare, and disapproval of fiscal conservatism and the Tea Party. Loyalty was expected to predict negative attitudes towards Occupy Wall Street. Sanctity was expected to predict trust in religion as well as support for strict constructionism, which reflects a reverence for the U.S. Constitution as originally written, similar to a literal interpretation of the Bible. Lastly, liberty, which was not assessed by Koleva, et al. (2012) and Stevens, et al. (2013a), was expected to predict support for abortion rights, gay rights, marijuana legalization, physician assisted suicide, and fiscal conservatism; concern about the economy; opposition to aggressive anti-terrorism policies, increased gun control, and government healthcare; and a belief that freedom of speech is the most important democratic right. These predictions were based on the conceptualization of the Liberty foundation, which entails a concern with individual rights and freedoms in economic and lifestyle (or social) choices, and the findings of Iyer, et al. (2012) and Haidt (2012) who report the Liberty

foundation is heavily emphasized by self-identified libertarians. All of the hypotheses concerning the associations between the moral foundations and political attitudes are presented in Table 3.

Method

Participants. Five-hundred and ten participants (287 male; 409 White, 26 East Asian (e.g., Chinese, Korean, Japanese), 25 Black, 22 Hispanic/Latino, 10 Multiracial, 7 Southeast Asian (e.g, Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian, Indonesia, Filipino), 6 South Asian (e.g., Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Afghan, Sri Lankan), 3 Middle Eastern/African, and 2 Native American; M_{age} = 30.59, S.D. $_{age}$ = 11.53) were recruited for a study of social and political attitudes and beliefs, from the Mechanical Turk participant pool, a web-based data collection source that produces samples more representative of the national population than typical college student samples (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011), and paid $0.50 for their participation. Participation was restricted to United States citizens fluent in English, over the age of 18, and currently located within the United States. Upon agreement to participate, subjects were redirected to the Qualtrics website (www.qualtrics.com) through a link in the Mechanical Turk recruitment posting. All measures, including informed consent and debriefing, were completed on the Qualtrics website. Upon completion of all measures subjects received a nine digit code to be entered as a response to the Mechanical Turk recruitment posting and receive payment.

Instructional manipulation checks. Participants first completed a series of instructional manipulation checks (IMC; see, e.g., Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009) and asked to respond with the number 4 to a series of open-ended questions such as: "What is your favorite color?" The IMCs were administered to control for satisficing effects (see, Krosnick, 1991). Participants

who did not correctly answer the IMCs were alerted to their error and allowed to proceed. All participants were further instructed that additional items were embedded throughout the survey to ensure they were attending to the survey items. These items were considered the focal manipulation checks (FMCs) and are described in further detail below.

Cognitive flexibility. Following the IMCs, participants completed the following measures of cognitive flexibility: need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) and need for closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). All of these measures were randomized and presented as one questionnaire (see, Appendix B). Responses were measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 4 = neither agree nor disagree, 7 = strongly agree).

Moral foundations questionnaire. The moral foundations questionnaire (Graham, et al., 2009; see, Appendix C) was then administered in two parts to assess the emphasis a participant placed on each of the moral foundations. The level of emphasis was measured with two 6-point Likert scales (0 = not at all relevant, 5 = extremely relevant; 1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree).

Measurement of social and political attitudes. A 55-item questionnaire, modified from Stevens, et al. (2013a), followed the moral foundations questionnaire and assessed attitudes and beliefs about a variety of social and political issues on a 5-point Likert scale (0 = not at all; 5 = completely). All items were presented in a randomized order for each participant.

These items were further divided into a number of subscales (see, Appendix D). Support for affirmative action and fiscal conservatism were measured with five items; environmental concern was measured with four items; and, support for stem cell research, gay rights, marijuana legalization, and government healthcare were measured with three items. Support for abortion rights, the death penalty, increased gun restrictions, the Tea Party, Occupy Wall Street, and strict constructionism were measured with two items. Concern over illegal immigration and the economy were also measured with two items. All remaining social and political attitude variables were measured with one item.

Focal manipulation checks. Two of the items of the social and political attitudes questionnaire served as two of the four focal manipulation checks: "I will respond with not at all to this question," and "I will respond with completely to this question." Participants who did not respond with "not at all" and "completely," respectively, were considered to have failed the manipulation check. The remaining two focal manipulation checks were two items embedded within the Moral Foundations Questionnaire. For the first item ("whether or not someone is good at math") a response above the midpoint of the scale was classified as failing the attention check. For the second item ("it is better to do good than to do bad") a response below the midpoint of the scale was classified as failing the manipulation check[6].

General demographics. Finally, participants provided general demographic information (see, Appendix E). This assessment included: gender, age, education, race/ethnicity, and religious affiliation, the frequency of

attendance at religious services, personal income, and household income. It also included multiple assessments of political ideology and party identification, described in further detail below. Prior to conducting the planned regression analyses, race/ethnicity and gender were dummy-coded, with White and male as the reference categories respectively.

Political ideology. Political ideology was assessed with four items. Two of these items were self-reported measures of political ideology: "How would you describe your political orientation?" (1 = extremely liberal; 7 = extremely conservative; 8 = I don't know) and, "In politics people also talk of "left" and "right". Where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?" The remaining two items assessed feelings towards liberals and conservatives: "How do you personally feel towards liberals (conservatives)?" (1 = dislike extremely; 9 = like extremely). The item assessing personal feelings towards liberals was recoded so that responses reflected greater liking of conservatives (α = .89). Since these items were measured on different Likert scales each item was standardized and a composite score for political ideology was calculated by computing the mean of these standardized scores, thus the mean for political ideology is 0, with scores above this point indicating greater conservatism and scores below it indicating greater liberalism.

Party identification. Political party identification was assessed with three items. One of these items was a self-reported measure of party identification: "If you had to choose, do you usually think of yourself as closer to the Democratic or Republican parties?" (1 = strong Democrat; 8 = strong Republican; 9 = I don't

know). The remaining two items assessed feelings towards Democrats and Republicans: "How do you personally feel towards Democrats (Republicans)?" (1 = dislike extremely; 9 = like extremely). The item assessing personal feelings towards Democrats was recoded so that responses reflected greater liking of Republicans (α = .73). Since these items were measured on different Likert scales each item was standardized and a composite score for party identification was calculated by computing the mean of these standardized scores, thus the mean for party identification is 0, with scores above this point indicating greater identification with the Republican Party and scores below it indicating greater identification with the Democratic Party.

Results

Preliminary Analysis

Before testing the hypotheses about the predictive power of moral foundations for ideological attitudes, reliability analyses were conducted on need for cognition, need for closure, each of the six moral foundation subscales (e.g., Graham, et al., 2009; Koleva, et al., 2012), and each subscale of the social and political attitudes measure (Stevens, et al., 2013). Table 4 presents the reliability coefficient, mean, and standard deviation for the following variables: religious attendance, need for cognition, need for closure, and the six moral foundations. Table 5 presents the reliability coefficient, mean, and standard deviation for each of the social and political attitude subscales. Table 6 presents the correlations between the demographic variables (ideology, party identification, age, gender, race/ethnicity, education, personal income, household income, and religious attendance) and each subscale of the social and political attitude measure. Table 7 presents the correlations between the psychological variables (cognitive flexibility variables and the moral foundations) with each subscale of the social and political attitude measure. Table 8 presents the correlations between the demographic variables and the psychological variables. Lastly, Table 9 presents the correlation matrix for the cognitive flexibility variables and the moral foundations (for all tables, see, Appendix A).

Main Analysis

A series of regression analyses tested the hypotheses concerning the predictive utility of the moral foundations for social and political attitudes. Each social and political attitude variable was regressed onto the demographic variables, need for cognition, need for closure, and the moral foundations. These regression analyses were performed in a step-wise fashion, with the demographic variables entered at step 1, need for cognition and need for closure entered at step 2, and the moral foundations entered at step 3. This is a conservative test of my hypotheses, as the majority of shared variance will be explained at steps 1 and 2 respectively. The overall relationship between the moral foundations and the political attitudes assessed was found by taking the square-root of ΔR^2 at step 3. This calculation provides an index of the overall relationship between a set of variables and the dependent variable, and is sometimes referred to as a semi-partial correlation. This calculation is analogous to an effect size and is reported for all the political attitudes assessed. Table 10 presents the results of these analyses. Importantly, with the exception of trust in religion ($\Delta F = 1.82$, *n.s.*), the moral foundations explained significant and unique portions of the variance for all of the social and political attitudes assessed (all ΔF's > 5.84, all *p*'s < .001), even when controlling for demographic factors and cognitive flexibility variables.

Support for abortion rights. The model was significant at step 1. Ideology, education, and religious attendance (all *t*'s > 2.23, all *p*'s > .05) significantly predicted support for abortion rights, with religious attendance the strongest predictor. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Ideology, religious

attendance, and need for closure (all t's > 2.74, all p's > .01) significantly predicted support for abortion rights, with religious attendance again the strongest predictor. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 also significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Ideology, age, gender, religious attendance, need for closure, Loyalty, and Sanctity (all t's > 1.96, all p's > .05) significantly predicted abortion rights. Sanctity emerged as the strongest predictor overall, and as predicted a greater emphasis on Sanctity was associated with less support for abortion rights (see, Table 10). Additionally, although the model is biased in favor of attributing predictive power to demographic and cognitive flexibility variables, results indicated the semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and support for abortion rights was .22, $\Delta R^2 = .05$, $\Delta F(6, 492) = 8.43$, $p < .001$.

Support for gay rights. The model was significant at step 1. All of the demographic variables (all t's > 2.25, all p's < .05), with the exceptions of party identification, $t(500) = -.87$, *n.s.*, and gender, $t(500) = 1.71$, *n.s.*, significantly predicted support for gay rights. Ideology emerged as the strongest predictor, with greater conservatism associated with less support. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 significantly improved the model's predictive utility. All of the demographic variables (all t's > 2.25, all p's < .05), with the exceptions of party identification $t(498) = -.81$, *n.s.*, and gender, $t(498) = 1.90$, $p = .06$, and need for closure, $t(498) = -3.34$, $p = .001$, significantly predicted support for gay rights. Ideology and religious attendance emerged as the strongest predictors. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3

also significantly improved the model's predictive utility. All of the demographic variables (all $t's > 2.38$, all $p's < .05$), except for party identification, $t(492) = -.12$, *n.s.*, and education $t(492) = 1.31$, *n.s.*, significantly predicted support for gay rights. Additionally, need for closure, liberty, Loyalty, and Sanctity (all $t's > 2.08$, all $p's < .05$) significantly predicted support for gay rights. Sanctity emerged as the strongest predictor overall, and as predicted greater emphasis on Sanctity was associated with less support for gay rights (see, Table 10). Furthermore, the semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and support for gay rights was .32, $\Delta R^2 = .11$, $\Delta F(6, 492) = 17.23$, $p < .001$.

Support for marijuana legalization. The model was significant at step 1. Ideology, race/ethnicity, and religious attendance (all $t's > 2.64$, all $p's < .01$) significantly predicted support for marijuana legalization. Ideology emerged as the strongest predictor, with greater conservatism associated with less support. The model was also significant at step 2, $F(11, 498) = 20.32$, $p < .001$, $R^2 = .31$. Ideology, race/ethnicity, religious attendance, need for cognition, and need for closure significantly (all $t's > 2.08$, all $p's < .05$) predicted support for marijuana legalization. Ideology again emerged as the strongest predictor. Lastly, the model was significant at step 3, $F(17, 492) = 16.43$, $p < .001$, $R^2 = .36$, ideology, religious attendance, need for cognition, need for closure, Loyalty, and Sanctity (all $t's > 2.03$, all $p's < .05$) significantly predicted support for marijuana legalization. Although ideology emerged as the strongest predictor of support for marijuana legalization, as predicted a greater emphasis on Sanctity was associated with less support (see, Table 10). The semi-partial relationship between the moral

foundations and support for marijuana legalization ($\Delta R^2 = .05$) was .22, $\Delta R^2 = .05$, $\Delta F(6, 492) = 6.73$, $p < .001$.

Support for stem-cell research. The model was significant at step 1. Ideology, gender, and religious attendance (all t's > 2.25, all p's $< .05$) significantly predicted support for stem-cell research. Ideology emerged as the strongest predictor, with greater conservatism associated with less support. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 significantly improved the predictive utility of the model. Ideology, gender, religious attendance, and need for cognition (all t's > 1.98, all p's $< .05$) significantly predicted support for stem-cell research. Ideology again emerged as the strongest predictor. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 also significantly improved the predictive utility of the model. Ideology, religious attendance, liberty, and Sanctity (all t's > 2.03, all p's $< .05$) significantly predicted support for stem-cell research. Sanctity emerged as the strongest predictor, and as expected a greater emphasis on Sanctity was associated with less support for stem-cell research (see, Table 10). The semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and support for stem-cell research was .28, $\Delta R^2 = .08$, $\Delta F(6, 492) = 10.23$, $p < .001$.

Opposition to physician-assisted suicide. The model was significant at step 1. Ideology, gender, race/ethnicity, education, and religious attendance (all t's > 2.00, all p's $< .05$)[7] significantly predicted opposition to physician-assisted suicide, with religious attendance the strongest predictor. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Ideology, gender, education, religious attendance, and need for

cognition (all t's > 2.10, all p's < .05) significantly predicted opposition to physician-assisted suicide. Religious attendance again emerged as the strongest predictor. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 also significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Ideology, religious attendance, need for cognition, and Sanctity (all t's > 2.30, all p's < .05) significantly predicted opposition to physician-assisted suicide. Sanctity emerged as the strongest predictor and consistent with predictions a greater emphasis on Sanctity was associated with more opposition to physician-assisted suicide (see, Table 10). The semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and opposition to physician-assisted suicide was .22, ΔR^2 = .05, ΔF(6, 492) = 5.84, p < .001.

Support for the death penalty. The model was significant at step 1. Ideology, party identification, age, gender, education, and religious attendance (all t's > 2.02, all p's < .05) significantly predicted support for the death penalty. Ideology emerged as the strongest predictor, with greater conservatism associated with more support. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Ideology, party identification, age, gender, education, and religious attendance (all t's > 1.96, all p's < .05) significantly predicted support for the death penalty. Ideology again emerged as the strongest predictor. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 also significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Party identification, age, religious attendance, Care, Liberty, and Authority (all t's > 2.00, all p's < .05) significantly predicted support for the death penalty. Care emerged as the strongest predictor and, as predicted, a greater emphasis on Care

was associated with less support for the death penalty (see, Table 10). The semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and support for the death penalty was .40, ΔR^2 = .15, $\Delta F(6, 492)$ = 17.68, $p < .001$.

Support for increased gun restrictions. The model was significant at step 1. Ideology, gender, education, and household income (all t's > 1.98, all p's < .05) significantly predicted support for increased gun restrictions. Ideology emerged as the strongest predictor, with greater conservatism associated with less support. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 did not significantly improve the predictive utility of the model. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 significantly improved the predictive utility of the model. Ideology, need for closure, Care, and Liberty (all t's > 2.10, all p's < .05) significantly predicted support increased gun restrictions. Liberty emerged as the strongest predictor. Consistent with my hypotheses Liberty and Care predicted support for increased gun restrictions. Specifically, a greater emphasis on Liberty was associated with less support while a greater emphasis on Care was associated with more support (see, Table 10). The semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and support for increased gun restrictions was .32, ΔR^2 = .10, $\Delta F(6, 492)$ = 10.32, $p < .001$.

Concern about the environment. The model was significant at step 1. Ideology, gender, and education (all t's > 3.80, all p's < .001) significantly predicted support for concern about the environment. Ideology emerged as the strongest predictor, with greater conservatism associated with less concern. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 significantly improved the

predictive utility of the model. Ideology, gender, education, and need for closure (all t's > 3.05, all p's < .01) significantly predicted concern about the environment. Ideology again emerged as the strongest predictor. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Ideology, gender, education, need for closure, Care, Fairness, Liberty, and Sanctity (all t's > 2.59, all p's ≤ .01) significantly predicted concern about the environment. Ideology was again the strongest predictor, although as predicted a greater emphasis on Care was associated with more concern about the environment (see, Table 10). The semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and concern about the environment was .33, $\Delta R^2 = .10$, $\Delta F(6, 492) = 17.42$, $p < .001$.

Enhanced interrogation/torture is immoral. The model was significant at step 1. Ideology, party identification, age, and gender (all t's > 2.36, all p's < .05) significantly predicted the belief that torture is immoral. Ideology emerged as the strongest predictor, with greater conservatism associated with the belief that torture is not immoral. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 significantly improved the predictive utility of the model. Ideology, party identification, age, gender, and need for closure (all t's > 2.08, all p's < .05) significantly predicted the belief that torture is immoral. Ideology again emerged as the strongest predictor. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 also significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Party identification, age, personal income, Care, Fairness, and Authority (all t's > 2.07, all p's < .05) significantly predicted the belief that torture is immoral. Care and Authority were

the strongest predictors. Specifically, and as predicted, a greater emphasis on Care was associated with a stronger belief that torture is immoral. Additionally, a greater emphasis on Authority was associated with less support for the belief that torture is immoral (see, Table 10). The semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and the belief that torture is immoral was .35, $\Delta R^2 = .11$, $\Delta F(6, 492) = 12.99$, $p < .001$.

Support for affirmative action. The model was significant at step 1. Ideology, gender, and race/ethnicity (all $t's > 5.49$, all $p's < .001$) significantly predicted support for affirmative action. Ideology emerged as the strongest predictor, with greater conservatism associated with less support. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 did not significantly improve the predictive utility of the model. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Ideology, gender, race/ethnicity, Fairness, and Liberty (all $t's > 3.63$, all $p's < .001$) significantly predicted support for affirmative action. Ideology was again the strongest predictor, although as predicted a greater emphasis on Fairness was associated with more support for affirmative action (see, Table 10). The semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and support for affirmative action was .27, $\Delta R^2 = .07$, $\Delta F(6, 492) = 8.58$, $p < .001$.

Support for government healthcare. The model was significant at step 1. Ideology, race/ethnicity, and education (all $t's > 2.42$, all $p's < .05$) significantly predicted support for government healthcare. Ideology emerged as the strongest predictor, with greater conservatism associated with less support. The addition of

the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 did not significantly improve the predictive utility of the model. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Ideology, race/ethnicity, education, Fairness, Liberty, and Sanctity (all $t's > 1.97$, all $p's < .05$) significantly predicted support for government healthcare. Ideology was again the strongest predictor, although as predicted a greater emphasis on Fairness was associated with more support for government healthcare, while a greater emphasis on Liberty was associated with less support (see, Table 10). The semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and support for government healthcare was .36, $\Delta R^2 = .13$, $\Delta F(6, 492) = 18.91$, $p < .001$.

Concern about illegal immigration. The model was significant at step 1. Ideology and age ($t's > 2.82$, all $p's < .01$) significantly predicted concern about illegal immigration. Ideology emerged as the strongest predictor, with greater conservatism associated with more concern. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 significantly improved the predictive utility of the model. Ideology, age, race/ethnicity, and need for closure (all $t's > 2.12$, all $p's < .05$), significantly predicted concern about illegal immigration. Ideology again emerged as the strongest predictor. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 also significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Ideology, race/ethnicity, need for closure, Liberty, Authority, and Sanctity (all $t's > 2.61$, all $p's < .01$) significantly predicted concern about illegal immigration. Ideology was again the strongest predictor although as predicted greater emphasis on Authority was associated with more concern about illegal immigration (see, Table

10). The semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and concern about illegal immigration was .24, $\Delta R^2 = .08$, $\Delta F(6, 492) = 10.18$, $p < .001$.

Support for increased military spending. The model was significant at step 1. Ideology, party identification, gender, and education (all *t's* > 2.32, all *p's* < .05) significantly predicted support for increased military spending. Ideology emerged as the strongest predictor, with greater conservatism associated with more support. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 significantly improved the predictive utility of the model. Ideology, party identification, gender, education, and need for closure (all *t's* > 1.97, all *p's* < .05), significantly predicted support for increased military spending. Ideology again emerged as the strongest predictor. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundation at step 3 also significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Ideology, party identification, need for closure, and Sanctity (all *t's* > 1.97, all *p's* < .05) significantly predicted support for increased military spending. Need for closure emerged as the strongest predictor. Contrary to predictions, Loyalty and Authority did not predict support for increased military spending. Additionally, a greater emphasis on Sanctity was associated with more support for increased military spending (see, Table 10). The semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and support for increased military spending was .24, $\Delta R^2 = .05$, $\Delta F(6, 492) = 6.15$, $p < .001$.

Support for warrantless wiretapping. The model was significant at step 1. Party identification, age, and race/ethnicity (all *t's* ≥ 1.96, all *p's* < .05) significantly predicted support for warrantless wiretapping. Party identification

emerged as the strongest predictor, with greater identification with the Republican Party associated with more support. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 significantly improved the predictive utility of the model. Party identification, age, and need for closure (all t's > 2.58, all p's ≤ .01) significantly predicted support for warrantless wiretapping. Party identification again emerged as the strongest predictor. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 also significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Party identification, age, Loyalty, and Authority (all t's > 2.26, all p's < .05) significantly predicted support for warrantless wiretapping. Party identification and Authority emerged as the strongest predictors. Thus, as predicted a greater emphasis on Authority was associated with more support for warrantless wiretapping. Additionally, and as predicted, a greater emphasis on Loyalty was associated with more support (see, Table 10). The semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and support for warrantless wiretapping was .24, $\Delta R^2 = .07$, $\Delta F(6, 492) = 6.83$, $p < .001$.

Free speech is the most important democratic right. The model was not significant at step 1. The model was significant at step 2, with the addition of the cognitive flexibility. Personal income and need for closure (t's ≥ 1.96, all p's < .05) significantly predicted the belief that freedom of speech is the most important democratic right. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Personal income, Fairness, and Liberty (all t's > 2.15, all p's < .05), significantly predicted the belief that freedom of speech was the most important democratic right. Fairness emerged as

the strongest predictor, although as predicted a greater emphasis on Liberty was associated with a stronger belief that freedom of speech is the most important democratic right (see, Table 10). The semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and the belief that freedom of speech is the most important democratic right was .33, $\Delta R^2 = .12$, $\Delta F(6, 492) = 12.35$, $p < .001$.

Support for an amendment against flag burning. The model was significant at step 1. Ideology, party identification, age, gender, and religious attendance (all t's > 2.09, all p's < .05) significantly predicted support for an amendment against flag burning. Ideology emerged as the strongest predictor, with greater conservatism associated with more support. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 significantly improved the predictive utility of the model. Ideology, party identification, age, gender, and religious attendance (all t's > 2.06, all p's < .05) significantly predicted support for an amendment against flag burning. Ideology again emerged as the strongest predictor. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 also significantly improved the model's predictive utility was significant at step 3. Party identification, gender, Loyalty, and Authority (all t's > 2.19, all p's < .05) significantly predicted support for an amendment against flag burning. Authority emerged as the strongest predictor, although as predicted a greater emphasis on Loyalty was associated with more support for an amendment against flag burning (see, Table 10). Overall the association between the moral foundations and support for a constitutional amendment against flag burning was .36, $\Delta R^2 = .13$, $\Delta F(6, 492) = 17.91$, $p < .001$.

Support for the Tea Party. The model was significant at step 1. Ideology, age, and education (all *t's* > 1.98*,* all *p's* < .05) significantly predicted support for the Tea Party. Ideology emerged as the strongest predictor, with greater conservatism associated with more support. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 did not significantly improve the predictive utility of the model. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Ideology, age, Care, Fairness, Liberty, and Sanctity (all *t's* > 2.00*,* all *p's* < .05) significantly predicted support for the Tea Party. Ideology was again the strongest predictor, although as predicted a greater emphasis on Fairness was associated with less support for the Tea Party (see, Table 10). The semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and support for the Tea Party was .28, ΔR^2 = .08, $\Delta F(6, 492)$ = 10.43, *p* < .001.

Support for Occupy Wall Street. The model was significant at step 1. Ideology, household income, and religious attendance (all *t's* > 2.85*,* all *p's* < .01) significantly predicted support for Occupy Wall Street. Ideology emerged as the strongest predictor, with greater conservatism associated with less support. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 did not significantly improve the predictive utility of the model. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Ideology, household income, Fairness, and Authority (all *t's* > 2.63*,* all *p's* < .01) significantly predicted support for Occupy Wall Street. Ideology was again the strongest predictor, although as predicted a greater emphasis on Fairness was associated with more support for Occupy Wall Street (see, Table 10). The semi-

partial relationship between the moral foundations and support for Occupy Wall Street was .28, ΔR^2 = .07, ΔF(6, 492) = 9.94, p < .001.

Support for fiscal conservatism. The model was significant at step 1. Ideology, race/ethnicity, and household income (all t's > 1.97, all p's < .05) significantly predicted support for fiscal conservatism. Ideology emerged as the strongest predictor, with greater conservatism associated with more support. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 did not significantly improve the predictive utility of the model. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Ideology, Care, Fairness, Liberty, and Sanctity (all t's > 1.97, all p's < .05) significantly predicted support for fiscal conservatism. Fairness emerged as the strongest predictor and as predicted a greater emphasis on Fairness was associated with less support for fiscal conservatism. Additionally, and as predicted, a greater emphasis on Liberty was associated with more support for fiscal conservatism (see, Table 10). The semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and support for fiscal conservatism was .42, ΔR^2 = .18, ΔF(6, 492) = 34.04, p < .001.

Concern about the economy. The model was significant at step 1. Ideology emerged as the strongest predictor, with greater conservatism associated with more concern. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 did not significantly improve the predictive utility of the model. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Ideology, gender, Liberty, and Sanctity (all t's > 2.15, all p's < .05) significantly predicted concern about the economy. Liberty emerged as the

strongest predictor and, as predicted, as greater emphasis on Liberty was associated with more concern about the economy (see, Table 10). Overall the association between the moral foundations and concern about the economy was .28, $\Delta R^2 = .08$, $\Delta F(6, 492) = 7.83$, $p < .001$.

Support for strict constructionism. The model was significant at step 1. Ideology emerged as the stronger predictor, with greater conservatism associated with more support. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 did not significantly improve the predictive utility of the model. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Ideology, Fairness, Liberty, and Sanctity (all $t's > 2.11$, all $p's < .05$) significantly predicted support for strict constructionism. Sanctity emerged as the strongest predictor, and as predicted a greater emphasis on Sanctity was associated with more support for strict constructionism (see, Table 10). The semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and support for strict constructionism was .30, $\Delta R^2 = .09$, $\Delta F(6, 492) = 10.02$, $p < .001$.

Faith in government. The model was significant at step 1. Ideology emerged as the stronger predictor, with greater conservatism associated with less faith. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 did not significantly improve the predictive utility of the model. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Ideology, race/ethnicity, Fairness, Liberty, Authority, and Sanctity (all $t's > 2.29$, all $p's < .05$) significantly predicted faith in government. Liberty emerged as the strongest predictor, and as predicted a greater emphasis on Liberty was

associated with less faith in the government (see, Table 10). The semi-partial

relationship between the moral foundations and faith in government was .28, ΔR^2

= .08, $\Delta F(6, 492) = 8.11$, $p < .001$.

Trust in religion. The model was significant at step 1. Only religious

attendance, $t(500) = 6.78$, $p < .001$, significantly predicted trust in religion. The

addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 did not significantly

improve the predictive utility of the model. Lastly, the addition of the moral

foundations at step 3 did not significantly improve the model's predictive utility.

Thus, overall, only religious attendance, $t(492) = 5.28$, $p < .001$ significantly

predicted trust in religion (see, Table 10).

Additional Analyses

Liberty/Oppression. Unlike the original five foundations of Care,

Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity, Iyer, et al. (2012) subdivided the

Liberty foundation into lifestyle liberty and economic liberty for their analysis.

Their results suggest Lifestyle Liberty captures the more liberal/progressive social

attitudes associated with the Liberty foundation, such as support for gay rights.

Economic Liberty, in contrast, appears to capture the more conservative attitudes

associated with the Liberty foundation, such as support for pro-capitalist policies

(e.g., tax cuts for the wealthy). Table 11 presents the correlation coefficients for

lifestyle liberty (M = 4.64, S.D. = .84) and economic liberty (M = 4.24, S.D. =

.76) and the demographic factors, cognitive flexibility variables, the remaining

moral foundations, and the social and political attitudes assessed.

Indeed, Lifestyle Liberty was positively correlated with: need for cognition; Care and Fairness; support for abortion rights, gay rights, marijuana legalization, stem-cell research, government healthcare, and Occupy Wall Street; concern about the environment; a belief that freedom of speech is the most important democratic right; and a belief that torture is immoral. It was also negatively correlated with: ideology, party identification, and religious attendance; need for closure; Authority and Sanctity; opposition to physician-assisted suicide; a belief that it should be unconstitutional to burn an American flag; illegal immigration concern; support for increased military spending, warrantless wiretapping, the Tea Party, fiscal conservatism, and strict constructionism. Economic Liberty was positively correlated with: ideology, party identification, and age; Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity; support for the death penalty, increased military spending, the Tea Party, fiscal conservatism, and strict constructionism; concern about the economy and illegal immigration; a belief that freedom of speech is the most important right; a belief that it should be unconstitutional to burn an American flag. It was also negatively correlated with: education; need for closure; support for abortion rights, gay rights, marijuana legalization, stem-cell research, increased gun restrictions, affirmative action, government healthcare, and Occupy Wall Street; concern about the environment; the belief that the use of torture is immoral; and faith in the government (see, Table 11).

Discussion

The pattern of results was quite clear and consistent; with the exception of trust in religion, the moral foundations explained a significant portion of the variance in all of the social and political attitudes assessed, as reflected by an average semi-partial relationship of .28. Of the 35 hypotheses made concerning a specific moral foundation and a specific social or political attitude, 27 of them were confirmed (77%; see, Table 12). Four of the 8 hypotheses that were not confirmed were made in regards to the Liberty foundation, which has recently been proposed (Haidt, 2012; Iyer, et al., 2012) and prior research on how the moral foundations are associated with social and political attitudes did not assess it (see, Koleva, et al., 2012; Stevens, et al., 2013). Furthermore, these associations emerged from a fairly conservative test of the hypotheses as the regression model employed was likely to attribute much of the shared variance in social and political attitudes between the predictor variables to those entered earlier in the model, and the moral foundations were entered at the final step. This set of results suggests the moral foundations, in part, underlie a wide variety of our social and political attitudes.

Overall the current set of results demonstrates that many of our social and political controversies are concerned with issues of Sanctity, Liberty, and Fairness. As predicted, and consistent with prior research (Koleva, et al., 2012; Stevens, et al., 2013), Sanctity concerns were associated with disapproval of abortion rights, gay rights, marijuana legalization, stem-cell research, and physician-assisted suicide (mean of standardized regression coefficients = .35).

Sanctity was also associated greater concern about illegal immigration and the economy; support for increased military spending, the Tea Party, fiscal conservatism, and strict constructionism; disapproval of government healthcare; lower faith in government; and less concern for the environment (mean of standardized regression coefficients = .21). Interestingly, although the Sanctity foundation is closely related to religion, it did not predict trust in religion. This may, in part, have been due to the low levels of church attendance reported by the participants, which implies a fairly low level of overall religiosity. On closer inspection however, it does appear that the sexuality and Sanctity of life issues may possess a religious component. Church attendance predicts disapproval of abortion rights, gay rights, marijuana legalization, stem-cell research, and physician-assisted suicide. Yet, in contrast, church attendance does not predict any of the other social and political attitudes Sanctity is associated with (see, Table 10).

More broadly, Sanctity has been linked to disgust (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009) and conservatives, in comparison to liberals, are more likely to experience disgust (Horberg, et al., 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, & Haidt, 2012; Terrizzi Jr., Shook, & Ventis, 2010). Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt (1999) suggest disgust be classified as an other-critical emotion, experienced in response to the behavior of others and involving some form of disapproval. As a result the experience of disgust often produces avoidance, exclusion, and stigmatization (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Jones & Fitness, 2008). Consistent

with this, disgust sensitivity (see e.g., Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994; Olatunji, Williams, Tolin, Sawchuk, Abramowitz, Lohr, & Elwood, 2007) is positively correlated with authoritarianism (Hodson & Costello, 2007), social conservatism (Inbar, et al., 2012; Terrizzi Jr., et al., 2010), and intuitive negative reactions to homosexuals (Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009). Additionally, empirically eliciting disgust makes people more likely to consider taboo sexual behaviors immoral (Horberg, et al., 2009) and increases prejudice towards groups associated with these behaviors, such as gay men (Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2012).

Jones and Fitness (2008) further report that criminal behavior (e.g., drug trafficking; fraud) elicits disgust resulting in dispositional attributions of blame, biases towards conviction, longer sentence recommendations, and exaggerated perceptions of crime in the community (see also, Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). Rozin and colleagues (Rozin, Markwith, & McCauley, 1994; Rozin, Nemeroff, Wane, & Sherrod, 1989; see also, Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008) have found that although contact with cars, clothing, possessions, rooms, and utensils used by unknown and undesirable person are both avoided this effect is stronger for the undesirable person. For instance, a sweater previously worn by a person who has suffered physical misfortune or deformity, disease, or a moral taint are perceived as highly aversive, offensive and contaminating. This reaction is consistent with Tetlock's (Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, et al., 2000) view of moral outrage and moral cleansing as a combination of affective (e.g., disgust), cognitive (e.g., increased dispositional attributions; exaggerated perceptions of crime), and behavioral (e.g., harsher sentencing recommendations) components. When the current results are

considered in light of these findings they suggest the possibility that certain ideas (e.g., socialism and/or communism, and the policies associated with them), individuals, or groups who are classified as immoral, because they represent a transgression of a value associated with a highly emphasized moral foundation, may come to possess a moral taint, be considered disgusting, and considered contaminating.

As predicted, Fairness concerns were associated with support for affirmative action, government healthcare, and Occupy Wall Street; and opposition to fiscal conservatism and the Tea Party. Haidt (2012) and Koleva, et al. (2012) have suggested the Fairness foundation captures attitudes towards inequality, and thus may reflect the traditional left-right (or liberal-conservative) dimension employed in much of the social psychological literature on ideology. Support for affirmative action, government healthcare, and Occupy Wall Street all appear consistent with this notion, as affirmative action and government healthcare attempt to reduce inequalities while Occupy Wall Street as a movement supports increased egalitarianism and an elimination of economic inequality. Likewise, the opposition to fiscal conservatism and the Tea Party is also consistent with this interpretation, as fiscal conservatism is opposed to economic redistribution and the Tea Party as a movement strongly supports fiscally conservative policies. Lastly, this perspective can also explain the unexpected associations between Fairness concern about the economy and a belief that freedom of speech is the most important democratic right, as the concern about the economy may be focused on the presence of economic inequality while

free speech allows anyone, regardless of social status, to hold and express their own attitudes and beliefs.

Fairness also, unexpectedly, predicted concern about the environment, a belief that torture is immoral, support for strict constructionism, and faith in government. With the exception of the belief that torture is immoral and consistent with Haidt's (2012) and Koleva, et al.'s (2012) suggestion, the association of Fairness with the remaining issues may reflect a general understanding of the liberal-conservative divide in the United States. Liberals are generally more concerned about human effects on the environment, tend to hold positive views towards what government can accomplish, and often prefer legal precedent to evolve with the times. Consistent with this suggestion ideology also predicted concern about the environment, faith in government, and strict constructionism (see, Table 10).

Importantly, previous research investigating the association of the moral foundations with social and political attitudes did not assess the Liberty foundation (Koleva, et al., 2012; Stevens, et al., 2013). Thus, the current results offer some initial insight into how many social and political controversies, regardless of ideological or party affiliation, may revolve around concerns of Liberty. As expected Liberty predicted more support for gay rights and fiscal conservatism; opposition to increased gun restrictions and government healthcare; a belief that free speech is the most important democratic right; concern about the economy; and low faith in the government. With the exception of concern about the economy, these attitudes all appear to reflect a resistance to an imposition of

authority and a desire to maintain personal autonomy, which appears particularly potent in the economic realm.

Indeed, Liberty predicts opposition to affirmative action, less concern for the environment, and support for the Tea Party. Affirmative action may reflect a view that the government is overstepping its authority by meddling in the market economy in an attempt to redistribute wealth in a more egalitarian, and thus less equitable, manner. Likewise, the lower concern for the environment may reflect an opposition to government controls on the economy, as some of the items assessed attitudes towards such policies (e.g., "I am opposed to off-shore oil drilling" and "I believe environmental regulations are limiting economic growth"). The support for the Tea Party is likely related to the group's support for fiscal conservative policies, which limit government involvement in the economy.

Additional analyses support this interpretation. When the Liberty foundation was subdivided into Lifestyle and Economic Liberty (see, Iyer, et al., 2012) a correlational analysis revealed that Economic Liberty was positively correlated with ideology, party identification, concern about the economy and support for fiscal conservatism and the Tea Party. Yet, Economic Liberty was negatively correlated with concern for the environment, a belief that torture is immoral, and support for affirmative action, government healthcare, increased gun restrictions, and Occupy Wall Street. In contrast, Lifestyle Liberty was positively correlated with concern about the environment, a belief that torture is immoral, and support for abortion rights, gay rights, marijuana legalization, stem-

cell research, government healthcare, and Occupy Wall Street; and negatively correlated with ideology, party identification, concern about illegal immigration, and support for fiscal conservatism and the Tea Party. The Liberty foundation overall (i.e., not subdivided into Economic Liberty and Lifestyle Liberty) predicted a number of economic attitudes, obtaining a medium effect size (see, Table 10). Thus, it appears that when the Liberty foundation is not subdivided, concerns about economic liberty may be a more prominent component element of the Liberty foundation than concerns about lifestyle liberty (see, Table 10).

These results concerning the Liberty foundation appear broadly consistent with the suggestions of Haidt (2012) and Iyer, et al. (2012). An emphasis on lifestyle freedoms (e.g., abortion rights, gay rights, marijuana usage) was positively correlated with liberalism, Care, and Fairness, and negatively correlated with Authority and Sanctity. In contrast, an emphasis on economic (and property-related) freedom was positively correlated with conservatism, Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity. When considered in conjunction with the social and political attitudes associated with Fairness the current results suggest that Fairness is operationalized by Moral Foundations Theory as equality, not proportionality or equity. Furthermore, the positive correlation of Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity with Economic Liberty is consistent with a system-justification motive (Jost, et al., 2003; see also, Haidt & Graham, 2009), in that laissez-faire capitalism tends to increase socioeconomic inequality and the binding foundations presumably facilitate the maintenance of the existing social structure by imbuing certain traditions, values, and institutions with respect and reverence.

As in Koleva, et al. (2012) and Stevens, et al. (2013a) the associations of Care with the social and political attitudes assessed were limited to a smaller number of issues, compared to the Fairness, Liberty, and Sanctity foundations. As predicted, and consistent with prior research, Care predicted support for increased gun restrictions, concern about the environment, the belief that the use of torture is immoral, and opposition to the death penalty, the Tea Party, and fiscal conservatism. This pattern of results suggests a high emphasis on Care leads one to perceive guns, the death penalty, and torture as extremely harmful, regardless of whether the source of this harm is an individual, a group, or larger societal institutions. Anger is expected to be directed towards those who commit a harmful act (e.g., use guns) or facilitate/allow a harmful act to happen (e.g., negligence).

This latter conjecture offers an explanation for the negative associations between emphasis on Care and support for fiscal conservatism and the Tea Party, especially when those findings are considered in light of the negative correlation between Care and Economic Liberty. Indeed, although essentially, everyone regardless of ideological identification, places a high emphasis on Care (see, e.g., Haidt, 2012) liberals consistently place more emphasis than conservatives (see, Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2011; Graham, et al., 2013). Liberals also tend to be more uncomfortable with social and economic inequality, particularly when it applies to historically disadvantaged groups, and thus may consider capitalism and a preference for more laissez faire economics harmful because it can maintain, or even increase, social and economic inequality.

Consistent with this, Clifford and Jerit (2013) found that the emphasis placed on the moral foundations predicted relevant trait accessibility when describing a politician (e.g., emphasis on Care was positively related to the number of Care- and Harm-related traits listed). Additionally, a politician's position on a given issue interacted with the individual's own position to impact trait inferences such that someone who, for instance, opposes fiscal conservatism due to Care/Harm concerns would be expected to rate a politician who does support fiscal conservatism as low on Care/Harm traits.

As expected, and consistent with prior research (Stevens, et al., 2013), Authority predicted support for warrantless wiretapping, concern about illegal immigration and opposition to Occupy Wall Street. Unexpectedly, Authority also predicted support for the death penalty and a constitutional amendment against flag burning, faith in the government, and a weaker belief that the use of torture is immoral. Illegal immigration may have triggered concerns about how illegal immigrants do not respect proper channels of immigration to the United States and/or how such immigration may ultimately subvert longstanding traditions, values, and institutions. A similar psychological reaction may have occurred to the Occupy Wall Street movement, which has been highly critical of Western, particularly American, society and may be seen as subversive movement challenging long-standing economic values and institutions by an individual who emphasizes the Authority foundation. The unexpected association between Authority and support for a constitutional amendment against flag burning can

also be considered to reflect concerns about subversion and disrespect, with a specific focus on a revered symbol.

At first, the positive association between faith in the government and Authority may be considered puzzling, as conservatism tends to be associated with an emphasis on Authority and, in the United States, conservatives often criticize the expansion of government in the economic realm. However, when one considers the government is a longstanding societal institution and that the Liberty foundation appears to capture conservative concerns about government influence in the economic realm, the association seems in line with Moral Foundations Theory and the link between Authority and faith in government may be considered an example of system-justification. Respect for the decisions made by traditional authorities and institutions may offer an explanation for the associations between Authority and support for the death penalty and warrantless wiretapping, and the weaker belief that the use of torture is immoral. In all three cases, an individual who emphasizes Authority may be respecting the judgment of a respected institution, an authority figure, or both. For instance in the case of the death penalty Authority concerns may motivate acceptance of the legal system's decision, while in the case of both warrantless wiretapping and the use of enhanced interrogation/torture the President and other high-ranking government and military officials have argued for them as necessary evils. Intriguingly, this adherence to the judgment of a respected authority (or authorities) occurs on two issues where Care concerns predict the opposing view, opposition to the death penalty and a stauncher belief that the use of torture is immoral.

Finally and as expected, Loyalty predicted support for a constitutional amendment against flag burning and for warrantless wiretapping. As noted in the previous paragraph, the American flag represents a revered group symbol. While in the case of Authority the association may reflect concerns over subversion, the association with Loyalty may be driven by the destruction of a highly valued group object. Such an action may be considered a threat to one's group and thus trigger Loyalty concerns. Support for warrantless wiretapping on the other hand may reflect a proactive desire to protect the group from threat or a more nefarious desire to exert more control over individual rights.

Unexpectedly, Loyalty also predicted support for abortion rights, gay rights, and marijuana legalization. These associations are even more surprising when one considers the positive association between Loyalty and religious attendance and the negative associations of the latter variable with support for abortion rights, gay rights, and marijuana legalization. Yet, as noted above the sample as a whole reported a fairly low mean frequency of religious attendance. A closer inspection of the overall means for the social and political attitudes indicates that support for abortion rights, gay rights, and marijuana legalization obtained the highest overall levels of support. Additionally, it appears there were ceiling effects for support for abortion rights ($M = 4.16$) and gay rights ($M = 4.25$). In other words, the current sample firmly supports abortion rights, gay rights, and marijuana legalization. Considering the mean age ($M = 30.59$) it is possible these unexpected findings may reflect a strong commitment to a

generational group and its social and political beliefs, and not necessarily a broader ideological one where age and generation are of little consequence.

In sum, the moral foundations predict a wide variety of social and political attitudes even when controlling for demographic factors, such as ideology, and cognitive flexibility variables.   Some attitudes can reflect the concerns of a single foundation while others may be associated with multiple foundations. In particular Sanctity, Liberty, and Fairness appear important to understanding a number of current, and potential, political events and controversies. In particular, the Liberty foundation, which prior research investigating the associations between the moral foundations and social and political attitudes did not assess (see, Koleva, et al., 2012; Stevens, et al., 2013), emerged as a prominent predictor, particularly of economic attitudes. The general consistency of the current findings with past research strongly suggests the emphasis placed on the moral foundations is a reliable and consistent predictor of social and political attitudes. The limitations and potential future directions of Study 1 are addressed in the General Discussion section.

Study 2

Study 2 was designed as a within-subjects investigation of hypotheses generated from the ideology as moral vigilance perspective. Two fictional statements made by anonymous individuals in a television interview were presented to subjects in a random order. One of these statements criticized the concept of welfare and the idea of Fairness as equality while the other criticized the U.S. military. The former of these was considered the ambiguously prejudiced statement while the latter was considered the ambiguously unpatriotic statement. According to the ideology as moral vigilance perspective, liberals, because of their emphasis on the individualizing foundations, are expected to possess error management biases for prejudice, discrimination, the oppression of historically disadvantaged groups, and the detection of unfair, or unjust status inequalities. Conservatives, because they emphasize the binding foundations in addition to the individualizing foundations, are expected to possess error management biases for challenges to or deviance from traditional norms and values, insubordination of respected authorities, ingroup criticism, threat from outsiders (particularly those with different values and social customs), and for free-riders within a society.

Thus, when presented with the ambiguously prejudiced comment an individual who highly emphasizes Fairness is expected to consider the comment prejudiced and inaccurate, and the person who said it as prejudiced and less educated. Finally, an individual who highly emphasizes Fairness is expected to desire greater social distance from the person who made the ambiguously

prejudiced comment. On the other hand, when presented with the ambiguously unpatriotic statement an individual who highly emphasizes Loyalty is expected to consider the comment unpatriotic and inaccurate, and the person who said it as unpatriotic and uneducated. Finally, an individual who highly emphasizes Loyalty is expected to desire greater social distance from the person who made the ambiguously unpatriotic comment.

These hypotheses investigate different aspects of the ideology as moral vigilance perspective. For both ambiguous statements I assessed how offensive it was, whether or not the statement and the person who said it were considered prejudiced (unpatriotic), and one's desired social distance from such a person. Additionally subjects were asked to consider how educated the person making the comment was. This design allows one to test hypotheses concerning error management biases (e.g., the statement and/or person is prejudiced or unpatriotic), outrage/anger (e.g., offensiveness of the statement), increased tendency to make dispositional attributions (e.g., the person making the statement may be relatively uneducated), and moral cleansing behaviors (e.g., preference for greater social distance)

Method

Participants. One-hundred and fifty one participants (66 male; 121 White, 10 Black, 5 South Asian, 4 Multiracial, 1 East Asian, 1 Southeast Asian, 1 Other Asian, and 1 Other (American); M_{age} = 35.48, S.D. $_{age}$ = 13.48) were recruited for a study of social and political attitudes and beliefs, from the Mechanical Turk participant pool, a web-based data collection source that produces samples more representative of the national population than typical college student samples (Buhrmester, et al., 2011), and paid \$1.00 for their participation. Participation was restricted to United States citizens fluent in English, over the age of 18, and currently located within the United States. Upon agreement to participate, subjects were redirected to the Qualtrics website (www.qualtrics.com) through a link in the Mechanical Turk recruitment posting. All measures, including informed consent and debriefing, were completed on the Qualtrics website. Upon completion subjects received a nine digit code to be entered as a response to the Mechanical Turk recruitment posting and receive payment.

Instructional manipulation checks. As in Study 1, participants first completed the same series of instructional manipulation checks (IMC; Oppenheimer, et al., 2009). Participants who did not correctly answer the IMCs were alerted to their error and allowed to proceed. All participants were further instructed that additional items were embedded throughout the survey to ensure they were attending to the survey items. These items were considered the focal manipulation checks (FMCs) and are described in further detail below.

Moral foundations questionnaire. Following the IMCs, participants completed the moral foundations questionnaire (Graham, et al., 2009; see, Appendix C) employed in Study 1.

Focal manipulation checks. The focal manipulation checks[8] were the two items embedded within the Moral Foundations Questionnaire.

Cognitive flexibility. Next, participants completed the modified need for cognition and need for closure measures employed in Study 1 (see, Appendix B).

Ambiguous statements. Following the cognitive flexibility measures participants were informed they would be presented with statements made by two different individuals and that their reactions to the statements and individuals would be assessed. Participants were then asked to: "Consider a person who makes the following statement in a television interview." They were then randomly presented with either an ambiguously prejudiced comment or an ambiguously unpatriotic statement (see, Appendix F)[9]. Reactions to the statement and inferences about the person making it were assessed immediately afterwards. This was followed by a measure of desired social distance. The ambiguous statement remained on the screen throughout all of these measures. Upon completion, participants were presented with the second ambiguous comment they had not been presented with and completed essentially the same assessments (see, Appendix G and Appendix H for stimuli and all measures). Overall, 73 participants (27 male; 59 White, 3 Black, 3 South Asian, 3 Multiracial, 2 Hispanic/Latino, 1 East Asian, 1 Other Asian, and 1 Other (American); M_{age} =

35.67, S.D. $_{age}$ = 14.75) were presented with the ambiguously prejudiced statement first and the ambiguously unpatriotic statement second, while 78 participants (39 male; 62 White, 7 Black, 5 Hispanic/Latino, 2 South Asian, 1 Southeast Asian, 1 Multiracial; M$_{age}$ = 35.29, S.D. $_{age}$ = 12.27) were presented with the ambiguously unpatriotic statement first and the ambiguously prejudiced statement second.

Ambiguous statement reactions. The reactions to the statements, the inferences made about the person who made it, and the reported desired level of social distance served as the dependent variables in Study 2 (see, Appendix G and Appendix H). Offensiveness of the comment, the accuracy of the comment, how prejudiced (unpatriotic) the statement was, how prejudiced (unpatriotic) the person making the statement is, and how educated the person making the statement is served as the dependent variables for Study 2. Composite measures for how offensive each statement was and social distance were calculated.

Offensiveness was created from three items of the reaction measure: "I think this statement is disrespectful," "I think this statement is offensive," and "I think this statement is harmful." The remaining two items from the reaction measure, "I think this statement is accurate," and "I think this statement is prejudiced (unpatriotic)" were analyzed separately because they provided a more direct test of the hypothesis. Composite scores were also calculated for the social distance measure. The two items from the inference measure: "I think this person is prejudiced (unpatriotic)" and "I think this person is educated," were analyzed

separately. All reliability coefficients, means, and standard deviations are presented in Table 11.

   General demographics. Participants then provided general demographic information (see, Appendix E).   This assessment was the same as employed in Study 1, thus ideology (α = .87) and party identification (α = .68) were calculated in the same manner.   Finally, as in Study 1 race/ethnicity and gender were dummy-coded, with White and male as the reference categories respectively.

Results

Preliminary Analysis

Before testing the hypotheses about the predictive power of moral foundations for error management biases and reactions to the ambiguous statements, reliability analyses were conducted on need for cognition, need for closure, and each of the six moral foundation subscales (e.g., Graham, et al., 2009; Koleva, et al., 2012). Table 13 presents the reliability coefficients, mean, and standard deviation for religious attendance, need for cognition, need for closure, the six moral foundations, and all of the dependent variables. Table 14 presents the correlations between the demographic variables and the psychological variables. Lastly, Table 15 presents the correlation matrix for the cognitive flexibility variables and the moral foundations (see, Appendix A).

Tests for within-subject order effects. Because of the within-subject nature of the design there was a potential for order effects to emerge and impact the dependent variables. Interaction terms between order (ambiguously prejudiced statement first or ambiguously unpatriotic statement first) and the psychological variables (cognitive flexibility and the moral foundations) were computed and a step-wise regression model was run on each dependent variable to test for potential order effects. Demographic variables were entered at step 1; order, need for cognition, need for closure, and the moral foundations at step 2; and the interaction terms at step 3. First, of the 12 dependent variables assessed, 1 had a significant ΔF at step 3. Second, no main effect for order emerged (all $t's <$ 1.57, *n.s.*). Third, of the 96 tests for interaction effects (12 dependent variables, 8

interaction terms) 10 significant interactions emerged (approximately 10%). There was no discernible pattern to these interactions. Based on these findings, it was concluded that order effects did not occur. The order factor was therefore not included as a predictor in subsequent analyses.

Main Analysis

A series of regression analyses tested the hypotheses of the ideology as moral vigilance perspective. For each ambiguous statement, offensiveness, social distance, and the reaction and inference items were each regressed onto the demographic variables, need for cognition, need for closure, and the moral foundations. These regression analyses were performed in a step-wise fashion, with the demographic variables entered at step 1, need for cognition and need for closure at step 2, and the moral foundations at step 3. This is a conservative test of my hypotheses, as the majority of shared variance will be explained at steps 1 and 2 respectively. Tables 16 and 17 present the results of these analyses for the ambiguously prejudiced and ambiguously unpatriotic statements respectively. Importantly, with the exception of the inference item "I think this person is educated" asked following the ambiguously unpatriotic statement ($\Delta F = 1.40$, *n.s.*), the moral foundations explained significant and unique portions of the variance for all of the dependent variables (all ΔF's > 3.01, all p's $< .01$).

Ambiguously Prejudiced Statement

Offensiveness. The model was significant at step 1. Ideology, gender, and religious attendance (all t's > 2.08, all p's $< .05$) significantly predicted the

offensiveness of the ambiguously prejudiced statement. Ideology emerged as the strongest predictor, with greater conservatism associated with less perceived offensiveness. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 did not significantly improved the predictive utility of the model. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Ideology, party identification, Liberty, and Loyalty (all *t's* > 2.32, all *p's* < .05) significantly predicted the offensiveness of the ambiguously prejudiced statement. Liberty emerged as the strongest predictor, with a greater emphasis on Liberty associated with finding the ambiguously prejudiced statement less offensive (see, Table 16). The semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and the offensiveness of the ambiguously prejudiced statement was .30.

I think this statement is prejudiced. The model was significant at step 1. Ideology and education (*t's* > 2.16, *p's* < .05) significantly predicted whether the ambiguous statement was considered prejudiced. Ideology emerged as the strongest predictor, with greater conservatism negatively associated with the belief the statement was prejudiced. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 did not significantly improved the predictive utility of the model. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Ideology and Liberty (*t's* > 2.32, *p's* < .05) significantly predicted whether the ambiguous statement was considered prejudiced. Ideology emerged as the strongest predictor, with greater liberalism associated with the belief the ambiguous statement was prejudiced. Additionally,

a greater emphasis on Liberty was negatively associated with the belief the ambiguous statement was prejudiced (see, Table 16). The semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and this belief was .32.

I think this statement is accurate. The model was significant at step 1. Ideology and age (t's > 2.48, p's < .05) significantly predicted whether the ambiguously prejudiced statement was considered accurate. Ideology emerged as the strongest predictor, with greater conservatism associated with the belief the statement was accurate. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 did not significantly improved the predictive utility of the model. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Gender and Liberty (t's > 2.42, p's < .05) significantly predicted whether the ambiguously prejudiced statement was considered accurate. Liberty emerged as the strongest predictor with a greater emphasis on Liberty associated with the belief the ambiguously prejudiced statement was accurate (see, Table 16). The semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and this belief was .40.

I think this person is prejudiced. The model was significant at step 1. Only ideology, $t(141) = -2.92$, $p = .004$, significantly predicted whether the person who made the ambiguous statement was considered prejudiced, with greater conservatism negatively associated with the belief the person is prejudiced. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables significantly improved the predictive utility of the model. Ideology and need for cognition (t's > 2.92, p's < .01) significantly predicted whether the person who made the

ambiguous statement was considered prejudiced. Ideology emerged as the strongest predictor. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 also significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Personal income, need for cognition, and Liberty (t's > 1.97, p's < .05) significantly predicted whether the person who made the ambiguous statement was considered prejudiced. Liberty emerged as the strongest predictor, with a greater emphasis on Liberty associated with the belief that the person who made the ambiguous statement was not prejudiced (see, Table 16). The semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and this belief was .32.

I think this person is educated. The model was significant at step 1. Only ideology, $t(141) = 2.11$, $p = .04$, significantly predicted whether the person who made the ambiguously prejudiced statement was considered educated, with greater conservatism associated with a stronger belief that the person is educated. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 did not significantly improved the predictive utility of the model. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Care, Liberty, and Authority (t's > 2.13, p's < .04) significantly predicted whether the person who made the ambiguously prejudiced statement was considered educated. Liberty emerged as the strongest predictor, with a greater emphasis on Liberty associated with the belief that the person who made the ambiguously prejudiced statement was accurate (see, Table 16). The semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and this belief was .35.

Social distance. The model was significant at step 1. Only ideology, $t(141) = -4.45, p < .001,$ significantly predicted desired social distance from the person who made the ambiguously prejudiced statement, with greater conservatism associated with less desired social distance. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 did not significantly improved the predictive utility of the model.   Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Ideology, Loyalty, and Liberty (*t's* > 1.97*, p's* < .05) significantly predicted desired social distance from the person who made the ambiguously prejudiced statement. Liberty emerged as the strongest predictor, with a greater emphasis on Liberty associated with less desired social distance from the person who made the ambiguously prejudiced statement (see, Table 16). Loyalty predicted a desire for greater social distance from the person who made the ambiguously prejudiced statement. The semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and this attitude was .33.

Ambiguously Unpatriotic Statement

Offensiveness. The model was not significant at step 1 or step 2. The addition of the moral foundations at step 3 significantly improved the predictive utility of the model. Need for cognition and Loyalty (*t's* > 1.95*, p's* ≤ .05) significantly predicted the offensiveness of the ambiguously unpatriotic statement. Loyalty emerged as the strongest predictor, with a greater emphasis on Loyalty associated with finding the ambiguously unpatriotic statement more offensive (see, Table 17). The semi-partial relationship between the moral

foundations and the offensiveness of the ambiguously prejudiced statement was .35.

I think this statement is patriotic. The model was not significant at step 1 or step 2. The addition of the moral foundations at step 3 significantly improved the predictive utility of the model. Care and Fairness (*t's* > 2.39*, p's* < .05) significantly predicted whether the ambiguous statement was considered patriotic. Fairness emerged as the strongest predictor and a greater emphasis on Fairness was associated with the belief the ambiguous statement was patriotic, Care showed the opposite effect (see, Table 17). The semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and this belief was .32.

I think this statement is accurate. The model was significant at step 1. Ideology and age (*t's* > 2.24*, p's* < .05) significantly predicted whether the ambiguously unpatriotic statement was considered accurate. Age emerged as the strongest predictor while greater conservatism was negatively associated with a belief the statement was accurate. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 did not significantly improved the predictive utility of the model.   Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Age and Fairness (*t's* > 3.03*, p's* < .01) significantly predicted whether the ambiguously prejudiced statement was considered accurate. Fairness emerged as the strongest predictor with a greater emphasis on Fairness associated with the belief the ambiguously unpatriotic statement was accurate (see, Table 17). The semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and this belief was .33.

I think this person is patriotic. The model was not significant at step 1 or step 2. The addition of the moral foundations at step 3 significantly improved the predictive utility of the model. Need for closure and Fairness (*t's* > 1.98, *p's* < .05) significantly predicted whether the person who made the ambiguous statement was considered patriotic. Fairness emerged as the strongest predictor, with a greater emphasis on Fairness associated with the belief that the person who made the ambiguous statement was patriotic (see, Table 17). The semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and this belief was .35.

I think this person is educated. The model was not significant at step 1. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables significantly improved the predictive utility of the model. Age and need for closure (*t's* > 2.13, *p's* < .04) significantly predicted whether the person who made the ambiguously unpatriotic statement was considered educated. Need for closure emerged as the strongest predictor. The addition of the moral foundations at step 3 did not significantly improve the model's predictive utility (see, Table 17).

Social distance. The model was significant at step 1. Age and religious attendance (*t's* > 2.12, *p's* < .04) significantly predicted desired social distance from the person who made the ambiguously unpatriotic statement. The addition of the cognitive flexibility variables at step 2 did not significantly improved the predictive utility of the model. Lastly, the addition of the moral foundations at step 3 significantly improved the model's predictive utility. Age, Fairness, and Loyalty (*t's* > 1.98, *p's* < .05) significantly predicted desired social distance from the person who made the ambiguously unpatriotic statement. Loyalty emerged as

the strongest predictor, with a greater emphasis on Loyalty associated with a desire for more social distance from the person who made the ambiguously unpatriotic statement. Fairness was associated with a desire for less social distance from the person who made the ambiguously unpatriotic comment (see, Table 17). The semi-partial relationship between the moral foundations and this attitude was .30.

Discussion

The pattern of results in Study 2 was, for the most part, unexpected. While liberalism was associated with the belief that the ambiguously prejudiced statement was prejudiced, being offended by it, and desiring social distance from the person who made the statement, the corresponding associations for conservatism to the unpatriotic statement did not emerge. Yet, consistent with the results of Study 1 they further attest to the role of the moral foundations of Fairness and Liberty in understanding many, American, social and political controversies, as indicated by the average semi-partial relationship, between the moral foundations and subjects reactions to the ambiguous comments, which was .33. More specifically, Liberty emerged as a prominent predictor of subjects' reactions to the ambiguously prejudiced statement while Fairness emerged as a prominent predictor of subjects' reactions to the ambiguously unpatriotic statement. Interestingly and regardless of which comment was presented, Loyalty consistently predicted how offensive the statement was and the desired social distance from the person who made the comment. All of these associations emerged when controlling for demographic factors and cognitive flexibility variables.

Emphasis on Fairness was hypothesized to predict a subject's reactions to the ambiguously prejudiced statement. In contrast, Fairness predicted many of the reactions to the ambiguously unpatriotic statement and, in fact, did not emerge as a significant predictor for any of the reactions assessed following the ambiguously prejudiced statement. As noted, the Fairness foundation appears to

best capture the traditional left-right dimension often employed in social psychological research (Haidt, 2012; Koleva, et al., 2012; see also, Study 1) and predicts attitudes towards affirmative action and general social and economic inequality. While it is somewhat surprising Fairness did not predict reactions to the ambiguously prejudiced statement, upon closer inspection the ambiguous unpatriotic statement is focused on how the United States has used its military to power its economy, which is said to have been built on the backs of the poor.

On the other hand, Liberty was not hypothesized to predict reactions to either ambiguous statement. Yet, it prominently predicted every dependent variable in response to the ambiguously prejudiced statement. Upon further reflection, particularly on the results of Study 1, the association of Liberty with these dependent variables is likely driven by the Economic Liberty component. This component of the Liberty foundation was associated with support for fiscal conservatism and the Tea Party, as well as opposition to affirmative action and government healthcare. Additionally, it appears to be the more powerful of the two Liberty components, as Lifestyle Liberty was associated with support for abortion rights, gay rights, marijuana legalization, government healthcare, and Occupy Wall Street; all of which are negatively associated with Economic Liberty.

More importantly however, when presented with either comment the foundation that best predicted reactions to it and the person who made it did so in a manner that reflected defense of the comment and the person who made it. In other words, when presented with the ambiguously prejudice statement, as an

individual's emphasis on Liberty increased they were more likely to not consider the comment or the person who made it prejudiced. Furthermore, this pattern was associated with finding the statement less offensive and more accurate, considering the person who made it more educated, and desiring less social distance from them. These attitudes and beliefs suggest the possibility that individuals' who highly emphasized the Liberty foundation perceived the person who made this comment as similar to them. This pattern of results also emerged for the Fairness foundation when individuals' were presented with the ambiguously unpatriotic statement. Specifically, as an individual's emphasis on Fairness increased they were more likely to consider the comment or the person who made it patriotic. Furthermore, this pattern was associated with finding the statement less offensive and more accurate, and desiring less social distance from the person who made the statement.

As noted previously, according to the similarity-liking principle we, in general, like people who share our attitudes, beliefs, opinions, and values more than those who disagree with us (e.g., Byrne, 1971; Chambers & Melnyk, 2006; Chambers, et al., 2013; Haidt, et al., 2003; Rokeach, 1960; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993). The ambiguously prejudiced statement advocates for a market based economy where outcomes are inevitably unequal. This affirms and reinforces the worldview of individuals' who place a high emphasis on Liberty, and in particular Economic Liberty. Thus as a result they reported greater liking of the person who made the comment. This interpretation of the results is consistent with the findings of Clifford and Jerit (2013), that the emphasis placed on the moral

foundations predicts relevant trait accessibility when describing a politician (e.g., emphasis on Care was positively related to the number of Care- and Harm-related traits listed). In other words, if a perceiver who highly emphasizes the Liberty foundation infers that another person also highly emphasizes the Liberty foundation they will infer that the person possess traits related to the Liberty foundation, which presumably the perceiver also possesses and thus consider the person similar to them.

Likewise, the ambiguously unpatriotic comment contends the United States utilizes its military for profit, taking advantage of the poor around the world. This affirms and reinforces a worldview that is concerned with the economic elite manipulating or cheating the rest of society so that they maintain their high status position. Thus as a result, individuals' with a greater emphasis on Fairness reported greater liking of the person who made the ambiguously unpatriotic comment. Furthermore, given this interpretation one might expect the Liberty foundation to also predict reactions to the ambiguously unpatriotic comment. However, since the Economic Liberty component of the foundation appears to primarily drive the associations between Liberty and other factors, and this component also appears linked to a strong profit motive, one would, if anything, expect the foundation to predict a negative reaction to the statement.

Evidence of System-Justification

Finally, as in Study 1, some interesting findings associated with the Loyalty foundation emerged. Regardless of which statement was evaluated,

Loyalty predicted how offensive the statement was and a desire for greater social distance from the person who made the statement. While Loyalty was expected to predict reactions to the ambiguously unpatriotic statement the corresponding predictions for the ambiguously prejudiced statement were not made. This more generalized response to both comments may reflect concerns over how such a comment, or a person making, may put group cohesion at risk. Again, this is more readily apparent in reactions to the ambiguously unpatriotic statement in that the person making it is highly critical of the United States and all of the participants were American citizens. Yet, when one considers that one of the values the United States was founded on is the concept of equality for all, then the negative reaction to the ambiguously prejudiced statement predicted by the Loyalty foundation makes sense. Simply put, to imply that we cannot achieve full equality directly contradicts a cherished American value generally held by a large majority of citizens. Thus, in both cases the responses predicted by the Loyalty foundation may constitute an example of a system justification motive (e.g., Jost, et al., 2003).

Intriguingly, system-justification is typically associated with conservatism as the adoption of conservative political attitudes is considered a means to satiate the system-justification motive (see, Jost, et al., 2003). Haidt and Graham (2009) have further suggested that the binding foundations of Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity capture the system-justification motive. Yet, in the present research Loyalty, and to a lesser extent Authority which predicted faith in government, predicted support for some political attitudes that are generally associated with

political liberalism. Nevertheless, I believe the present results reflect evidence of system-justification because Jost, et al. (2003), contend that the system-justification motive can be employed in defense of politically liberal attitudes and social systems, when those attitudes and social systems represent the status quo.

When the mean age of the current sample is considered (M = 35.48) along with the results from Study 1 indicating that Loyalty was a significant predictor of support for abortion rights, gay rights, and marijuana legalization – the three issues which obtained the highest overall levels of support – and that Authority was a predictor of faith in government the conclusion that such attitudes may reflect system-justification is strengthened. It was suggested above that this association may have reflected generational effects given the mean age of the sample in Study 1 (M = 30.59). For instance, a woman's right to an abortion has been protected by the U.S. Supreme Court since the *Roe v. Wade* decision in 1973 suggesting that the system-justification motive (Jost, et al., 2003) would tend to favor support for abortion in individuals born and socialized after *Roe v. Wade*. Additionally, younger adults (born 1965 and later) are more likely to favor gay rights and their entrance to the electorate, coupled with the exit of members from older generations, has shifted public opinion in America in favor of gay rights (e.g., adoption, marriage; Pew Research Center, March 20, 2013; see also, Putnam & Campbell, 2010).

Conclusions

In sum, although the results of Study 2 are not entirely consistent with my hypotheses, they further attest to the importance of Fairness and Liberty concerns in many of our current social and political controversies. Indeed, it appears there are sharp divisions in how liberals and conservatives conceptualize the concepts of fairness and liberty, with liberals emphasizing fairness as equality and concerned with liberty in the lifestyle realm and conservatives emphasizing fairness as proportionality or equity and concerned with liberty in the economic realm. This divide is further compounded by the concepts themselves, as fairness and liberty can both be considered an essentially contested concept, something that does not (and cannot) have an agreed upon meaning (see, Connoly, 1983; MacKenzie, 2003). That these concepts can become imbued with moral content means that all sides in a debate over social issues and policies consider their conceptualization of the concept and interpretation of the social environment to largely be objectively correct. Someone who holds a different conceptualization and interpretation of the social environment must, therefore, be mistaken (e.g., Chambers, et al., 2006; Chambers & Melnyk, 2006; Goodwin & Darley, 2008, 2012; Haidt, 2012). As with Study 1, the limitations and potential future directions of Study 2 are addressed in the General Discussion section.

General Discussion

I examined the relationship between the moral foundations and a number of social and political attitudes (Study 1) as well as aspects of the initial moral reasoning which occurs in response to a trigger event after an intuitive judgment has been made (Study 2). As noted, the results of both studies attest to the role the moral foundations, in particular Fairness, Liberty, and Sanctity, play in many social and political controversies. These effects emerged from a fairly conservative test of the hypotheses and occurred even when controlling for demographic factors and cognitive flexibility variables. Essentially, it appears that the moral foundations, in part, underlie political attitudes and that many political stances previously considered paradoxical from a unidimensional perspective of ideology (e.g., supporting the death penalty but opposing abortion rights) in fact, reflect the pluralism of our morality. When it is considered that the death penalty typically triggers Care-related concerns while abortion rights typically trigger Sanctity-related, or Lifestyle Liberty-related, concerns than the presumed tension between the two positions largely evaporates. The positions are motivated by different moral intuitions, whose concerns do not typically overlap (see, Stevens, et al., 2013).

The current studies can be added to the growing body of literature linking the moral foundations to social and political attitudes (e.g., Haidt, 2012; Koleva, et al., 2012; Stevens, et al., 2013) and, more broadly, social and political psychology literature that contends core values and predispositions predict sociopolitical attitudes, as well as, if not better than, demographic variables such

as party affiliation and socioeconomic status (e.g., Carmines & Stimson, 1980; Erikson & Tedin, 2007; Feldman, 1988; Goren, 2013; Fong, 2001; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993). Furthermore and consistent with Stevens, et al. (2013a), the current series of studies suggests the moral foundations, and thus presumably one's core values, may, depending on the issue, even be a more powerful predictor than ideological self-placement. It therefore seems reasonable to suggest that there is not only a psychological structure to most, if not all, of our political attitudes, but a moral structure as well. Thus, almost any political issue may carry with it the potential for moralization and ultimately be a reflection of our moral intuitions even when we are not explicitly aware of this effect.

Additionally, Study 2 suggests that the moral foundations an individual emphasizes can influence the process of person perception, in particular the inference of traits and characteristics (see also, Clifford & Jerit, 2013). This has some intriguing implications. The process of trait inference often occurs spontaneously (for reviews see, e.g., Uleman, Blader, & Todorov, 2005; Uleman, Saribay, Gonzalez, 2008) but can be moderated by existing attitudes and beliefs, such as stereotypes (e.g., Otten & Moskowitz, 2000). The possible role of the similarity-liking principle in Study 2 is consistent with the results of Otten and Moskowitz (2000) who found that people have a tendency to spontaneously infer more positive traits in ingroup members and more negative traits in outgroup members. Given that subjects had no other information about the person making the statement, other than the statement itself, it seems fairly plausible that the

similarity-liking principle drove a spontaneous inference of positive traits when the statement was consistent with one's highly emphasized values.

Ultimately and perhaps most importantly, the current studies provide one of the initial investigations into the moral reasoning aspects of the Social Intuitionist Model (Haidt, 2001). Graham, et al. (2013), contend this area of research remains relatively unexplored and understudied, and have advocated for more investigation of this phenomena in order to move the discussion of social intuitionism and the moral foundations beyond the realm of one's initial moral judgment. Study 2 attempted to capture people's initial conscious reactions to a potentially morally controversial statement. While the results were somewhat unexpected, they still demonstrated the importance of the Moral Foundations in underlying political perception.

Limitations and Future Directions

Both studies have important limitations. First, both used samples of convenience obtained from the Internet. Participants tended to be more educated, more secular, and more liberal than the general U.S. population. In other words, many of them were likely WEIRD – Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic – subjects (see, Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Nevertheless, I believe these samples to be a considerable improvement over the samples limited to college students typically utilized in most social and political psychology research (e.g., Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004).

Second, in Study 1 a potential methodological concern is the similarity between some of the items from the Moral Foundations Questionnaire and the dependent variables. For instance, some of the Liberty/Oppression items (such as: "The government interferes far too much in our everyday lives") are worded similarly to some of the social and political attitude items. This may have inflated some of the associations between the moral foundations and the social and political attitudes assessed. This may have occurred, in particular for the Liberty and Sanctity foundations (see, Koleva, et al., 2012), two of the more powerful predictors of social and political attitudes in general.

More broadly, Study 1 deals entirely with correlational data. Thus, although theoretically when considering the order of causality, the moral foundations should precede many of the other predictors also included, there is no way to actually establish this direction of causality. Some questions that therefore remain unanswered are: how does one come to develop a particular moral matrix? In other words, what leads one individual to primarily emphasize the individualizing foundations (e.g., liberals), while another emphasizes the six foundations fairly equally (e.g., conservatives), and a third focuses almost exclusively on one of these six (e.g., libertarians)? Do our moral intuitions prepare us to adopt a particular ideology or does the ideology we adopt shape how we respond to our moral intuitions? It is likely that these relationships are bidirectional; recall that the moral foundations are proposed as a first draft that is extensively revised through experience, although future investigations should

begin to attempt to clarify the strength and typical direction of these links, as well as other potential moderating factors that may alter the causal order.

Study 2 deals with experimental data and therefore does not suffer from this limitation. Yet, it only provided an initial test of hypotheses generated from the ideology as moral vigilance perspective that was limited to two issues, government legislation of equal economic results and the size, scope, and intention of the U.S. military budget. These issues primarily triggered the Fairness and Liberty foundations, and to a more limited extent the Loyalty foundation. How the foundations of Care, Authority, and Sanctity would operate in similar conditions was not investigated. Furthermore, although liberals were more offended by and considered the ambiguously prejudiced statement more prejudiced than conservatives, the majority of results are more consistent with the similarity-liking principle (Byrne, 1971) in that individuals appeared to defend a person who made a controversial comment if they perceived that person as sharing their beliefs, in effect granting them psychological standing for their position (e.g., Effron & Miller, 2012; Miller & Effron, 2010; Miller, et al., 2009). In terms of perceptual vigilance, subjects were, if anything, on-guard for similarity and not necessarily a moral transgression. Yet, if the results are considered in another light they do suggest that when an individual detects value differences between themselves and another individual they prefer to avoid (i.e., prefer greater social distance) and somewhat derogate them (i.e., rate as less educated).

Additionally, although Study 2 attempted to investigate aspects of moral reasoning which occur following an intuitive moral judgment, it does so in a fairly limited and constrained fashion. The statement presented is presumed to function as an eliciting event or trigger (see, Haidt, 2001) and the reactions to it are considered aspects of moral reasoning. Yet, this statement is presented completely in a vacuum, there is no context presented other than that it was made in a television interview by someone. Furthermore, there is no information given about the person making the statement – no information concerning their race/ethnicity, gender, political inclinations, and socioeconomic status. Subjects, therefore can only base their reactions on the statement itself, and any potential inferences they have made from it. Elucidating how such additional information may moderate people's reactions may shed further light on how the moral foundations can impact the process of person perception.

More broadly, future research should attempt to further test aspects of the ideology as moral vigilance perspective that were not investigated in the current series of studies. For instance, perhaps the emphasis an individual places on a given moral intuition influences what stimuli they remember. One could assess the emphasis an individual places on the moral foundations and then present subjects with a scene of a bedroom with the task of remembering as many personal objects as possible. If an individual highly prioritizes Care they may demonstrate better recall for objects associated with Care-concerns (e.g., a book opposing the death penalty) compared to a foundation that is not so highly prioritized. Such findings would be consistent with Clifford and Jerit (2013).

Other potential avenues of research include assessing the emphasis placed on the moral foundations, asking subjects to estimate the prevalence of a given social problem (e.g., inequality; drug usage; prejudice; free-riding) and then compare those estimates to real-world figures. According to the ideology as moral vigilance perspective, the extent or prevalence of social problems related to a highly emphasized moral foundation should be overestimated and/or exaggerated.

Conclusion

Whether we are aware or not, our politics – our political attitudes, beliefs, opinions, and convictions – appear linked in many ways to our preferred vision of how the world should be. When reasoning is applied to this domain it often reflects some form of morally motivated reasoning. This may take the form of a social or political attitude that is ultimately linked to and motivated by one's dominant moral concerns or it may be reflected in how another individual is evaluated on the basis of their inferred moral beliefs and values. We are complex social animals, with many different motivations and concerns. Understanding the source of these differences and how they impact the processes of social and person perception can potentially provide a deeper understanding of our social and political conflicts, and, hopefully, allow for a reduction in tension between conflicting visions of the world. The acknowledgement that the other side in a debate is not evil, but instead driven by motivations to seek what they see as a desirable end-state for society may not end all internal political conflicts, but it might open the door for compromise on issues where there may be common ground, since presumably we share at least some similar moral intuitions.

Endnotes

1 = Ideology refers to an interrelated set of attitudes, beliefs, and values concerning what the proper goals of society are and how they should be pursued/achieved (e.g., Jost, 2006; Tedin, 1987). This dissertation focuses on political ideology, therefore any subsequent references to ideology, unless otherwise specified, concern political ideology.

2 = "Right-wing" or conservative is generally employed to describe the former ideological stance while "left-wing" or liberal is reserved for the latter.

3 = It is acknowledged that the term liberal has multiple meanings that depend on a country's political system. For instance, in Europe and South America liberal may be used to refer to a pro-capitalist stance on economic issues, yet in the United States the term tends to imply support for social justice and civil rights, and opposition to certain capitalist policies. In this dissertation the term liberalism refers to progressive ideologies that challenge inequality and traditional social norms and values.

4 = Jones and Fitness (2008) refer to the phenomenon as moral hypervigilance.

5 = Examples of sociopolitical issues that have undergone amoralization include alcohol prohibition and divorce (Rozin, et al., 1997).

6 = All analyses reported were performed on all subjects (N = 510) and separately on the subset of subjects who passed the focal manipulation checks (N = 468). The pattern of results did not change, thus all analyses reported are done so for the entire sample (N = 510).

7 = Unless otherwise noted all *t* values reported are their absolute value.

8 = A total of 19 subjects did not pass one of the FMC's, 13 of these subjects had also failed the initial IMC's. 18 of the 19 subjects did not pass the "Whether someone was good at math" FMC. Additionally 2 of these 18 subjects did not pass the "It is better to good than bad" FMC. Only 1 subject passed the former FMC and not the latter. Given that math may be relevant to being "right" or "wrong" in some situations and the results of Study 1, all subjects were retained for analysis.

9 = These statements were pilot tested for ambiguity in a Mechanical Turk sample (N = 68). When asked how prejudiced (M = 3.28, S.D. = 1.40) or unpatriotic (M = 2.62, S.D. = .98) the person making the statement was neither mean differed significantly from 3, the midpoint of the scale (both t's < 2.00, both p's > .05).

Appendix A: Table 1 through Table 15

Table 1. *System Justifying Ideologies*.

	Conceptual/Operational Definition
Protestant work ethic	People have a moral responsibility to work hard and avoid leisure; hard work is its own reward.
Meritocracy	Individual ability and motivation are rewarded; success is an indicator of character and is deserved.
Belief in a just world	People typically get what they deserve.
Fair market ideology	Market-based procedures are efficient, fair, legitimate, and just.

Table 2. *Psychological predictors of political conservatism.*

	Conceptual/Operational Definition
Needs for, order structure, and closure	Preference for orderly and well-structured decision making; a desire to make decisions quickly and stick with them.
Dogmatism/Intolerance to ambiguity and uncertainty	General cognitive rigidity; preference for clear, unambiguous decisions and situations.
Openness to experience	Personality orientation that motivates creativity, curiosity, cognitive flexibility, and sensation seeking; affinity for novelty, diversity, and change.
Mortality salience/Death anxiety	Anxiety that results from an awareness and fear of one's own mortality.
System instability	Actual or perceived threat to the legitimacy or stability of the social, economic, or political system; a threat to the status quo.
Integrative complexity	Recognition of a high number of integrated components of an issue.

Table 3. Study 1 (N = 510): Predicted associations between moral foundations
and social and political attitudes.

Political Issue	*Associations Predicted with the Moral Foundations*
Support for abortion rights	Sanctity (-); Liberty
Support for gay rights	Sanctity (-); Liberty
Support for marijuana legalization	Sanctity (-); Liberty
Support for stem-cell research	Sanctity (-)
Opposition to physician-assisted suicide	Sanctity; Liberty (-)
Support for the death penalty	Care (-)
Support for increased gun restrictions	Care; Liberty (-)
Concerned about the environment	Care
Torture is immoral	Care
Support for affirmative action	Fairness
Support for government healthcare	Fairness; Liberty (-)
Concerned about illegal immigration	Authority
Support for increased military spending	Authority; Loyalty
Support for warrantless wiretapping	Authority; Loyalty; Liberty (-)
Free speech is most important democratic right	Liberty
Support for amendment against flag burning	Loyalty
Support for Tea Party	Fairness (-)
Support for Occupy Wall Street	Loyalty (-)
Support for fiscal conservatism	Fairness (-); Liberty
Concerned about the economy	Liberty
Support for strict constructionism	Sanctity
Faith in government	Fairness; Liberty (-)
Trust in religion	Sanctity

Table 4. Study 1 (N = 510): Descriptives.

	Cronbach's α	Mean	S.D.
Religious attendance	*	2.51	2.14
Need for cognition	.74	4.89	1.06
Need for closure	.64	2.93	.84
Care	.73	4.49	.80
Fairness	.70	4.45	.72
Liberty	.70	4.37	.66
Loyalty	.69	3.44	.83
Authority	.76	3.65	.89
Sanctity	.87	3.02	1.22

* = Assessed with one item.

Table 5. Study 1 (N = 510): Descriptives for social and political attitude issues.

	Cronbach's α or Item Correlation[1]	Mean	S.D.
Support for abortion rights	.65	4.16	1.17
Support for gay rights	.86	4.25	1.14
Support for marijuana legalization	.85	3.92	1.20
Support for stem-cell research	.74	3.79	1.03
Opposition to physician-assisted suicide	*	2.00	1.30
Support for the death penalty	.69	3.00	1.29
Support for increased gun restrictions	.47	3.22	1.30
Concerned about the environment	.72	3.48	.92
Enhanced interrogation/torture is immoral	*	3.32	1.36
Support for affirmative action	.74	3.08	.91
Support for government healthcare	.61	3.25	1.02
Concerned about illegal immigration	.66	2.41	1.18
Support for increased military spending	*	1.68	1.10
Support for warrantless wiretapping	*	1.85	1.06
Free speech is the most important democratic right	*	3.84	1.00
Support for an amendment against flag burning	*	2.25	1.48
Support for Tea Party	.42	2.38	1.07
Support for Occupy	.44	3.45	1.06

Wall Street

Fiscal Conservatism	.77	2.40	.91
Concerned about the economy	.47	3.34	1.00
Support for strict constructionism	.42	2.62	1.09
Faith in government	*	2.55	1.12
Trust in religion	.56	3.10	.56

[1] = Support for fiscal conservatism, marijuana legalization, abortion rights, affirmative action, and stem-cell research were measured with more than 2 items and thus a reliability analysis was conducted. All other variables were assessed with one or two items, and the item correlation is displayed for variables assessed with two items.

* = Assessed with one item.

Table 6. Study 1 (N = 510) correlations: Demographic variables with social and political attitudes.

	Ideology (Cons.)	Party ID (Repub.)	Age	Gender	Race/ Ethnicity	Education	Personal Income	Household Income	Religious Attendance
Support for abortion rights	-.51***	-.36***	-.02	-.01	-.10*	.13***	.03	.02	-.52***
Support for gay rights	-.48***	-.35***	-.19***	.001	-.16***	.07⁺	-.11**	.03	-.42***
Support for marijuana legalization	-.45***	-.32***	-.12**	-.09*	-.15***	.02	-.06	-.02	-.35***
Support for stem-cell research	-.43***	-.34***	-.07	-.14**	-.11**	.12**	.08⁺	.09*	-.33***
Opposition to physician-assisted suicide	.34***	.25***	.01	.11**	.13**	-.14***	-.06	-.01	.37***
Support for the death penalty	.29***	.26***	.14***	-.05	.01	-.10*	.07	.02	.02
Increase gun restrictions	-.32***	-.21***	-.03	.10*	-.04	.11**	-.04	.06	-.08⁺
Concerned about the environment	-.58***	-.41***	-.09*	.16***	-.04	.16**	-.08⁺	.00	-.22***
Torture is immoral	-.32***	-.30***	-.08⁺	.08⁺	-.01	.12**	-.003	-.06	-.10*
Support for affirmative action	-.35***	-.18***	-.02	.19***	.18***	.04	-.04	-.08⁺	-.13**
Support for government healthcare	-.54***	-.39***	-.13**	-.02	.05	.12**	-.08⁺	-.04	-.22***
Concerned about illegal immigration	.43***	.28***	.20***	.11**	-.05	-.06	.08⁺	.03	.19***
Support for increased military spending	.40***	.36***	.11**	.14**	.04	-.12**	.04	-.02	.22***
Support for warrantless wiretapping	.23***	.27***	.15***	.09*	.08⁺	.02	.07	.06	.11**
Free speech is the most important democratic right	-.04	-.01	.07	.02	-.09*	-.02	.07	-.03	-.01
Support for an amendment against flag burning	.40***	.38***	.19***	.24***	.02	-.07	.04	-.04	.24***
Support for Tea Party	.50***	.37***	.15***	.01	.01	-.09*	.10*	.04	.18***

Support for Occupy Wall Street	-.52***	-.39***	-.03	.02	-.05	.03	-.07	-.14**	-.28***
Fiscal Conservatism	.59***	.43***	.03	-.04	-.03	-.04	.13**	.12**	.22***
Concerned about the economy	.22***	.13**	.08$^+$	.18***	-.05	-.04	-.01	-.05	.11**
Support for strict constructionism	.40***	.25***	.15***	.04	-.01	-.11**	.01	-.06	.17***
Faith in government	-.22***	-.11*	-.08	.03	.12**	.03	-.03	.03	-.04
Trust in religion	.27***	.24***	.15***	.03	.01	.04	.06	-.03	.36***

*** $= p \leq .001$; ** $= p \leq .01$; * $= p \leq .05$; $^+ = p \leq .10$.

Table 7. Study 1 (N = 510) correlations: Cognitive flexibility variables and the moral foundations with and social and political attitudes.

	Need for Cognition	Need for Closure	Care	Fairness	Liberty	Loyalty	Authority	Sanctity
Support for abortion rights	.23***	-.21***	.08+	.20***	.03	-.25***	-.37***	-.53***
Support for gay rights	.20***	-.23***	.11**	.18***	.06	-.27***	-.40***	-.58***
Support for marijuana legalization	.28***	-.26***	.11**	.17***	.05	-.18***	-.35***	-.45***
Support for stem-cell research	.28***	-.22***	.03	.14**	.08+	-.25***	-.32***	-.51***
Opposition to physician-assisted suicide	-.26***	.16***	.07	-.03	.003	.25***	.31***	.47***
Support for the death penalty	-.15***	.16***	-.33***	-.26***	.16***	.20***	.33***	.21***
Increase gun restrictions	.10*	-.12**	.26***	.19***	-.28***	-.13**	-.13**	-.12**
Concerned about the environment	.18***	-.20***	.30***	.33***	-.27***	-.30***	-.36***	-.39***
Enhanced interrogation/torture is immoral	.18***	-.20***	.34***	.32***	-.06	-.16***	-.31***	-.21***
Support for affirmative action	.04	-.07	.26***	.32***	-.21***	-.13**	-.20***	-.15***
Support for government healthcare	.14**	-.15***	.21***	.34***	-.29***	-.28***	-.36***	-.40***
Concerned about illegal immigration	-.24***	.25***	-.06	-.15***	.15***	.33***	.45***	.44***
Support for increased military spending	-.17***	.24***	-.06	-.14***	.07	.35***	.41***	.42***
Support for warrantless wiretapping	-.14**	.19***	-.05	-.09*	-.03	.31***	.36***	.31***
Free speech is the most important democratic right	.20***	-.24***	.21***	.32***	.30***	.01	-.03	-.03
Support for an amendment against flag burning	-.21***	.18***	.08+	-.04	.05	.47***	.55***	.50***
Support for Tea Party	-.15***	.10*	-.18***	-.23***	.27***	.28***	.34***	.36***
Support for Occupy Wall Street	.17***	-.13**	.22***	.32***	-.08+	-.24***	-.41***	-.36***
Fiscal Conservatism	-.13**	.14***	-.35***	-.48***	.29***	.23***	.34***	.32***
Concerned about the economy	-.02	-.03	.13**	.08+	.27***	.16***	.24***	.25***
Support for strict constructionism	-.15***	.09*	-.13**	-.21***	.17***	.19***	.26***	.37***
Faith in government	.04	-.06	.19***	.22***	-.20***	.03	.01	-.06
Trust in religion	-.05	.01	-.02	-.07	.02	.19***	.25***	.30***

*** = $p \leq .001$; ** = $p \leq .01$; * = $p \leq .05$; + = $p \leq .10$.

Table 8. Study 1 (N = 510) Correlations: Demographics with cognitive flexibility variables and the moral foundations.

	Need for Cognition	Need for Closure	Care	Fairness	Liberty	Loyalty	Authority	Sanctity
Ideology (Cons.)	-.21***	.14***	-.16***	-.26***	.21***	.37***	.46***	.47***
Party ID (Repub.)	-.19***	.10*	-.06	-.18***	.11**	.33***	.38***	.39***
Age	-.03	.10*	.09*	.09*	.07	.11**	.20***	.19***
Gender (Male = 0)	-.08$^+$	.05	.32***	.16***	.02	.12**	.18***	.21***
Race/ethnicity (White = 0)	-.10*	.09$^+$	-.06	.08$^+$	-.08$^+$	.10*	.13**	.14***
Education	.18***	-.02	.01	-.01	-.08$^+$	-.07	-.11**	-.15***
Personal income	.08$^+$	.01	-.08$^+$	-.07	.03	.06	.08$^+$	.03
Household income	.01	-.03	-.06	-.10*	-.01	.02	.06	-.01
Religious attendance	-.04	.04	-.02	-.09*	-.02	.23***	.29***	.45***

*** $= p \leq .001$; ** $= p \leq .01$; * $= p \leq .05$; $^+ = p \leq .10$.

Table 9. Study 1 (N = 510) Correlations: cognitive flexibility variables and the moral foundations.

	Need for Cognition	Need for Closure	Care	Fairness	Liberty	Loyalty	Authority
Need for cognition	-						
Need for closure	-.53***	-					
Care	.07	-.21***	-				
Fairness	.12**	-.20***	.59***	-			
Liberty	.12**	-.22***	.08$^+$	.14***	-		
Loyalty	-.20***	.17***	.13**	.07	.14**	-	
Authority	-.23***	.21***	.03	-.02	.12**	.66***	-
Sanctity	-.31***	.22***	.15***	.02	.05	.58***	.70***

*** $= p \leq .001$; ** $= p \leq .01$; * $= p \leq .05$; $^+ = p \leq .10$.

Table 10. Study 1 (N = 510): Predicting social and political attitudes from demographics, cognitive flexibility, and the moral foundations.

	Step 1: B	B	Step 2: B	β	Step 3: B	β
Support for abortion rights:	$F(9, 500) = 37.50***$		$\Delta F(2, 498) = 11.43***$		$\Delta F(6, 492) = 8.43***$	
	$R^2 = .40$		$\Delta R^2 = .03$		$\Delta R^2 = .05$	
Ideology (Cons.)	-.80	-.36***	-.74	-.33***	-.66	-.30***
Party ID (Repub.)	-.04	-.02	-.02	-.01	.04	.02
Age	.01	.06	.01	.07	.01	.09*
Gender (Male = 0)	.07	.03	.02	.01	.17	.07*
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	-.04	-.01	.09	.04	.07	.03
Education	.08	.09*	.07	.07	.04	.04
Personal Income	.003	.003	-.002	-.002	.01	.01
Household Income	.02	.02	.02	.03	.02	.03
Religious Attendance	-.22	**-.40*****	-.22	**-.41*****	-.17	-.31***
Need for Cognition	-	-	.09	.08	.03	.03
Need for Closure	-	-	-.16	-.11**	-.11	-.08*
Care	-	-	-	-	-.02	-.02
Fairness	-	-	-	-	.09	.06
Liberty	-	-	-	-	.10	.06
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	.16	.11**
Authority	-	-	-	-	-.02	-.01
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	-.31	**-.32*****
Support for gay rights:	$F(9, 500) = 29.60***$		$\Delta F(2, 498) = 9.43***$		$\Delta F(6, 492) = 17.23***$	
	$R^2 = .35$		$\Delta R^2 = .02$		$\Delta R^2 = .11$	
Ideology (Cons.)	-.67	**-.31*****	-.62	**-.29*****	-.48	-.23***
Party ID (Repub.)	-.10	.04	-.09	-.04	-.01	-.01
Age	-.01	-.12**	-.01	-.11**	-.01	-.09*
Gender (Male = 0)	.15	.07	.16	.07	.25	.11**
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	-.34	-.12**	-.29	-.13**	-.20	-.07*
Education	.09	.10*	.08	.10*	.04	.05
Personal Income	-.11	-.13**	-.11	-.13**	-.09	-.11*
Household Income	.06	.09*	.06	.09*	.06	.09*
Religious Attendance	-.15	-.28***	-.15	**-.29*****	-.07	-.14***
Need for Cognition	-	-	.03	.03	-.05	-.05
Need for Closure	-	-	-.19	-.14***	-.12	-.09*
Care	-	-	-	-	.05	.03
Fairness	-	-	-	-	.11	.07
Liberty	-	-	-	-	.16	.09*
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	.14	.10*
Authority	-	-	-	-	.03	.02
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	-.44	**-.47*****
Support for marijuana legalization:	$F(9, 500) = 19.71***$		$\Delta F(2, 498) = 17.26***$		$\Delta F(6, 492) = 6.73***$	
	$R^2 = .26$		$\Delta R^2 = .05$		$\Delta R^2 = .05$	
Ideology (Cons.)	-.79	**-.35*****	-.71	**-.31*****	-.64	**-.28*****
Party ID (Repub.)	-.05	-.02	-.02	-.01	.004	.002
Age	-.01	-.05	-.003	-.03	-.001	-.01
Gender (Male = 0)	-.13	-.05	-.10	-.04	-.05	-.02
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	-.31	-.10**	-.24	-.08*	-.17	-.06
Education	.01	.01	-.01	-.01	-.04	-.04
Personal Income	-.02	-.02	-.02	-.03	-.01	-.01
Household Income	-.002	-.003	.002	.003	.004	.01
Religious Attendance	-.12	-.20***	-.12	-.22***	-.08	-.14**
Need for Cognition	-	-	.15	.13**	.10	.09*
Need for Closure	-	-	-.19	-.13**	-.14	-.09*
Care	-	-	-	-	.07	.04
Fairness	-	-	-	-	.03	.02
Liberty	-	-	-	-	.12	.06
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	.29	.20***
Authority	-	-	-	-	-.12	-.08
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	-.26	-.27***
Support for stem-cell research:	$F(9, 500) = 19.03***$		$\Delta F(2, 498) = 12.92***$		$\Delta F(6, 492) = 10.23***$	
	$R^2 = .26$		$\Delta R^2 = .04$		$\Delta R^2 = .08$	
Ideology (Cons.)	-.56	**-.29*****	-.51	**-.26*****	-.44	-.23***

Party ID (Repub.)	-.18	-.08	-.15	-.07	-.09	-.04
Age	-.001	-.01	.00	.01	.001	.01
Gender (Male = 0)	-.19	-.09*	-.17	-.08*	-.10	-.05
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	-.17	-.07	-.12	-.05	-.05	-.02
Education	.05	.06	.03	.03	.003	.003
Personal Income	.04	.05	.03	.04	.05	.06
Household Income	.04	.06	.04	.07	.04	.06
Religious Attendance	-.10	-.20***	-.10	-.21***	-.04	-.09*
Need for Cognition	-	-	.14	.15**	.08	.08
Need for Closure	-	-	-.10	-.08	-.05	-.04
Care	-	-	-	-	.02	.02
Fairness	-	-	-	-	.07	.05
Liberty	-	-	-	-	.16	.10**
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	.06	.05
Authority	-	-	-	-	.12	.10
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	-.35	**-.41***

Opposition physician-assisted suicide: $F(9, 500) = 15.65***$ $\Delta F(2, 498) = 9.62***$ $\Delta F(6, 492) = 5.84***$
$R^2 = .22$ $\Delta R^2 = .03$ $\Delta R^2 = .05$

Ideology (Cons.)	.53	.22***	.47	.19***	.40	.16**
Party ID (Repub.)	.04	.01	-.001	.00	-.07	-.03
Age	-.01	-.05	-.01	-.05	-.01	-.08
Gender (Male = 0)	.26	.10*	.23	.09*	.07	.03
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	.26	.08*	.21	.06	.12	.04
Education	-.12	-.12**	-.09	-.09*	-.06	-.06
Personal Income	-.02	-.02	-.01	-.01	-.02	-.02
Household Income	.02	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02
Religious Attendance	.17	**.28***	.18	**.29***	.12	.20***
Need for Cognition	-	-	-.20	-.16***	-.13	-.11*
Need for Closure	-	-	.05	.03	.06	.04
Care	-	-	-	-	.12	.07
Fairness	-	-	-	-	.00	.00
Liberty	-	-	-	-	-.02	-.01
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	-.06	-.04
Authority	-	-	-	-	-.04	-.03
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	.31	**.29***

Support for the death penalty: $F(9, 500) = 8.46***$ $\Delta F(2, 498) = 3.47*$ $\Delta F(6, 492) = 17.68***$
$R^2 = .13$ $\Delta R^2 = .01$ $\Delta R^2 = .15$

Ideology (Cons.)	.54	**.22***	.50	**.21***	-.003	-.001
Party ID (Repub.)	.31	.12*	.30	.11*	.28	.11*
Age	.02	.15**	.02	.14**	.02	.13**
Gender (Male = 0)	-.25	-.10*	-.26	-.10*	-.08	-.03
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	.02	.01	-.01	-.004	-.03	-.01
Education	-.11	-.11*	-.11	-.11*	-.05	-.05
Personal Income	.04	.04	.04	.04	-.01	-.01
Household Income	.01	.01	.01	.01	-.003	-.004
Religious Attendance	-.06	-.10*	-.06	-.09*	-.07	-.12**
Need for Cognition	-	-	.04	-.03	-.04	-.03
Need for Closure	-	-	.15	.09	.02	.01
Care	-	-	-	-	-.49	**-.30***
Fairness	-	-	-	-	-.16	-.09
Liberty	-	-	-	-	.29	.15***
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	.01	.01
Authority	-	-	-	-	.37	.25***
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	.04	.04

Support for increased gun restrictions: $F(9, 500) = 8.81***$ $\Delta F(2, 498) = 1.94$ $\Delta F(6, 492) = 10.32***$
$R^2 = .13$ $\Delta R^2 = .01$ $\Delta R^2 = .10$

Ideology (Cons.)	-.81	**-.33***	-.79	**-.32***	-.45	-.18**
Party ID (Repub.)	.03	.01	.02	.01	-.04	-.01
Age	-.001	-.01	.00	-.003	-.001	-.01
Gender (Male = 0)	.34	.13**	.34	.13**	.17	.06
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	.002	.001	.02	.01	-.06	-.02
Education	.10	.10*	.11	.10*	.08	.08
Personal Income	-.08	-.09	-.08	-.09	-.06	-.06
Household Income	.07	.10*	.07	.09	.06	.09
Religious Attendance	.01	.02	.01	.02	-.003	-.004
Need for Cognition	-	-	-.02	-.02	.004	.003
Need for Closure	-	-	-.14	-.09	-.16	-.10*

Care	-	-	-	-	.31	.19***
Fairness	-	-	-	-	.09	.05
Liberty	-	-	-	-	-.56	**-.28***
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	-.08	-.05
Authority	-	-	-	-	.12	.08
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	-.04	-.04

Concerned about the environment:	$F(9, 500) = 36.74$***		$\Delta F(2, 498) = 6.28$**		$\Delta F(6, 492) = 17.42$***	
	$R^2 = .40$		$\Delta R^2 = .02$		$\Delta R^2 = .10$	
Ideology (Cons.)	-.90	**-.52***	-.88	**-.50***	-.54	**-.31***
Party ID (Repub.)	-.09	-.05	-.09	-.05	-.07	-.04
Age	-.01	-.06	-.004	-.05	-.004	-.05
Gender (Male = 0)	.41	.22***	.42	.22***	.36	.19***
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	.07	.03	.10	.04	.06	.03
Education	.11	.15***	.11	.15***	.07	.10**
Personal Income	-.06	-.09	-.06	-.09	-.03	-.05
Household Income	.03	.05	.02	.05	.03	.05
Religious Attendance	-.02	-.05	-.02	-.05	.002	.01
Need for Cognition	-	-	-.002	-.002	-.02	-.02
Need for Closure	-	-	-.14	-.13**	-.11	-.10**
Care	-	-	-	-	.15	.13**
Fairness	-	-	-	-	.21	.16***
Liberty	-	-	-	-	-.32	-.23***
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	-.04	-.03
Authority	-	-	-	-	.002	.002
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	-.18	-.23***

Enhanced interrogation/torture is immoral:	$F(9, 500) = 9.61$***		$\Delta F(2, 498) = 7.28$***		$\Delta F(6, 492) = 12.99$***	
	$R^2 = .15$		$\Delta R^2 = .02$		$\Delta R^2 = .11$	
Ideology (Cons.)	-.54	**-.21***	-.48	**-.19**	-.06	-.02
Party ID (Repub.)	-.46	-.16**	-.45	-.16**	-.43	-.15**
Age	-.01	-.11*	-.01	-.10*	-.01	-.10*
Gender (Male = 0)	.37	.13**	.39	.14***	.21	.08
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	.06	.02	.12	.03	.10	.03
Education	.09	.09	.08	.08	.05	.04
Personal Income	.07	.07	.07	.07	.11	.10*
Household Income	-.07	-.09	-.07	-.09	-.06	-.07
Religious Attendance	.01	.02	.01	.02	.03	.05
Need for Cognition	-	-	.04	.03	.04	.03
Need for Closure	-	-	-.23	-.14**	-.08	-.05
Care	-	-	-	-	.39	**.23***
Fairness	-	-	-	-	.28	.15**
Liberty	-	-	-	-	-.13	-.06
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	.07	.04
Authority	-	-	-	-	-.35	**-.23***
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	-.04	-.04

Support for affirmative action:	$F(9, 500) = 16.74$***		$\Delta F(2, 498) = 1.19$		$\Delta F(6, 492) = 8.58$***	
	$R^2 = .23$		$\Delta R^2 = .00$		$\Delta R^2 = .07$	
Ideology (Cons.)	-.74	**-.43***	-.74	**-.43***	-.46	**-.27***
Party ID (Repub.)	.16	.09	.16	.08	.16	.09
Age	.00	.00	.00	.004	.00	.002
Gender (Male = 0)	.42	.23***	.42	.23***	.36	.19***
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	.58	.25***	.59	.26***	.54	.24***
Education	.01	.01	.01	.01	-.01	-.02
Personal Income	.03	.05	.03	.05	.05	.07
Household Income	-.03	-.06	-.04	-.07	-.03	-.05
Religious Attendance	-.02	-.04	-.02	-.04	-.01	-.02
Need for Cognition	-	-	-.04	-.04	-.04	-.04
Need for Closure	-	-	-.08	-.07	-.05	-.04
Care	-	-	-	-	.10	.09
Fairness	-	-	-	-	.23	.18***
Liberty	-	-	-	-	-.24	-.18***
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	.01	.01
Authority	-	-	-	-	-.12	-.11
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	-.05	-.07

Support for government healthcare:	$F(9, 500) = 25.97$***		$\Delta F(2, 498) = 2.17$		$\Delta F(6, 492) = 18.91$***	
		$R^2 = .32$		$\Delta R^2 = .01$		$\Delta R^2 = .13$
Ideology (Cons.)	-.96	**-.49*****	-.94	**-.49*****	-.53	**-.27*****
Party ID (Repub.)	-.07	-.03	-.07	-.03	-.05	-.02
Age	-.01	-.06	-.004	-.05	-.01	-.05
Gender (Male = 0)	.07	.04	.07	.04	.03	.01
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	.24	.09*	.25	.10**	.18	.07*
Education	.10	.12**	.10	.12**	.06	.07*
Personal Income	-.03	-.04	-.03	-.04	-.004	-.01
Household Income	-.02	-.03	-.02	-.03	-.01	-.02
Religious Attendance	-.02	-.05	-.02	-.05	.01	.02
Need for Cognition	-	-	-.02	-.02	-.05	-.05
Need for Closure	-	-	-.11	-.09*	-.08	-.07
Care	-	-	-	-	.09	.07
Fairness	-	-	-	-	.36	.25***
Liberty	-	-	-	-	-.39	-.25***
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	-.004	-.004
Authority	-	-	-	-	-.001	-.001
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	-.22	-.26***
Concerned about illegal immigration:	$F(9, 500) = 15.07$***		$\Delta F(2, 498) = 12.94$***		$\Delta F(6, 492) = 10.18$***	
		$R^2 = .21$		$\Delta R^2 = .04$		$\Delta R^2 = .08$
Ideology (Cons.)	.93	**.42*****	.86	**.39*****	.54	**.24*****
Party ID (Repub.)	-.10	-.04	-.12	-.05	-.19	-.08
Age	.01	.13**	.01	.11*	.01	.07
Gender (Male = 0)	.13	.05	.10	.04	.01	.01
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	-.19	-.06	-.25	-.09*	-.31	-.11**
Education	-.07	-.07	-.05	-.06	.002	.002
Personal Income	.01	.01	.02	.02	-.01	-.01
Household Income	.02	.04	.02	.-3	.01	.02
Religious Attendance	.02	.04	.03	.05	-.01	-.03
Need for Cognition	-	-	-.09	-.09	-.05	-.04
Need for Closure	-	-	.21	.15***	.18	.13**
Care	-	-	-	-	-.02	-.01
Fairness	-	-	-	-	-.12	-.08
Liberty	-	-	-	-	.19	.11**
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	-.01	-.01
Authority	-	-	-	-	.26	.20***
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	.19	.19**
Support for increased military spending:	$F(9, 500) = 14.16$***		$\Delta F(2, 498) = 10.05$***		$\Delta F(6, 492) = 6.15$***	
		$R^2 = .20$		$\Delta R^2 = .03$		$\Delta R^2 = .05$
Ideology (Cons.)	.51	**.25*****	.47	**.23*****	.25	.12*
Party ID (Repub.)	.32	.14**	.33	.14**	.25	.11*
Age	.004	.04	.002	.02	.00	.01
Gender (Male = 0)	.22	.10*	.21	.10*	.16	.07
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	.07	.03	.03	.01	-.01	-.01
Education	-.11	-.12**	-.11	-.13**	-.07	.09
Personal Income	.05	.07	.05	.06	.03	.04
Household Income	-.02	-.03	-.01	-.02	-.02	-.03
Religious Attendance	.04	.08	.04	.08*	.01	.01
Need for Cognition	-	-	.04	.04	.08	.08
Need for Closure	-	-	.26	.20***	.21	**.16*****
Care	-	-	-	-	-.03	-.02
Fairness	-	-	-	-	-.13	-.08
Liberty	-	-	-	-	.04	.03
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	.13	.10
Authority	-	-	-	-	.11	.09
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	.14	.15*
Support for warrantless wiretapping:	$F(9, 500) = 6.50$***		$\Delta F(2, 498) = 5.89$**		$\Delta F(6, 492) = 6.83$***	
		$R^2 = .11$		$\Delta R^2 = .02$		$\Delta R^2 = .07$
Ideology (Cons.)	.12	.06	.08	.04	-.11	-.05
Party ID (Repub.)	.48	**.22*****	.48	**.21*****	.39	**.17*****
Age	.01	.14***	.01	.12**	.01	.11*
Gender (Male = 0)	.08	.04	.08	.03	.03	.02
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	.23	.09*	.20	.07	.12	.05
Education	.02	.02	.02	.03	.05	.06
Personal Income	-.03	-.03	-.03	-.03	-.05	-.06
Household Income	.04	.07	.05	.07	.04	.06

Religious Attendance	.003	.01	.01	.01	-.03	-.06
Need for Cognition	-	-	-.001	-.001	.03	.03
Need for Closure	-	-	.19	.15**	.11	.08
Care	-	-	-	-	-.06	-.04
Fairness	-	-	-	-	-.09	-.06
Liberty	-	-	-	-	-.08	-.05
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	.17	.13*
Authority	-	-	-	-	.20	**.17**
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	.07	.08

Free speech is most important democratic right: $F_{(9, 500)} = 1.31$ $\Delta F_{(2, 498)} = 17.13^{***}$ $\Delta F_{(6, 492)} = 12.35^{***}$

$R^2 = .02$ $\Delta R^2 = .06$ $\Delta R^2 = .12$

Ideology (Cons.)	-.13	-.07	-.06	-.03	-.04	-.02
Party ID (Repub.)	.04	.02	.06	.03	.10	.05
Age	.004	.04	.01	.06	.001	.01
Gender (Male = 0)	.002	.001	.03	.01	-.08	-.04
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	-.19	-.07	-.12	-.05	-.18	-.07
Education	-.05	-.07	-.07	-.09	-.05	-.06
Personal Income	.09	**.12***	.08	.11*	.09	.11*
Household Income	-.04	-.07	-.04	-.07	-.03	-.05
Religious Attendance	.01	.01	.002	.003	.02	.05
Need for Cognition	-	-	.09	.10	.08	.08
Need for Closure	-	-	-.23	**-.19***	-.09	-.08
Care	-	-	-	-	.06	.05
Fairness	-	-	-	-	.35	**.25***
Liberty	-	-	-	-	.33	.22***
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	-.01	-.01
Authority	-	-	-	-	-.01	-.01
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	-.02	-.03

Support for an amendment against flag burning: $F_{(9, 500)} = 17.80^{***}$ $\Delta F_{(2, 498)} = 5.14^{**}$ $\Delta F_{(6, 492)} = 17.91^{***}$

$R^2 = .24$ $\Delta R^2 = .02$ $\Delta R^2 = .13$

Ideology (Cons.)	.62	**.22***	.56	**.20***	.26	.09
Party ID (Repub.)	.53	.17***	.51	.17**	.33	.11*
Age	.01	.10*	.01	.09*	.01	.05
Gender (Male = 0)	.52	.18***	.50	.17***	.29	.10*
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	.08	.02	.03	.01	-.13	-.03
Education	-.08	-.07	-.06	-.06	-.004	-.004
Personal Income	.04	.03	.04	.04	.02	.02
Household Income	-.03	-.03	-.03	-.04	-.05	-.06
Religious Attendance	.06	.09*	.07	.09*	.01	.01
Need for Cognition	-	-	-.10	-.07	-.03	-.03
Need for Closure	-	-	.13	.08	.05	.03
Care	-	-	-	-	.10	.06
Fairness	-	-	-	-	-.09	-.04
Liberty	-	-	-	-	-.08	-.04
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	.25	.14**
Authority	-	-	-	-	.46	**.28***
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	.11	.09

Support for Tea Party: $F_{(9, 500)} = 19.82^{***}$ $\Delta F_{(2, 498)} = .56$ $\Delta F_{(6, 492)} = 10.43^{***}$

$R^2 = .26$ $\Delta R^2 = .00$ $\Delta R^2 = .08$

Ideology (Cons.)	.88	**.43***	.86	**.43***	.51	**.25***
Party ID (Repub.)	.13	.06	.12	.06	.11	.05
Age	.01	.09*	.01	.09*	.01	.08*
Gender (Male = 0)	-.10	-.04	-.10	.05	-.05	-.03
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	-.06	-.03	-.08	-.03	-.05	-.02
Education	-.07	-.09*	-.07	-.08	-.03	-.03
Personal Income	.04	.05	.04	.05	.01	.02
Household Income	.01	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01
Religious Attendance	.004	.01	.01	.01	-.02	-.04
Need for Cognition	-	-	-.04	-.04	-.02	-.02
Need for Closure	-	-	.01	.01	-.01	-.01
Care	-	-	-	-	-.15	-.11*
Fairness	-	-	-	-	-.20	-.13**
Liberty	-	-	-	-	.35	.22***
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	.05	.04
Authority	-	-	-	-	.03	.02

Sanctity	-	-	-	-	.17	.19**

Support for Occupy Wall Street:	$F_{(9, 500)} = 24.40^{***}$ $R^2 = .31$		$\Delta F_{(2, 498)} = 2.36$ $\Delta R^2 = .01$		$\Delta F_{(6, 492)} = 9.94^{***}$ $\Delta R^2 = .07$	
Ideology (Cons.)	-.89	**-.44***	-.86	**-.43***	-.60	**-.30***
Party ID (Repub.)	-.15	-.07	-.14	-.07	-.10	-.05
Age	.003	.04	.004	.04	.004	.05
Gender (Male = 0)	.09	.04	.10	.05	.07	.03
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	.05	.02	.08	.03	.08	.03
Education	.01	.01	-.002	-.002	-.03	-.04
Personal Income	.02	.03	.02	.03	.04	.05
Household Income	-.08	-.13**	-.08	-.13**	-.07	-.11**
Religious Attendance	-.06	-.12**	-.06	-.12**	-.03	-.07
Need for Cognition	-	-	.05	.05	.04	.04
Need for Closure	-	-	-.06	-.04	.03	.02
Care	-	-	-	-	.10	.07
Fairness	-	-	-	-	.24	.16***
Liberty	-	-	-	-	-.04	-.03
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	.12	.09
Authority	-	-	-	-	-.30	-.25***
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	-.08	-.09

Support for fiscal conservatism:	$F_{(9, 500)} = 33.96^{***}$ $R^2 = .38$		$\Delta F_{(2, 498)} = 2.46$ $\Delta R^2 = .01$		$\Delta F_{(6, 492)} = 34.04^{***}$ $\Delta R^2 = .18$	
Ideology (Cons.)	.96	**.56***	.95	**.55***	.53	.31***
Party ID (Repub.)	.10	.05	.10	.05	.10	.05
Age	-.01	-.07	-.01	-.07	-.004	-.06
Gender (Male = 0)	-.11	-.06	-.11	-.06	.01	.01
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	-.24	-.10**	-.25	-.11**	-.14	-.06
Education	-.02	-.02	-.02	-.02	.02	.02
Personal Income	.03	.05	.03	.05	.01	.01
Household Income	.04	.08*	.04	.08*	.04	.07
Religious Attendance	.02	.04	.02	.04	.00	.001
Need for Cognition	-	-	.02	.03	.03	.03
Need for Closure	-	-	.10	.09*	.05	.04
Care	-	-	-	-	-.17	-.15***
Fairness	-	-	-	-	-.40	**-.32***
Liberty	-	-	-	-	.37	.27***
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	-.02	-.01
Authority	-	-	-	-	.05	.05
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	.13	.17***

Concerned about the economy:	$F_{(9, 500)} = 4.91^{***}$ $R^2 = .08$		$\Delta F_{(2, 498)} = 1.17$ $\Delta R^2 = .00$		$\Delta F_{(6, 492)} = 7.83^{***}$ $\Delta R^2 = .08$	
Ideology (Cons.)	.46	**.24***	.47	**.25***	.28	.15*
Party ID (Repub.)	-.13	-.06	-.12	-.06	-.14	-.07
Age	.001	.01	.001	.01	-.003	-.03
Gender (Male = 0)	.31	.16***	.32	.16***	.20	.10*
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	-.14	-.06	-.12	-.05	-.17	-.07
Education	-.02	-.02	-.02	-.02	.03	.03
Personal Income	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.02	-.02
Household Income	-.02	-.03	-.02	-.03	-.02	-.03
Religious Attendance	.02	.03	.02	.03	.00	.001
Need for Cognition	-	-	-.004	-.01	.01	.01
Need for Closure	-	-	-.08	.06	-.02	-.02
Care	-	-	-	-	.07	.05
Fairness	-	-	-	-	.04	.03
Liberty	-	-	-	-	.33	**.22***
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	-.08	-.07
Authority	-	-	-	-	.13	.11
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	.13	.16*

Support for strict constructionism:	$F_{(9, 500)} = 12.52^{***}$ $R^2 = .18$		$\Delta F_{(2, 498)} = 1.07$ $\Delta R^2 = .00$		$\Delta F_{(6, 492)} = 10.02^{***}$ $\Delta R^2 = .09$	
Ideology (Cons.)	.85	**.41***	.83	**.40***	.52	.25***
Party ID (Repub.)	-.12	-.06	-.14	-.06	-.17	-.07
Age	.01	.10*	.01	.10*	.01	.09*
Gender (Male = 0)	-.02	-.01	-.03	-.02	-.01	-.01
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	-.11	-.04	-.13	-.05	-.11	-.04
Education	-.08	-.09	-.07	-.08	-.03	-.04

Personal Income	.01	.01	.01	.02	-.01	-.02
Household Income	-.04	-.06	-.04	-.06	-.04	-.06
Religious Attendance	.02	.03	.02	.04	-.03	-.06
Need for Cognition	-	-	-.06	-.06	-.02	-.02
Need for Closure	-	-	-.001	-.001	-.04	-.03
Care	-	-	-	-	-.12	-.08
Fairness	-	-	-	-	-.23	-.16**
Liberty	-	-	-	-	.22	.13**
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	-.05	-.04
Authority	-	-	-	-	-.10	-.08
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	.34	**.39***
Faith in government:	$F_{(9, 500)} = 4.74***$		$\Delta F_{(2, 498)} = .29$		$\Delta F_{(6, 492)} = 8.11***$	
	$R^2 = .08$		$R^2 = .00$		$R^2 = .08$	
Ideology (Cons.)	-.62	**-.29***	-.61	**-.29***	-.39	-.18**
Party ID (Repub.)	.17	.07	.17	.07	.11	.05
Age	-.01	-.05	-.01	-.05	-.01	-.07
Gender (Male = 0)	.15	.07	.16	.07	.03	.01
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	.39	.14**	.40	.14**	.28	.10*
Education	.01	.01	.01	.01	-.001	-.001
Personal Income	-.002	-.002	-.002	-.002	.01	.01
Household Income	.03	.04	.03	.04	.02	.03
Religious Attendance	.01	.03	.01	.03	.02	.03
Need for Cognition	-	-	-.01	-.01	.00	.00
Need for Closure	-	-	-.05	-.04	-.06	-.05
Care	-	-	-	-	.14	.10
Fairness	-	-	-	-	.23	.15**
Liberty	-	-	-	-	-.37	**-.22***
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	.10	.07
Authority	-	-	-	-	.20	.16**
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	-.15	-.16**
Trust in religion:	$F_{(9, 500)} = 11.61***$		$\Delta F_{(2, 498)} = .66$		$\Delta F_{(6, 492)} = 1.82$	
	$R^2 = .17$		$R^2 = .00$		$R^2 = .02$	
Ideology (Cons.)	.09	.09	.09	.09	.04	.04
Party ID (Repub.)	.12	.11	.12	.10	.10	.08
Age	.004	.09	.004	.09	.004	.08
Gender (Male = 0)	-.05	-.05	-.06	-.05	-.08	-.07
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	-.04	-.03	-.04	-.03	-.06	-.04
Education	.02	.05	.02	.05	.03	.08
Personal Income	.01	.03	.01	.03	.01	.02
Household Income	-.03	-.08	-.03	-.08	-.03	.02
Religious Attendance	.08	**.30***	.08	**.30***	.07	**.25***
Need for Cognition	-	-	-.02	-.04	-.01	-.02
Need for Closure	-	-	-.04	-.05	-.05	-.08
Care	-	-	-	-	-.01	-.01
Fairness	-	-	-	-	-.02	-.03
Liberty	-	-	-	-	-.02	-.02
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	-.004	-.01
Authority	-	-	-	-	.06	.09
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	.05	.11

*** = $p < .001$; ** = $p \le .01$; * = $p \le .05$. Largest coefficient at each step for is presented in bold.

Table 11. Study 1 – correlations: lifestyle liberty and economic liberty, with demographic factor, cognitive flexibility variables, moral foundations, and social and political attitudes.

	Lifestyle Liberty	Economic Liberty
Ideology (Cons.)	-.20***	.39***
Party ID (Repub.)	-.16***	.23***
Age	-.07	.13**
Gender (Male = 0)	-.002	.02
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	-.07	-.06
Education	.03	-.12**
Personal income	-.02	.05
Household income	-.02	-.004
Religious attendance	-.20***	.08
Need for cognition	.22***	.04
Need for closure	-.34***	-.10*
Care	.20***	-.01
Fairness	.32***	.01
Loyalty	-.06	.21***
Authority	-.18***	.26***
Sanctity	-.25***	.20***
Support for abortion rights	.33***	-.15***
Support for gay rights	.34***	-.12**
Support for marijuana legalization	.31***	-.10*
Support for stem-cell research	.36***	-.10*
Opposition to physician-assisted suicide	-.17***	.10*
Support for the death penalty	-.08	.25***
Increase gun restrictions	.01	-.38***
Concerned about the environment	.11**	-.42***
Enhanced interrogation/torture is immoral	.14**	-.15***
Support for affirmative action	.06	-.30***

Support for government healthcare	.14***	-.45***
Concerned about illegal immigration	-.13**	.26***
Support for increased military spending	-.21***	.20***
Support for warrantless wiretapping	-.09*	.02
Free speech is the most important democratic right	.26***	.24***
Support for an amendment against flag burning	-.19***	.17***
Support for Tea Party	-.10*	.41***
Support for Occupy Wall Street	.25***	-.24***
Fiscal Conservatism	-.14**	.45***
Concerned about the economy	.05	.32***
Support for strict constructionism	-.12**	.29***
Faith in government	.06	-.29***
Trust in religion	-.06	.06

*** = $p < .001$; ** = $p \leq .01$; * = $p \leq .05$.

Table 12. Study 1 (N = 510): Summary of associations between moral foundations and social and political attitudes.

Political Issue	*Associations Predicted with the Moral Foundations*	*Results*	*Semi-Partial Relationship (Moral Foundations and Issue Attitude)*
Support for abortion rights	Sanctity (-); Liberty	Sanctity (-); Loyalty	0.22
Support for gay rights	Sanctity (-); Liberty	Sanctity (-); Liberty; Loyalty	0.32
Support for marijuana legalization	Sanctity (-); Liberty	Sanctity (-); Loyalty	0.22
Support for stem-cell research	Sanctity (-)	Sanctity (-); Liberty	0.28
Opposition to physician-assisted suicide	Sanctity; Liberty (-)	Sanctity	0.22
Support for the death penalty	Care (-)	Care (-); Authority; Liberty	0.40
Support for increased gun restrictions	Care; Liberty (-)	Liberty (-); Care	0.32
Concerned about the environment	Care	Care; Fairness; Liberty (-); Sanctity (-)	0.33
Torture is immoral	Care	Authority (-); Care; Fairness	0.35
Support for affirmative action	Fairness	Fairness; Liberty (-)	0.27
Support for government healthcare	Fairness; Liberty (-)	Fairness; Liberty (-); Sanctity (-)	0.36
Concerned about illegal immigration	Authority	Authority; Liberty; Sanctity	0.25
Support for increased military spending	Authority; Loyalty	Sanctity	0.24
Support for warrantless wiretapping	Authority; Loyalty; Liberty (-)	Authority; Loyalty	0.24
Free speech is most important democratic right	Liberty	Fairness; Liberty	0.33
Support for amendment against flag burning	Loyalty	Authority; Loyalty	0.36
Support for Tea Party	Fairness (-)	Care (-); Fairness (-); Liberty; Sanctity	0.28
Support for Occupy Wall Street	Loyalty (-)	Authority (-); Fairness	0.28
Support for fiscal conservatism	Fairness (-); Liberty	Care (-); Fairness (-); Liberty; Sanctity	0.42

Concerned about the economy	Liberty	Liberty; Sanctity	0.28
Support for strict constructionism	Sanctity	Fairness (-); Liberty; Sanctity	0.30
Faith in government	Fairness; Liberty (-)	Authority; Fairness; Liberty (-); Sanctity (-)	0.28
Trust in religion	Sanctity	-	-

Table 13. Study 2 (N = 151): Descriptives.

	Cronbach's α	Mean	S.D.
Religious attendance	*	3.09	2.59
Need for cognition	.77	4.88	1.20
Need for closure	.55	2.81	.83
Care	.69	4.51	.81
Fairness	.68	4.52	.72
Liberty	.70	4.54	.68
Loyalty	.73	3.62	.89
Authority	.72	3.88	.89
Sanctity	.86	3.30	1.28
Ambiguously Prejudiced Statement			
Offended	.91	2.95	1.27
I think this statement is prejudiced.	*	3.20	1.44
I think this statement is accurate.	*	3.15	1.33
I think this person is prejudiced.	*	3.39	1.32
I think this person is educated.	*	3.22	1.08
Social Distance	.74	2.79	1.05
Ambiguously Unpatriotic Statement			
Offended	.88	2.51	1.21
I think this statement is unpatriotic.	*	3.87	1.25
I think this statement is accurate.	*	2.63	1.41
I think this person is unpatriotic.	*	2.53	1.27
I think this person is educated.	*	3.54	1.23
Social Distance	.73	2.42	1.00

* = Assessed with one item.

Table 14. Study 1 (N = 151) Correlations: Demographics with cognitive flexibility variables and the moral foundations.

	Need for Cognition	Need for Closure	Care	Fairness	Liberty	Loyalty	Authority	Sanctity
Ideology (Cons.)	.01	-.09	-.12	-.34***	.22**	.27***	.38***	.36***
Party ID (Repub.)	.02	-.15+	.13	-.16*	.11	.32***	.46***	.33***
Age	-.02	-.02	.14+	-.06	-.13	.01	.07	.12
Gender (Male = 0)	-.18*	.18*	.38***	.11	-.20*	.01	.12	.10
Race/ethnicity (White = 0)	.01	.11	.11	.09	.05	.05	.19*	.32***
Education	.26***	-.05	-.04	-.04	-.24**	-.17*	-.17*	-.18*
Personal income	.17*	-.10	-.05	-.13	-.15+	.12	.02	-.01
Household income	.20*	-.02	-.01	-.09	-.05	.08	.04	-.02
Religious attendance	-.01	.13	.13	-.09	.02	.25**	.32***	.49***

*** $= p \leq .001$; ** $= p \leq .01$; * $= p \leq .05$; + $= p \leq .10$.

Table 15. Study 2 (N = 151) Correlations: cognitive flexibility variables and the moral foundations.

	Need for Cognition	Need for Closure	Care	Fairness	Liberty	Loyalty	Authority
Need for cognition	-						
Need for closure	-.36***	-					
Care	.01	.01	-				
Fairness	.14+	-.04	.56***	-			
Liberty	.07	-.26**	-.02	-.004	-		
Loyalty	-.24**	.04	.26***	.12	.26***	-	
Authority	-.22**	.09	.28***	.02	.10	.64***	-
Sanctity	-.26***	.20**	.37***	.09	.08	.53***	.69***

*** $= p \leq .001$; ** $= p \leq .01$; * $= p \leq .05$; + $= p \leq .10$.

Table 16. Study 2 (N = 151): Predicting reactions, inferences, and social distance to the ambiguously prejudiced statement from demographics, cognitive flexibility variables, and the moral foundations.

	Step 1:		Step 2:		Step 3:	
	B	β	B	β	B	β
Offended:	$F(9, 141) = 7.31$***		$\Delta F(2, 139) = .29$		$\Delta F(6, 133) = 4.37$***	
		$R^2 = .32$		$\Delta R^2 = .01$		$\Delta R^2 = .11$
Ideology (Cons.)	-.90	**-.38*****	-.90	**-.38*****	-.60	-.25*
Party ID (Repub.)	-.43	-.17	-.45	-.18	-.63	-.25*
Age	.01	.06	.01	.07	.004	.04
Gender (Male = 0)	.45	.18*	.49	.19**	.31	.12
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	.05	.02	.06	.02	.06	.02
Education	.14	.15	.12	.13	.10	.11
Personal Income	-.06	-.07	-.06	-.07	-.13	-.13
Household Income	-.11	-.14	-.12	-.15	-.10	-.13
Religious Attendance	.08	.16*	.08	.16*	.06	.11
Need for Cognition	-	-	.07	.07	.11	.10
Need for Closure	-	-	-.04	-.02	-.13	-.09
Care	-	-	-	-	.12	.08
Fairness	-	-	-	-	.17	.09
Liberty	-	-	-	-	-.58	**-.31*****
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	.32	.23*
Authority	-	-	-	-	-.17	-.12
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	.06	.06
I think this statement is prejudiced:	$F(9, 141) = 6.23$***		$\Delta F(2, 139) = .96$		$\Delta F(6, 133) = 3.26$**	
		$R^2 = .29$		$\Delta R^2 = .00$		$\Delta R^2 = .09$
Ideology (Cons.)	-1.12	**-.42*****	-1.11	**-.41*****	-.84	**-.31*****
Party ID (Repub.)	-.25	-.08	-.27	-.09	-.34	-.12
Age	.01	.08	.01	.08	.01	.05
Gender (Male = 0)	.42	.14	.48	.17*	.31	.11
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	.07	.02	.08	.02	-.02	-.01
Education	.18	.17*	.16	.15	.11	.11
Personal Income	-.10	-.09	-.10	-.09	-.13	-.12
Household Income	-.04	-.05	-.06	-.07	-.03	-.04
Religious Attendance	.02	.04	.03	.05	.001	.002
Need for Cognition	-	-	.11	.09	.11	.09
Need for Closure	-	-	-.05	-.03	-.17	-.10
Care	-	-	-	-	.002	.001
Fairness	-	-	-	-	.26	.13
Liberty	-	-	-	-	-.62	-.29***
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	.01	.01
Authority	-	-	-	-	-.13	-.08
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	.16	.15
I think this statement is accurate:	$F(9, 141) = 3.25$***		$\Delta F(2, 139) = .13$		$\Delta F(6, 133) = 5.02$***	
		$R^2 = .17$		$\Delta R^2 = .00$		$\Delta R^2 = .15$
Ideology (Cons.)	.88	**.36*****	.88	**.36*****	.43	.17
Party ID (Repub.)	-.13	-.05	-.11	-.04	.02	.01
Age	-.02	-.20*	-.02	-.21*	-.02	-.15
Gender (Male = 0)	.23	.09	.21	.08	.54	.20*
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	-.31	-.09	-.32	-.10	-.27	-.08
Education	-.06	-.06	-.05	-.06	.01	.01
Personal Income	.12	.12	.12	.12	.14	.14
Household Income	-.09	-.12	-.09	-.11	-.11	-.14
Religious Attendance	.05	.10	.05	.10	.07	.13
Need for Cognition	-	-	-.03	-.03	.001	.001
Need for Closure	-	-	.04	.02	.15	.10
Care	-	-	-	-	-.29	-.18
Fairness	-	-	-	-	-.17	-.09
Liberty	-	-	-	-	.74	**.38*****
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	.04	.02
Authority	-	-	-	-	.11	.07
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	-.04	-.04
I think this person is prejudiced:	$F(9, 141) = 2.76$***		$\Delta F(2, 139) = 4.56$*		$\Delta F(6, 133) = 3.01$**	
		$R^2 = .15$		$\Delta R^2 = .05$		$\Delta R^2 = .10$

	B	β	B	β	B	β
Ideology (Cons.)	-.76	**-.31****	-.75	**-.31****	-.43	-.18
Party ID (Repub.)	.03	.01	.02	.01	-.05	-.02
Age	.01	.11	.01	.12	.01	.10
Gender (Male = 0)	.15	.06	.27	.10	.10	.04
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	-.06	-.02	-.08	-.02	-.07	-.02
Education	.11	.12	.05	.05	.00	.00
Personal Income	-.20	-.20	-.18	-.18	-.21	-.21*
Household Income	.03	.03	-.01	-.02	.003	.004
Religious Attendance	-.02	-.05	-.03	-.05	-.03	-.06
Need for Cognition	-	-	.28	.25**	.26	.24**
Need for Closure	-	-	.04	.03	-.07	-.04
Care	-	-	-	-	.01	.01
Fairness	-	-	-	-	.26	.14
Liberty	-	-	-	-	-.63	**-.32*****
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	.05	.04
Authority	-	-	-	-	-.07	-.05
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	.03	.03

I think this person is educated:	$F(9, 141) = 2.61**$		$\Delta F(2, 139) = 1.22$		$\Delta F(6, 133) = 3.80**$	
	$R^2 = .14$		$\Delta R^2 = .02$		$\Delta R^2 = .12$	
Ideology (Cons.)	.45	**.23***	.45	**.22***	.16	.08
Party ID (Repub.)	.26	.12	.20	.09	.25	.11
Age	-.01	-.12	-.01	-.12	-.01	-.09
Gender (Male = 0)	-.07	-.03	-.05	-.02	.16	.07
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	.43	.16	.46	.17*	.37	.14
Education	-.07	-.09	-.05	-.07	-.003	-.004
Personal Income	.05	.06	.03	.04	.07	.09
Household Income	-.003	-.01	.01	.01	.00	.00
Religious Attendance	-.03	-.08	-.02	.04	-.02	-.04
Need for Cognition	-	-	-.06	-.07	-.07	-.07
Need for Closure	-	-	-.18	-.14	-.11	-.08
Care	-	-	-	-	-.31	-.23*
Fairness	-	-	-	-	.11	.07
Liberty	-	-	-	-	.52	**.33*****
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	-.20	-.16
Authority	-	-	-	-	.33	.27*
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	.01	.01

Social distance:	$F(9, 141) = 6.18***$		$\Delta F(2, 139) = .19$		$\Delta F(6, 133) = 4.06***$	
	$R^2 = .28$		$\Delta R^2 = .00$		$\Delta R^2 = .12$	
Ideology (Cons.)	-.85	**-.43*****	-.85	**-.43*****	-.73	**-.38*****
Party ID (Repub.)	-.26	-.12	-.27	-.13	-.39	-.18
Age	.01	.11	.01	.11	.01	.07
Gender (Male = 0)	.20	.10	.23	.11	.11	.05
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	.13	.05	.13	.05	.09	.03
Education	.03	.04	.02	.03	.00	.00
Personal Income	-.06	-.07	-.06	-.07	-.13	-.16
Household Income	.01	.01	.003	.01	.02	.04
Religious Attendance	.02	.05	.02	.05	-.01	-.03
Need for Cognition	-	-	.03	.04	.09	.10
Need for Closure	-	-	-.03	-.02	-.14	-.11
Care	-	-	-	-	.07	.05
Fairness	-	-	-	-	-.05	-.04
Liberty	-	-	-	-	-.53	-.34***
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	.23	.20*
Authority	-	-	-	-	-.20	-.17
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	.16	.20

*** = $p < .001$; ** = $p \leq .01$; * = $p \leq .05$. Largest coefficient at each step for is presented in bold.

Table 17. Study 2 (N = 151): Predicting reactions, inferences, and social distance to the ambiguously unpatriotic statement from demographics, cognitive flexibility variables, and the moral foundations.

	Step 1: B	β	Step 2: B	β	Step 3: B	β
Offended:	$F(9, 141) = 1.55$		$\Delta F(2, 139) = 1.66$		$\Delta F(6, 133) = 3.31^{**}$	
		$R^2 = .09$		$\Delta R^2 = .02$		$\Delta R^2 = .12$
Ideology (Cons.)	.04	.02	.05	.02	-.11	-.05
Party ID (Repub.)	.41	.17	.48	.20	.08	.03
Age	.01	.06	.01	.06	.002	.03
Gender (Male = 0)	-.02	-.01	-.07	-.03	-.15	-.06
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	-.11	-.04	-.15	-.05	-.30	-.10
Education	-.10	-.11	-.11	-.13	-.06	-.07
Personal Income	.08	.09	.11	.12	.02	.02
Household Income	-.11	-.15	-.12	-.16	-.11	-.15
Religious Attendance	.07	.15	.06	.12	.01	.01
Need for Cognition	-	-	.06	.06	.20	.19*
Need for Closure	-	-	.24	.17	.19	.13
Care	-	-	-	-	.16	.11
Fairness	-	-	-	-	-.33	-.19
Liberty	-	-	-	-	-.11	-.06
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	.30	**.22***
Authority	-	-	-	-	.24	.18
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	.10	.10
I think this statement is patriotic:	$F(9, 141) = .77$		$\Delta F(2, 139) = 1.08$		$\Delta F(6, 133) = 4.93^{***}$	
		$R^2 = .05$		$\Delta R^2 = .01$		$\Delta R^2 = .17$
Ideology (Cons.)	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.004	.30	.13
Party ID (Repub.)	-.18	-.07	-.20	-.08	.15	.06
Age	.00	.002	.001	.01	.003	.03
Gender (Male = 0)	-.17	-.07	-.10	-.04	-.04	-.01
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	.22	.07	.22	.07	.27	.09
Education	.12	.13	.09	.10	.02	.03
Personal Income	-.02	-.02	-.01	-.01	.04	.05
Household Income	-.11	-.14	-.12	-.17	-.11	-.15
Religious Attendance	-.01	-.04	-.01	-.01	.02	.05
Need for Cognition	-	-	.13	.12	.001	.001
Need for Closure	-	-	-.02	-.02	-.07	-.05
Care	-	-	-	-	-.41	-.27*
Fairness	-	-	-	-	.75	**.43*****
Liberty	-	-	-	-	-.30	-.16
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	-.18	-.13
Authority	-	-	-	-	-.32	-.23
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	.08	.08
I think this statement is accurate:	$F(9, 141) = 3.55^{***}$		$\Delta F(2, 139) = .16$		$\Delta F(6, 133) = 3.63^{**}$	
		$R^2 = .19$		$R^2 = .00$		$R^2 = .11$
Ideology (Cons.)	-.62	-.23*	-.62	-.23*	-.10	-.04
Party ID (Repub.)	-.24	-.09	-.26	-.09	-.07	-.03
Age	-.03	**-.29*****	-.03	**-.29*****	-.03	-.29***
Gender (Male = 0)	-.07	-.03	-.06	-.02	-.22	-.08
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	-.23	-.07	-.22	-.06	-.14	-.04
Education	.06	.06	.07	.07	.02	.02
Personal Income	-.03	-.02	-.04	-.03	.05	.05
Household Income	-.04	-.05	-.04	-.04	-.04	-.05
Religious Attendance	.01	.01	.01	.02	.05	.08
Need for Cognition	-	-	-.04	-.03	-.20	-.17
Need for Closure	-	-	-.08	-.05	-.02	-.01
Care	-	-	-	-	.16	.09
Fairness	-	-	-	-	.60	**.30****
Liberty	-	-	-	-	-.07	-.03
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	-.17	-.11
Authority	-	-	-	-	-.28	-.17
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	-.13	-.12

I think this person is patriotic:	F(9, 141) = .67		ΔF(2, 139) = 2.57		ΔF(6, 133) = 3.31*	
	R^2 = .04		ΔR^2 = .04		ΔR^2 = .12	
Ideology (Cons.)	-.25	-.10	-.24	-.10	.03	.01
Party ID (Repub.)	-.17	-.07	-.26	-.10	.05	.02
Age	-.003	-.03	-.002	-.02	.00	-.004
Gender (Male = 0)	-.13	-.05	-.02	-.01	.03	.01
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	.14	.04	.18	.06	.22	.07
Education	.10	.11	.09	.10	.03	.04
Personal Income	.001	.001	-.02	-.02	.04	.04
Household Income	-.01	-.01	-.02	-.02	-.004	-.01
Religious Attendance	.001	.001	.01	.03	.04	.08
Need for Cognition	-	-	.08	.07	-.03	-.03
Need for Closure	-	-	-.25	.16	-.28	-.18*
Care	-	-	-	-	-.33	-.21
Fairness	-	-	-	-	.64	**.36***
Liberty	-	-	-	-	-.24	-.13
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	-.13	-.09
Authority	-	-	-	-	-.33	-.23
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	.08	.08
I think this person is educated:	F(9, 141) = 1.51		ΔF(2, 139) = 5.69**		ΔF(6, 133) = 1.40	
	R^2 = .09		ΔR^2 = .07		ΔR^2 = .05	
Ideology (Cons.)	-.35	-.15	-.35	-.15	-.22	-.10
Party ID (Repub.)	.07	.03	-.07	-.03	.12	.05
Age	-.02	**-.18***	-.02	-.18*	-.02	-.18*
Gender (Male = 0)	-.14	-.06	-.03	-.01	-.01	-.003
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	.31	.10	.39	.13	.34	.11
Education	.11	.12	.12	.14	.09	.10
Personal Income	.04	.04	.01	.01	.07	.08
Household Income	-.04	-.06	-.03	-.05	-.03	-.04
Religious Attendance	-.02	-.04	.01	.01	.02	.04
Need for Cognition	-	-	-.02	-.02	-.10	-.10
Need for Closure	-	-	-.42	**-.28**	-.42	**-.28**
Care	-	-	-	-	-.16	-.11
Fairness	-	-	-	-	.39	.23*
Liberty	-	-	-	-	.01	.01
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	-.28	-.21
Authority	-	-	-	-	-.07	-.05
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	.06	.06
Social distance:	F(9, 141) = 2.86**		ΔF(2, 139) = 2.33		ΔF(6, 133) = 3.34**	
	R^2 = .15		ΔR^2 = .03		ΔR^2 = .11	
Ideology (Cons.)	.12	.07	.12	.06	-.09	-.05
Party ID (Repub.)	.20	.10	.26	.13	.02	.01
Age	.01	.18*	.01	.17*	.01	.16*
Gender (Male = 0)	.09	.04	.01	.01	.03	.02
Race/Ethnicity (White = 0)	-.10	-.04	-.13	-.05	-.15	-.06
Education	-.13	-.18	-.12	-.17	-.09	-.12
Personal Income	.10	.13	.11	.14	.02	.02
Household Income	-.05	-.09	-.05	-.08	-.05	-.08
Religious Attendance	.08	**.21***	.07	**.18***	.04	.10
Need for Cognition	-	-	-.05	-.06	.08	.09
Need for Closure	-	-	.18	.15	.11	.09
Care	-	-	-	-	-.01	-.01
Fairness	-	-	-	-	-.35	-.25*
Liberty	-	-	-	-	-.17	-.12
Loyalty	-	-	-	-	.30	**.27***
Authority	-	-	-	-	.15	.13
Sanctity	-	-	-	-	.05	.07

*** = $p < .001$; ** = $p \leq .01$; * = $p \leq .05$. Largest coefficient at each step for is presented in bold.

Appendix B: Cognitive Flexibility Variables

Instructions: Please respond to the following statements by indicating the extent to which you agree or disagree with them. Fill in the blanks with the number from the rating scale that best represents your evaluation of the item.

Rating Scale:
1. Strongly disagree
2. Moderately disagree
3. Slightly disagree
4. Neither agree nor disagree
5. Slightly agree
6. Moderately agree
7. Strongly agree

Need for Cognition:

I prefer complex to simple problems.
I only think as hard as I have to.
I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally.
It's enough for me that something gets the job done; I don't care how or why it works.
I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.

Need for Closure:

When thinking about a problem, I consider as many different opinions on the issue as possible.
When considering most conflict situations, I can rarely see how both sides could be right.
I always see many different solutions to problems I face.
I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own view.
Even after I've made up my mind about something, I am always eager to consider a different opinion.

Appendix C: Moral Foundations Questionnaire

Part 1. When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking? Please rate each statement using this scale:

[0] = not at all relevant (This consideration has nothing to do with my judgments of right and wrong)
[1] = not very relevant
[2] = slightly relevant
[3] = somewhat relevant
[4] = very relevant
[5] = extremely relevant (This is one of the most important factors when I judge right and wrong)

Whether or not someone suffered emotionally (C/H)
Whether or not some people were treated differently than others (F/C)
Whether or not someone's action showed love for his or her country (L/B)
Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority (A/S)
Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency (S/D)
Whether or not private property was respected. (L/O)
Whether or not someone was good at math (FMC)
Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable (C/H)
Whether or not someone acted unfairly (F/C)
Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group (L/B)
Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society (A/S)
Whether or not someone did something disgusting (S/D)
Whether or not everyone was free to do as they wanted. (L/O)
Whether or not someone was cruel (C/H)
Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights (F/C)
Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty (L/B)
Whether or not an action caused chaos or disorder (A/S)
Whether or not someone acted in a way that God would approve of (S/D)

Part 2. Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement using the following scale:

[1] = Strongly disagree
[2] = Moderately disagree
[3] = Slightly disagree
[4] = Slightly agree
[5] = Moderately agree
[6] = Strongly agree

Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue. (C/H)
When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring that everyone is treated fairly. (F/C)
I am proud of my country's history. (L/B)
Respect for authority is something all children need to learn. (A/S)
People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed. (S/D)
People who are successful in business have a right to enjoy their wealth as they see fit. (L/O)
It is better to do good than to do bad. (FMC)
One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless animal. (C/H)
Justice is the most important requirement for a society. (F/C)
Society works best when it lets individuals take responsibility for their own lives without telling them what to do. (L/O)
People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something wrong. (L/B)
Men and women each have different roles to play in society. (A/S)
I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural. (S/D)
I think everyone should be free to do as they choose, so long as they don't infringe upon   the equal freedom of others. (L/O)
It can never be right to kill a human being. (C/H)
I think it's morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money while poor children inherit nothing. (F/C)
People should be free to decide what group norms or traditions they themselves want tofollow. (L/O)
It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself. (L/B)
If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer's orders, I would obey anyway because that is my duty. (A/S)
Chastity is an important and valuable virtue. (S/D)
The government interferes far too much in our everyday lives. (L/O)
The government should do more to advance the common good, even if that means limiting the freedom and choices of individuals. (L/O)
Property owners should be allowed to develop their land or build their homes in any way they choose, as long as they don't endanger their neighbors. (L/O)

Item Key: C/H = Care/harm; F/C = Fairness/cheating; L/O = Liberty/oppression; L/B = Loyalty/betrayal; A/S = Authority/subversion; S/D = Sanctity/degradation.

Appendix D: Social and Political Attitudes Questionnaire

Instructions: Please use the scale below to indicate how well the following statements describe
your attitudes and beliefs. There are no right or wrong answers, just put the number that corresponds to your choice in the blank before the item.

Rating Scale:
1. Not at all
2. A little
3. A moderate amount
4. A lot
5. Completely

Support for Abortion:
I think abortion is wrong no matter what the circumstances (R).
I support a woman's right to choose.

Support for Stem-Cell Research:
I believe stem cell research is immoral (R).
I am concerned about government restrictions on stem cell research.
I believe the possible benefits of stem cell research outweigh the negative consequences of destroying embryos.

Support for Gay Rights:
I think same-sex couples should be prevented from adopting children (R).
I believe that gays and lesbians should be allowed to serve openly in the military.
I believe same-sex couples should be allowed to marry.

Support for Marijuana Legalization:
I believe the possible benefits of medical marijuana outweigh its negative consequences.
I favor the legalization of marijuana.
I oppose the legalization of marijuana (R).

Support for Affirmative Action:
I think the amount of discrimination in society is exaggerated (R).
I think the use of racial/ethnic quotas in hiring should be forbidden (R).
I believe whites are hurt by affirmative action (R).
I believe companies should be required to hire women.
I believe companies should be required to hire minorities.

Support for Capital Punishment:
I support the use of capital punishment.
I think the use of capital punishment is immoral (R).

Support for Increased Gun Restrictions:
I would like the government to increase restrictions on gun ownership.
I would oppose stricter gun regulations (R).

Support for Government Healthcare:
I am opposed to increased government regulation of the healthcare system (R).
I believe the government should provide healthcare for all citizens.
I support the individual mandate requiring people to purchase health insurance.

Concern about Illegal Immigration:
I am concerned about illegal immigration.
I think illegal immigrants should be arrested and deported.

Tea Party Support:
I support the Tea Party movement.
I think the Tea Party movement is dangerous (R).

Occupy Wall St. Support:
I support the Occupy Wall St. movement.
I think the Occupy Wall St. is dangerous (R).

Fiscal Conservatism:
I think social security should be privatized.
I would like the government to increase the regulations of banks and financial institutions (R).
I believe the government has a responsibility to help the poor (R).
I would oppose government attempts to reduce differences in income.
I would like the government to raise taxes on the wealthy (R).

Opposition to Physician-Assisted Suicide:
I oppose physician-assisted suicide.

Flag Burning is Unconstitutional:
I believe it should be unconstitutional to burn an American flag.

Support for Warrantless Wiretapping:
I think the benefits of warrantless wiretapping outweigh its negative consequences.

Free Speech is the Most Important Democratic Right:
I believe that freedom of speech is the most important democratic right.

Support for Increased Military Spending:
I think military spending should be increased.

Enhanced Interrogation/Torture is Immoral:
I believe the use of enhanced interrogation tactics/torture is immoral.

Faith in the Government:
I believe the government can solve the country's economic problems.

Economic Concern:
I am worried the government will default on the national debt.
I am concerned about the country's economic future.

Environmental Concern:
I am concerned about the effects of global warming.
I am opposed to off-shore oil drilling.
I believe environmental regulations are limiting economic growth.
I think the effect that humans have on climate change is overstated.

Strict Constructionism:
I think the Supreme Court should base its rulings on its understanding of what the U.S. Constitution meant as it was originally written.
I believe the Supreme Court should base its rulings on its understanding of what the U.S. Constitution means in current times (R).

Trust in Religion:
I think people should place more trust in religion.
I think people place too much trust in science (R).

(R) = reverse coded.

Appendix E: Demographics

Instructions: We would now like to get some information about you and your
background.

What is your ethnic background?

☐ White
☐ Black/African American
☐ Hispanic/Latino
☐ Native American
☐ Middle Eastern/North African
☐ South Asian (e.g., Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Afghan, Sri Lankan)
☐ East Asian (e.g., Chinese, Korean, Japanese)
☐ Southeast Asian (e.g., Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian; Indonesian, Filipino)
☐ Pacific Islander (e.g., Micronesian, Melanesian, Polynesian)
☐ Other Asian
☐ Multiracial
☐ Other _____

Gender:

☐ Male
☐ Female

What is your age? _____

How would you describe your political orientation?

    1 = Extremely liberal
    2 = Liberal
    3 = Slightly liberal
    4 = Middle of the road
    5 = Slightly conservative
    6 = Conservative
    7 = Extremely conservative
    8 = Don't know

**In politics people also talk of "left" and "right". Where would you place
yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?**

   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
  Left   Right

How do you personally feel about Liberals?

   1 = Dislike extremely
   2 = Dislike very much
   3 = Dislike moderately
   4 = Dislike slightly
   5 = Neither like nor dislike
   6 = Like slightly
   7 = Like moderately
   8 = Like very much
   9 = Like extremely

How do you personally feel about Conservatives?

   1 = Dislike extremely
   2 = Dislike very much
   3 = Dislike moderately
   4 = Dislike slightly
   5 = Neither like nor dislike
   6 = Like slightly
   7 = Like moderately
   8 = Like very much
   9 = Like extremely

When it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or something else?

☐ Democrat
☐ Republican
☐ Independent
☐ Something Else (_____)

If you had to choose, do you usually think of yourself as closer to the Democratic or Republican parties?

   1 = Strong Democrat
   2 = Democrat
   3 = Weak Democrat
   4 = Independent Democrat
   5 = Independent Republican
   6 = Weak Republican
   7 = Republican
   8 = Strong Republican
   9 = Don't know

What is the highest level of education you have attained?

☐ Less than high school	☐ 4-Year college degree (BA, BS)
☐ High school/GED	
☐ Some college	☐ Master's Degree (MA, MS)
☐ 2-Year college degree (Associates)	☐ Doctoral Degree
	☐ Professional Degree (MD, JD)

What is your average yearly income? (i.e., Your individual income, NOT combined household income).

☐ Under $34,500.00	☐ $75,000.00 to $99,999.00
☐ $10,000.00 to $24,999.00	☐ $100,000.00 to $124,999.00
☐ $25,000.00 to $49,999.00	☐ $125,000.00 to $149,999.00
☐ $50,000.00 to $74,999.00	☐ $150,000.00 or above

What is your average yearly household income? (i.e., the total annual income of all members of your household, including your own and any spouse, significant other, or care-giver).

☐ Under $34,500.00	☐ $75,000.00 to $99,999.00
☐ $10,000.00 to $24,999.00	☐ $100,000.00 to $124,999.00
☐ $25,000.00 to $49,999.00	☐ $125,000.00 to $149,999.00
☐ $50,000.00 to $74,999.00	☐ $150,000.00 or above

Appendix F: Study 2 – Ambiguous Comments

Instructions: Consider a person who makes the following statement in a television interview:

Ambiguously Prejudiced Statement:

"In a free society there is no equality, there are makers and there are takers. You cannot guarantee that any two people will end up the same. Fairness, you can't legislate it, you can't make it happen. You can try, you can redistribute wealth and call it welfare and so forth, but people are different. Some people are self-starters, and some people are lazy, cheats with their hands out, takers engaged in class warfare against the makers."

Ambiguously Unpatriotic Statement:

"America is not a shining city on a hill. The only thing we lead the world in is defense spending, where we spend more than the next twenty-six countries combined, twenty-five of who are our allies. We have militarized our economy to profit from waging wars on poor people, and to justify our actions we make appeals to national security. We are not seen as liberators bringing democracy and freedom, but as conquerors on a crusade."

Appendix G: Ambiguous Comment Reaction Assessment

1 = Not at all
2 = Maybe
3 = Not Very
4 = Somewhat
5 = Extremely

The text of the ambiguous comment (prejudiced; unpatriotic) from the television was presented again. Subjects were then asked:

Reaction Assessment:

I think this statement is:
Disrespectful.
Offensive.
Harmful.

Prejudiced (Patriotic).*
Accurate.

Inference Assessment:

Based on this statement, I think this person is:
Prejudiced (Patriotic).*
Educated.

* = The prejudiced items and the patriotic items were only included in the reaction assessment for the ambiguously prejudiced and ambiguously unpatriotic comment respectively.

Appendix H: Social Distance Measure

1 = Not at all
2 = Maybe
3 = Not Very
4 = Somewhat
5 = Extremely

The text of the ambiguous comment (prejudiced; unpatriotic) from the television was presented again. Subjects were then asked:

If someone said this to me in conversation, I would:

End the conversation immediately.
Agree and continue the conversation.
Prefer such a person live outside my neighborhood.

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